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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, FILTER FAILURE,
AND INFORMATION CAPTURE
WENDY E. WAGNER†
ABSTRACT
There are no provisions in administrative law for regulating the
flow of information entering or leaving the system, or for ensuring
that regulatory participants can keep up with a rising tide of issues,
details, and technicalities. Indeed, a number of doctrinal refinements,
originally intended to ensure that executive branch decisions are made
in the sunlight, inadvertently create incentives for participants to
overwhelm the administrative system with complex information,
causing many of the decisionmaking processes to remain, for all
practical purposes, in the dark. As these agency decisions become
increasingly obscure to all but the most well-informed insiders,
administrative accountability is undermined as entire sectors of
affected parties find they can no longer afford to participate in this
expensive system. Pluralistic oversight, productive judicial review, and
opportunities for intelligent agency decisionmaking are all put under
significant strain in a system that refuses to manage—and indeed
tends to encourage—excessive information. This Article first discusses
how parties can capture the regulatory process using information that
allows them to control or at least dominate regulatory outcomes (the
information capture phenomenon). It then traces the problem back to
a series of failures by Congress and the courts to require some
filtering of the information flowing through the system (filter failure).
Rather than filtering information, the incentives tilt in the opposite
direction and encourage participants to err on the side of providing
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too much rather than too little information. Evidence is then offered
to show how this uncontrolled and excessive information is taking a
toll on the basic objectives of administrative governance. The Article
closes with a series of unconventional but relatively straightforward
reforms that offer some hope of bringing information capture under
control.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, legal visionaries like Joseph Sax, Lynton
Caldwell, and Ralph Nader pressed for a system of rules that would
1
give the public greater access to administrative decisions. Their battle
against smoke-filled rooms populated only by well-heeled insiders
bore fruit, and Congress adopted important reforms aimed at letting
the sunshine in.
2
An explosion of laws followed, requiring open records, rigorous
3
4
processes for advisory groups, access to congressional deliberations,
and demands that agencies go the extra mile to include all interested
5
participants and to take their views into consideration. During this

1. See, e.g., JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN
ACTION (1972); Lynton Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act: Retrospect and
Prospect, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. 50,030 (1976); Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act
and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970).
2. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
3. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006).
4. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
5. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70 (2006).

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

1324

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1321

same time, the courts also stepped up their oversight of the agencies.
Most notably, they expanded standing rules to enable public interest
representatives to challenge agencies in court when agency rules
6
diverge significantly from promises made by Congress.
7
A few commentators have expressed misgivings about the trend,
but the overwhelming majority views these reforms as important
steps in the right direction. This is not surprising given that equal
access, transparency, and judicial review are considered cornerstones
8
of accountable government. Open government initiatives not only
enhance oversight of agencies by affected groups, but also facilitate
9
checks and balances within government itself.
But every successful reform movement has its unintended
consequences. What few administrative architects anticipated from
10
the new commitment to “sunlight” was that a dense cloud of
detailed, technical, and voluminous information would move in to
obscure the benefits of transparency. And because rulemaking
processes are by their very nature blind to the risks of excessive
6. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1723, 1748 (1975) (documenting and critiquing the liberalization of standing rules
and the resulting greater judicial oversight of agency rulemakings through what he calls the
“interest representation model”).
7. Professor Stewart in particular expressed great skepticism that broad participation
rights would transfer naturally to the vigorous representation of all interests affected by the
regulatory proceedings. Id. at 1763; see also id. at 1803 (“Full implementation of the formal
participation and standing rights that are central to the interest representation model of
administrative law would enormously increase the expense of the administrative process and
might, in practice, increase the barriers to participation by interests that are not well-organized
or affluent.”).
8. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 22–29 (6th ed. 2006) (describing administrative law’s
chronological development since 1962, which highlights the importance of these principles in the
contemporary evolution of administrative law).
9. Cf. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.9, at 668 (5th ed.
2010) (“It is simply impossible for the President even to be aware of all of the policy decisions
agencies make. His staff assigned to this task is too small to engage in detailed scrutiny of all
major policy decisions.”).
10. Justice Brandeis’ phrase, “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,” see Louis D.
Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, reprinted in LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92, 92 (1914), has been
repeated almost like a mantra in some administrative law and regulatory circles. See, e.g., Steven
Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399,
399 (2009) (quoting Brandeis and arguing that the notion of transparency is critical to the
integrity of government); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory
System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (2007) (“Commentators describing the origins of the
disclosure requirements of the securities acts frequently quote Louis Brandeis, that ‘[s]unlight
is . . . the best of disinfectants.’”).
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information, committed as they are to the flow of information and
expansive participation, a new phenomenon—called “information
capture”—is taking hold.
In the regulatory context, information capture refers to the
excessive use of information and related information costs as a means
of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in informal
11
rulemakings. A continuous barrage of letters, telephone calls,
meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal comments, post-rule
comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices of appeal from
knowledgeable interest groups over the life cycle of a rulemaking can
12
have a “machine-gun” effect on overstretched agency staff. The law
does not permit the agency to shield itself from this flood of
information and focus on developing its own expert conception of the
project. Instead, the agency is required by law to “consider” all of the
13
input received.
To make matters worse, as the issues grow more numerous and
technical, less well-financed interest groups find it hard to continue
participating in the process. They often lack the time, the resources,
or the expertise to continue reviewing all of the information that
becomes part of the rulemaking record. Yet as their engagement
wanes, so does the pluralistic engine considered so fundamental to
the administrative process. They can no longer provide a means of
culling out extraneous information and other chaff from the
rulemaking through their vigorous engagement. Incentives to load as
much information as possible into the system, combined with a
reduction in the number and diversity of affected parties participating
14
in the rulemaking process, set the stage for information capture.
The root cause of information capture is not administrative law’s
commitment to open government and transparency, but rather its
failure to require participants to self-process the information they
15
load into the system, termed “filter failure” here. In most social and
legal settings, participants have meaningful incentives to process and
hone the information they communicate. Most notably, they want to
be sure that the desired message is communicated in an efficient and
11. It is possible that the information capture phenomenon also afflicts formal rulemakings
in some ways, but these issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
12. JAMES LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 51
(1960).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
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effective way. Administrative law, by contrast, imposes almost no
filtering requirements or incentives on any of the participants who
engage in the rulemaking and instead produces strong incentives for
precisely the opposite behavior at key points in the process.
Unlike the older conceptions of capture that depend
fundamentally on the vulnerability of the hearts, minds, and stamina
of agency staff to special interests, information capture flourishes
16
even when agency officials are determined to resist this pressure.
Even more insidious, under the right circumstances capture will take
place even if the dominant participants are not trying to manipulate
the system. It is as if the logic of the administrative process creates a
gravitational field that attracts more and more information. Even if
the consequences are unintended, the parties with the resources to
feed the information monster will benefit, to the detriment of actors
with fewer resources and the administrative system as a whole.
Moreover, once excessive information begins to gum up the works,
simple fixes are no longer possible. Radical institutional overhaul
17
becomes the only viable remedy.
Information capture thrives in regulatory arenas in which
technical issues dominate the rulemaking. In these settings, diffuse
beneficiaries, typically represented by public interest groups, face
substantial impediments to participating in costly rulemakings when
the rules are detailed, complex, technical, and involve issues that are
difficult to translate into salient risks for donors, the public, and the
media. Without pressure from a diverse group of affected interests
and absent a central arbiter with incentives to find balance in spite of
incomplete representation, regulatory outcomes risk becoming
skewed in favor of the dominant interest group.
A number of important social policies may be adversely affected
by administrative law’s naïve presupposition that more information is
18
better. Although this affinity for unbounded information may have
16. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. For example, there have been rumblings of information capture and excessive
information in the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) telecommunications
regulations, see Pete Tridish & Danielle Redden, Radio Controlled: A Media Activist’s Guide to
the FCC!, PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT, Feb. 12, 2006, http://prometheusradio.org/low_
power_radio/organizational_guides/radio_controlled.html (trying to break open the “obscure”
FCC rulemakings, which appear to have been mired in information capture, for radio activists);
in the disclosure required by securities regulation, see, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the
Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
417, 449 (2003) (arguing that security disclosure requirements are not sensitive to the need to
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originated in the middle of the last century when information was
19
more scarce, in the electronic age, this undiscriminating approach to
information is clearly outdated. Indeed, other institutions recognize
that effective processing of information is a prerequisite to effective
20
decisionmaking. This Article begins by examining pollution and
toxics regulations by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
but it is part of a larger project that examines a broad range of issue
areas that may be adversely affected by the administrative state’s
obliviousness to the effects of excessive information in a variety of
regulatory settings.
The argument that administrative law’s utter inability to
recognize and address information excess—its filter failure—
significantly undermines its ability to ensure administrative
accountability in certain areas of regulation unfolds in four Parts. The
first Part provides an orientation to the basic concepts of information
capture and filter failure and sets them against the larger literature of
law, political science, and information theory. The second Part
discusses how current administrative laws and processes exacerbate,
rather than counteract, excessive information costs and information
capture. The third Part highlights some of the adverse consequences
that flow from a legal system that remains indifferent to information
excess.
Despite the apparent entrenchment of information capture
within existing administrative process, this Article closes on an
optimistic note by identifying a number of relatively straightforward
reforms in the fourth Part that are likely to go some distance toward
redressing the adverse consequences of information capture in the
administrative state. One antidote presented in this final Part is to
reform the standard for judicial review in a way that recalibrates
judicial deference to the level of vigorous and balanced engagement
by interest groups, rather than to the reasonableness of the agency’s
result. A variety of panels—like citizen advisory and science advisory
filter or limit information and that this leads to a series of regulatory-related problems); and in
utilities regulation, see Frank N. Laird, Learning Contested Lessons: Participation Equity and
Electric Utility Regulation, 25 REV. POL’Y RES. 429, 434 (2008) (discussing how public utilities
commission public hearings are still stacked in favor of utilities in ways that resonate with the
information capture theory).
19. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 242 (4th ed. 1997) (criticizing
organizations’ information systems as generally not being designed “to conserve the critical
scarce resource—the attention of managers”).
20. See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
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panels—could also be deployed to counteract information capture’s
tendency to focus an agency too narrowly on the concerns of one set
of interests. Administrative process should also be revamped to
provide agencies with greater freedom to develop rules free from
interest group influence, such as providing an early, litigation-free
opportunity for regulatory innovation by policy wonks who are
insulated from stakeholder pressure. Finally, the dominant
stakeholders can be pitted against one another in a competitive sense
to cut through the information excess and identify regulatory
solutions that otherwise might lie buried beneath piles of information.
I. THE BASICS OF INFORMATION CAPTURE AND FILTER FAILURE
In administrative law, the absence of limits on the quality,
quantity, or content of information submitted to the agency makes
the temptation to inundate the agency with reams of technical details
and multiple arguments all but irresistible. Indeed, a variety of
doctrinal and statutory incentives unwittingly encourage regulatory
participants to load the administrative system with more and more
information in ways that ultimately undermine pluralistic oversight by
creating unfair advantages for those advocates who have the
resources to engage in these excessive processes. At the root of the
problem is filter failure—a refusal of administrative law to make an
effort to optimize the amount or nature of information entering or
leaving the system. The needed filters or screens would not blot out
communications, but rather would make them more efficient and
streamlined by requiring regulatory participants, including the
agency, to rigorously process communications before inflicting them
on other regulatory participants. The absence of filters to encourage
more efficient communications, when combined with strong
incentives for parties to overload the system, puts the regulatory
system at risk of information capture, which allows some parties to
control or at least dominate regulatory outcomes using information.
This Part sets out the mechanics of this filter failure and resulting
information capture. After providing a more complete explanation of
these phenomena, the Part discusses how information capture fits into
the theoretical literature more generally. The Part closes by exploring
some features of EPA rulemakings that cause them to be particularly
vulnerable to information capture.
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A. The Basics of Information Capture
Information capture involves either the inadvertent or the
strategic use of costly communications—well beyond what is
necessary to convey the message—to gain control over regulatory
outcomes. Information capture can be undertaken by stakeholders or
even the agency itself. Because the prize is control over the regulatory
outcome, information capture can be waged by different parties (that
is, a stakeholder and the agency) simultaneously, often using multiple
strategies. To be a serious player in this game, a participant must
enjoy convenient access to relevant information, a significant reserve
of resources (mostly technical and legal), and high stakes and
motivation. To win, a player need not convince his opponents of the
merits of his case; he need only wear them down enough to cause
them to throw in their towels and give in.
The root cause of information capture is filter failure, a basic
failure of the administrative process to force participants to ensure
that the information they provide meets the needs of the audience
21
and situation. Ideally, participants will provide the right level of
information—both in content and volume—for their intended
audience. In many social settings, in fact, the problem of information
22
excess is not a serious one. Most speakers and writers voluntarily
bear the costs of processing and filtering information before they
23
communicate it to ensure it will reach their intended audience. In an
academic setting, simple rewards like book sales, article citations, and

21. Clay Shirky coined the term “filter failure” in his speech at the Web 2.0 Expo NY, “It’s
Not Information Overload. It’s Filter Failure” in September of 2008, which is available at
http://web2expo.blip.tv/file/1277460/. The need for filters or limits on information that are
mindful of the capabilities and limitations of the audience is relatively well accepted, see, e.g.,
PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS 22, 26 (1989)
(offering as a cooperative principle that conversation be based on the needs and purposes of the
situation), though the concept may not be totally worked out, even in linguistics, see, e.g., Henry
E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1133
(2003) (observing how linguistics have focused traditionally on the costs of information from the
perspective of the speaker, rather than the audience). Shirky’s most valuable contribution is to
focus attention on these filters and away from more abstract worries about information
overload, which often do not consider the unique features of the receiving institutional or social
setting.
22. In Professor Smith’s model of information, “the aim is to maximize the net benefits of
communication, that is the excess of the benefits of communication over the costs of production
and process. ‘Processing costs’ . . . include the costs incurred by a cognitive agent in receiving
information from a message.” Smith, supra note 21, at 1108.
23. See id. at 1136 (noting how most information theory assumes that the communications
are cooperative in nature).
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instructor evaluations encourage speakers to internalize the costs of
processing information, even when their audience is large and
anonymous.
Many areas of law are sensitive to the problem of information
excess and even consciously require actors to filter information
before the legal system will recognize it. Professor Henry Smith writes
with great admiration about property rules that tend to encourage the
approximate optimization of information through simple rules that
24
other owners can respect. Contract rules may be even more
exemplary in calibrating the level of detail and volume that is
25
reasonable for a given contract to the capabilities of the parties.
Many court battles, at least at the appellate level, involve explicit
limits on the pages, margins, and even font size of briefs; the time
allocated for oral argument; and the number of pages of
26
attachments. And trials before juries—however indirectly—require
counsel to distill and abbreviate the key message for a group of lay
persons with average attention spans and educational levels. Trial
courts also impose a number of important filters on evidence to
ensure that counsel, rather than the judicial system, bear the cost of
27
processing this information prior to introducing the evidence at trial.
But administrative law is different. A commitment to open
government and full participation is understood to preclude limits or
filters on information, and the administrative system operates on the
working assumption that all information is welcome and will be fairly

24. See id. at 1114, 1155–56 (arguing that property law does a relatively good job of
minimizing third-party processing costs).
25. See id. at 1177–90 (discussing the ways that contract law develops to take into account
information costs).
26. Virtually every article providing tips for appellate brief writing emphasizes the need for
being as succinct as possible and for sharpening arguments to make them accessible to the busy
judicial panel. See, e.g., Shari M. Oberg & Daniel C. Brubaker, Supreme Review, 87 MICH. B.J.
30, 33 (2008) (“Given the workload of the Supreme Court, effective applications are as concise
as possible.”); Michael J. Traft, Special Considerations in Appellate Briefs, in 1 APPELLATE
PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS ch. 14, § 14.1 (2008).
27. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”); see also Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73
IOWA L. REV. 227, 229 (1988) (noting the argument in recent historical scholarship that “the
modern rules of evidence were instituted primarily for the control of lawyers rather than for the
control of juries”).
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28

considered. Indeed, the historic myth of agencies as experts may
have locked the courts into a kind of unrealistic expectation with
regard to the unlimited capacity of agencies to resolve any question
29
put to them. In their high hopes for the administrative state, the
courts and even Congress and the president seem to have designed
the system with “the fallacy of thinking that ‘more information is
30
better.’”
Yet without filters, parties have little reason to economize on the
31
information they submit to agencies. Participants are not held to any
limits on the information they file, nor must they assume any of the
32
costs the agency incurs in processing their voluminous filings.
Indeed, a variety of court rulings actually encourage regulatory
participants to err on the side of providing far too much information,
33
rather than too little. But as information costs rise, so do the costs of
28. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 21–22 (2006) (discussing the commitment to and gradual
expansion of the public’s right to access information underlying agency decisions); see also infra
Part II.A.
29. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence
of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 417 (2007) (describing how in the
early to mid-1900s, agency experts were viewed as neutral specialists able to successfully
implement Congress’s more general policy solutions and identify the “objectively correct
solution[s] to the country’s problems”).
30. SIMON, supra note 19, at 242–43 (emphasis added).
31. Participants might be naturally inclined to filter communications occurring in individual
meetings, hearings, or phone calls with an agency staff member. See, e.g., Andrea Bear Field &
Kathy E.B. Robb, EPA Rulemakings: Views from Inside and Outside, 5 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T, Summer 1990, at 5, 5 (advocating this type of control over short-term communications).
Over the long term and across the life cycle of a rule’s development, however, the incentives
tend in just the opposite direction.
32. The Freedom of Information Act is an exception to this general rule; it allows the
agency to ask the requester to reimburse it for reasonable expenses incurred in responding to
the information request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2006) (authorizing federal agencies to set
fees for search and duplication that are “limited to reasonable standard charges for document
search and duplication” and providing for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and
duplication).
33. For a discussion of these legal incentives, see infra Part II.A–B. In theory, the point at
which information costs are higher than necessary depends on the intended audience. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 21, at 1157 (taking care to avoid the goal of “optimizing” information and
instead attempting to highlight how the law sometimes is attentive to trading off the costs of
communication shouldered by the communicator and those imposed on the audience).
Determining this precise point will be both difficult and quite contestable. Conveniently,
however, because the focus of this Article is on filter failure and the nearly complete absence of
any restrictions on the flow of information through the system, the argument is simply that some
types of filters or restrictions are required. Other commentators may wish to debate how to
determine the right level of or approach to filtering in different administrative settings.
Although I dodge this bullet, I strongly suspect that ultimately the resolution will come from
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participation, and this can affect the ability of some groups to
continue to participate in the process and ultimately may cause thinly
financed groups to exit for lack of resources.
In a participatory system already struggling against the odds to
generate balanced engagement from a broad range of affected
parties, filter failure is likely to be the last straw. Pluralistic processes
integral to administrative governance threaten to break down and
cease to function when an entire, critical sector of affected interests
drops out due to the escalating costs of participation. Instead of
presiding over vigorous conflicts between interest groups that draw
out the most important issues and test the reliability of key facts, the
agency may stand alone, bracing itself against a continuous barrage of
information from an unopposed, highly engaged interest group. The
agency will do its best to stay abreast of the information, but without
pluralistic engagement by the opposition, which helps filter the issues,
and without the support of procedural filters that impose some
discipline on the filings of dominant participants, the agency may find
itself fighting a losing battle. A system that puts the decisionmaker at
the mercy of an unlimited flood of information from an unopposed
group, which in turn can reinforce its filings by a credible threat of
litigation, is captured by information. Figure 1 illustrates the
dynamics of filter failure and information capture.

pragmatic experimentation with various types of information filters and incentives, until a
relatively acceptable balance has been struck.
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Figure 1. A Flowchart of Filter Failure and Information Capture

From the standpoint of a resourceful party, the ability to gain
control of the rulemaking process through the use of excessive
34
information may even be turned into a strategic advantage. Using
technical terms and frames of reference that require a high level of
background information and technical expertise, and relying heavily
35
on “particularized knowledge and specialized conventions,” these
fully engaged stakeholders can deliberately hijack the proceedings.
Aggressively gaming the system to raise the costs of participation ever
higher will, in many cases, ensure the exclusion of public interest
groups that lack the resources to continue to participate in the
process. Doing so all but assures that the aggressor will enjoy an
unrestricted playing field and the ability to control the public input
through all phases of the rulemaking life cycle.
Even when agency staff can withstand the technical minutia
coming at them at high speed and under tight time constraints, they
face an administrative record that is badly lopsided, and threats of

34. For a more detailed description, see infra Part III.B.2.
35. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1167 (describing all of these features as negative
aspects of information).
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lawsuits against the substance of their regulation that come
36
predominantly from only one sector (industry). This skewed
pressure may not cause them to cave in to each and every unopposed
comment and technical addendum, but it likely affects at least some
37
of the choices incorporated into the final rule. And when time is
short, information capture becomes even more severe. Agency staff,
even those who began their careers as true believers in their agency’s
mission, may find themselves relieved to have regulations written by
industry because this ensures a quicker path toward a final, binding
38
rule.
B. Information Capture’s Fit with Existing Theories
Collective action theory already highlights the grim plight of
public interest groups saddled with multiple handicaps in organizing
39
and participating. The resultant underrepresentation of the diffuse
public—at least relative to its actual stake in the issue—is a constant
40
worry for political processes.
Information capture, however, adds a new worry to the collective
action story: it reveals that the costs of organizing are not the only
41
impediment that public interest representatives need to overcome.

36. See infra notes 266–69 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Air Toxics in the
Boardroom: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Hazardous Air Pollutants Rules 19–22 (Nov. 13,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
38. See infra Part III.A.2.
39. See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 29–52 (2008) (providing a thorough
overview of public choice concerns about collective action barriers).
40. See, e.g., RONALD J. HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA 329–30 (3d
ed. 1997) (discussing the impediments faced by representatives of the diffuse public in relation
to more concentrated interests, as well as their struggles to keep up in recent times); NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 69–72 (1994) (describing collective action problems with particular reference to
how they impede smooth functioning of the political process); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L.
Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285–90 (2006)
(same); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
99 (1983) (“[W]idely dispersed costs or benefits are less effectively represented in policymaking
than concentrated costs or benefits. Thus we would expect error-correction to favor interests
championed by enforcers and regulated firms and to undervalue interests of unorganized
beneficiaries of government programs.” (footnote omitted)).
41. Much of the commentary on public engagement in administrative rulemaking focuses
primarily on the costs to nonprofits of organizing, and neglects the equally important costs
associated with accessing and processing the relevant information, which can vary significantly
between rules. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and
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Instead, inflated information costs, beyond what is justified or
necessary, further drive up the cost of participation and
simultaneously lower the payoff, at least to public interest groups that
will find it increasingly difficult to translate the issues into tangible
42
public benefits. In economic terms, as the costs go up and the payoff
goes down, these thinly financed and salience-dependent groups that
43
represent the public will drop out of the process. Indeed, they may
even drop out midway through the rulemaking after realizing that
they can no longer justify their involvement to donors and other
funders.
These rising information costs can take a variety of forms in the
44
regulatory system. Communications bulging with undigested facts
are the most common type of information excess and include
redundancies and peripheral issues that must be culled out;
discussions pitched at too specialized a level or demanding an
unreasonable level of background information from the reader; and
discussions delving into very intricate details, many of which are of
trivial significance. All of these information excesses serve to inflate
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 966 (2006) (surmising that the lack of public participation in erulemaking is due in large part to the “opportunity costs,” including more recreational
opportunities and the concern that one comment will not make a difference in any event; but
missing the arguably more important impediment posed by highly voluminous and technical
information that must be processed before a party can determine whether it has a stake in the
issue or can identify meaningful ways to engage); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1760–90 (focusing on
stakes-related features that tend to disadvantage public interest groups, but neglecting to
consider the added barriers arising from the high costs of processing relevant information that
further disadvantage these groups).
42. See, e.g., Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change:
The Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 421, 442 (1999) (discussing the
importance of a “credible risk” to environmental and public health campaigns; without this risk,
the effort is severely handicapped). Information externalities, then, may be particularly costly
for public interest representatives because it not only increases the costs of their participation
but also decreases their ability to sell their involvement to donors, thus further shrinking the
payoff.
43. Professor Neil Komesar observes that an individual’s participation is based upon the
relative costs and benefits of that participation, a calculation that varies not only by issue but by
institution. When the costs of information are lowered and information becomes more
accessible, participation increases. Similarly, when the benefits to participation rise—for
example, through damage awards in tort claims—claimants’ participation increases. See
KOMESAR, supra note 40, at 8. It is the combination of lower costs and higher benefits that
explains the comparative advantages of the tort system relative to the regulatory system in
providing improved access to needed information regarding health and environmental
protection.
44. See Smith, supra note 21, at 1153–55 (roughly defining information externalities as
those costs that “are most likely not to be internalized by a sender of a message,” which
Professor Smith then illustrates graphically).
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the participants’ costs in processing the information. Secrecy and
deception also impose unjustified information costs on other
participants if they are not able to access the information cheaply or
46
at all. Even thinly supported litigation threats and marginally
meritorious lawsuits can increase information-related costs for
47
recipients (that is, defendants) to unreasonable levels. Familiar
concepts like nuisance litigation and extortive settlements refer at
base to the concept that the audience—or defendant—incurs
48
excessive information costs as a result of plaintiffs’ abuse of process.
The results of this information capture resemble the outcomes
expected from more traditional forms of capture, but the mechanisms
through which information capture occurs are actually quite different
from and at odds with these early public choice models. Most versions
of old-fashioned agency capture depend on wooing malleable agency
staff and officials with contributions or promises of future
49
employment. If the soul of the regulatory official is not for sale, then

45. For examples, see infra notes 92, 94–112 and accompanying text. Information costs
include costs associated with accessing and processing information. Information processing costs
can arise from information that requires specialized training or extensive background expertise,
information that is voluminous, information that is dense and complex, and information that is
poorly organized and not explained in clear ways. Access costs arise primarily when one or
more of the participants has asymmetric information and, at its extreme, involves a party’s
refusal to share the information. The importance of these different types of information costs to
rational behavior is still being worked out, but their basic features—of raising the costs for
audiences to understand a message—seems well accepted. For some of the ongoing work that
attempts to better understand how these species of information costs affect behavior, see, for
example, Haruo Horaguchi, The Role of Information Processing Cost as the Foundation of
Bounded Rationality in Game Theory, 51 ECON. LETTERS 287 (1996); Stephen Morris & Hyun
Song Shin, Optimal Communication, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 594 (2007).
46. See supra note 45.
47. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the
Administrative Process 104 n.25 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (recounting an anecdote in which the industry petitioned in
the hope of getting rule adjustments, but the agency held firm and the industry ultimately
voluntarily dismissed its petition).
48. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 445, 453–60 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (criticizing attorneys for medically unreasonable assembly-line diagnoses in the fen-phen
settlement); see also Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation:
The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 62–103 (2003)
(hypothesizing a high false-positive rate of asbestosis diagnoses in mass asbestos litigation due
to plaintiffs’ attorneys’ assembly-line practices).
49. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 40, at 1284 (observing how capture theory is
based on the premise that well-organized groups gain an advantage by contributing votes and
resources); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 178 (1990) (“‘Capture’ is the
adoption by the regulator for self-regarding (private) reasons, such as enhancing electoral
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this traditional form of agency capture is ineffectual. Information
capture, by contrast, thrives even in cases in which officials are
principally opposed to the skewed outcomes that may result. The end
result, however, is the same. In information capture, just as in oldfashioned capture, the stakeholders with relatively greater resources
are able to dominate the outcomes and often do so free of oversight
by onlookers—not because the deals have been struck through
financial inducements, but because they are so technical and
complicated that in practice they take place at an altitude that is out
of the range of vision of the full set of normally engaged and affected
parties.
Information capture also fits neatly within existing political
science models of interest group participation, though again the
phenomenon seems to be missing from existing theory. In his classic
four-quadrant typology of regulation, for example, Professor James
Q. Wilson predicts that when the benefits of a policy are diffused
across the population and the costs are concentrated on a small group
of regulated parties, the agency is more at risk of capture unless a
charismatic entrepreneur emerges who acts as the “vicarious
50
representative” of the public beneficiaries. On its face, Professor
Wilson’s model fits well with information capture, which simply adds
in the variable of information costs to predict particularly high risks
of capture for complex and technical rules. In applying his model to
the subset of technical environmental regulations, however, Professor
Wilson is surprisingly optimistic that dominance by regulated parties
will generally be avoided due to the low costs of accessing the process
and the growing prevalence of policy entrepreneurs, such as
51
environmental nonprofits. Through these assumptions, Professor
Wilson betrays a possible blind spot with regard to filter failure and

support or postregulatory compensation, of a policy which would not be ratified by an informed
polity free of organization costs.”).
50. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367–70 (1980). Professor
Wilson’s four quadrants of politics categorize regulation according to the distribution of benefits
(concentrated or diffuse) on the one hand, and the distribution of costs (concentrated or
diffuse) on the other. The specific categories include not only “entrepreneurial politics,” in
which benefits are broad but the costs of a policy are concentrated, but also “majoritarian
politics,” in which society in general incurs both the benefits and the cost of the policy; “interestgroup politics,” in which both the costs and benefits of a policy are concentrated on a narrow set
of interests; and “client politics,” in which the benefits of a policy accrue to a narrow set of
interests and the costs are spread over the entire population. Id.
51. See, e.g., id. at 385 (suggesting that environmental groups can hold industry accountable
and participate equally in regulation).
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resulting information capture. Professor William Gormley’s
quadrants of regulatory participation come much closer to
recognizing the existence of information capture because he qualifies
as subject to one-sided interest-group dominance (what he calls
“board room politics”) those rules for which the information is highly
52
complex. But these must also be nonsalient rules, by which he means
53
rules that do not interest the public, and which he assumes, like
Professor Wilson, generally do not include health or environmental
54
rules. Professor Gormley’s neglect of filter failure and corresponding
information excesses also seem to cause him to miss potentially
important interactions between his own two variables, complexity and
55
salience.
More specific references to an information capture–like
phenomenon did arise during the early period of social regulation,
but these accounts mysteriously seemed to fizzle out before they
56
developed into more robust explanatory models. James Landis, for
example, observed in 1960 that regulated industry—in large part
through the never-ending stream of information—has a “daily
machine-gun like impact” on the agency that leads to an industry

52. See William T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY
595, 607–08 (1986).
53. See id. at 598 (“A highly salient issue is one that affects a large number of people in a
significant way. Expressed a bit differently, salience is low unless the scope of conflict is broad
and the intensity of conflict is high.”).
54. See id. at 600 tbl.1 (including among the high-complexity, low-salience rules: “Cable
Television Regulation,” “Antitrust Regulation,” “Securities Regulation,” “Insurance
Regulation,” “Banking Regulation,” “Telephone Regulation,” “Transportation Regulation,”
“Hospital Regulation,” and “Patent Regulation”; and including in the high-complexity, highsalience rules: “Hazardous Waste Regulation,” “Air Quality Regulation,” “Water Quality
Regulation,” “Occupational Safety,” and “Health Regulation”).
55. The strategic ability to move rules that have the capability of being “salient” into the
“nonsalient” pile through information capture seems to escape Professor Gormley’s model. In
retrospect, Professor Gormley’s classification system easily could be amended to include
practical inaccessibility to the public as part of the salience variable. This friendly amendment
acknowledges the multiple reasons why interest groups (particularly public interest groups) may
or may not engage in a rule, and also notices how complexity makes engagement increasingly
unlikely for public interest groups, thus creating a feedback effect between the variables.
56. The possibility of information capture seemed to be largely dismissed by the late 1970s,
based in part on a renewed faith in pluralistic processes made possible by the courts’ expanded
scope of preenforcement judicial review. Professor Croley, for example, argues that agencies
typically account for information biases introduced by regulated parties, in part because
adversaries will be quick to counteract this type of informational pressure. See, e.g., CROLEY,
supra note 39, at 294 (“If one group supplies an agency with incomplete or biased information,
another group with adverse interests will have opportunities to challenge or rebut it.”); see also
infra Part III.A.
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57

bias. And Professor Louis Jaffe suggested as early as 1954 that by
virtue of their continuing presence, regulated parties capture agencies
58
through the constant stream of information they provide to agencies.
Later, in 1978, Professors Owen and Braeutigam noticed how
stakeholders could use information games—filing voluminous and
59
technical comments, for example—to gain control over the agency.
In any case, these prescient sightings of information overload still
miss the important intersection between information theory and
administrative law that information capture helps bring into focus.
The problem is not just that interested parties can strategically
bombard the agency with information in order to overwhelm them. It
is that the administrative system is so completely oblivious to
information costs that it not only neglects requiring some information
filtering, but also collectively creates strong incentives for this
information excess. Although much of the resulting information
overload may result from inadvertence—a blind but rational response
to rules of administrative process—the system’s obliviousness to
information costs also creates space for strategic gamesmanship.
Information excess can then be a conscious strategy deployed by
resourceful participants to exhaust their adversaries, reduce the
accountability of the rulemakings outside of the immediate circle of
those in the know, and browbeat the agency into capitulating to many
of their demands by reinforcing each technical complaint and
criticism with a credible threat of litigation.
Information capture and the accompanying notion of filter
failure not only highlight the perverse role that information can play
in administrative law, but also fill some gaps in existing theories of
interest group participation and agency accountability. For example,

57. LANDIS, supra note 12, at 71. But see CROLEY, supra note 39, at 293–95 (recounting the
theory of information capture, but concluding that support for the hypothesis is limited to
nonexistent).
58. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A
Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1113–19 (1954); Louis L. Jaffe, Federal Regulatory
Agencies in Perspective: Administrative Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 BOSTON C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 565, 566 (1970); see also 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 11–14 (1971); Roger Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L.
REV. 1016, 1028–30 (1971) (observing that “most of the information flowing to the agency will
come from the regulated”).
59. See BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME:
STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4–5 (1978) (advocating that special
interests should make strategic use of information and litigation to gain control over the
administrative process).

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

1340

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1321

information capture embellishes in important ways on familiar
concepts such as agency costs, monitoring costs, and slack—terms that
generally refer to the costs or capacity for stakeholder oversight of
60
agency decisions. When information capture is taken into account, it
becomes important not only to think of whether the average agency
monitoring costs are high or low, but also to assess the difference in
monitoring costs between the most and least informationally
advantaged participants in the rulemaking process (assuming that
61
their stakes are roughly equivalent). References to monitoring costs
or slack that aggregate all interest groups as an undistinguished unit
may miss a critical variable in the accountability equation.
Information capture, in contrast to older versions of capture, is
also more apolitical and value neutral than the iron triangles of
political theory that seem to depend on the prospect of campaign
contributions and similar financial inducements between regulated
parties and congresspersons (two points of the triangle) and on the
predisposition of agency personnel to capitulate to congressional
62
pressure (the third point of the triangle). A sharp disparity in
resources is one factor in predicting the onset of information capture
in administrative law, but it is not decisive. Poorly financed groups
can succeed in information capture if the issue is salient and the
63
stakes are high enough for them. Additionally, in situations in which
a group holds information advantages, it can engage more
inexpensively than other groups, even when it lacks other types of
resources.
Information capture could even catalyze rethinking of the basic
64
model for agency accountability. Information capture and filter

60. See, e.g., Levine & Forrence, supra note 49, at 180 (discussing these terms and
explaining that the term “slack” refers to the discretion a regulatory agency enjoys that is free
from accountability).
61. An agency official may have extraordinary slack from the vantage point of an attentive
but informationally exhausted public interest group that cannot keep up with the information,
but very little slack with regard to the careful, information-intensive positions, arguments, and
documentation that a common set of regulated parties produce over the life cycle of regulation.
Cf. Levine & Forrence, supra note 49, at 185, 187, 190 (discussing the average amount of slack
for a given rule or policy and noting that it is often very high when information costs are high,
but not discussing how different interest groups may provide a regulator with very different
amounts of slack in a single rulemaking).
62. See, e.g., HREBENAR, supra note 40, at 263 (describing Iron Triangles formed in part by
contributions to officials that create cozy relationships).
63. Cf. id. at 331–39 (focusing on the important role that resources play in political power).
64. For a more detailed discussion of these adverse consequences, see infra Part III.
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failure underscore how requiring agencies to open their rules to
comments, without limits or penalties, runs the risk of inviting kitchen
sink, scattershot comments that can occupy shelves of docket space
and exhaust attentive participants. Information capture highlights
how enlarging access to the courts can inadvertently provide a
strategic tool for advantaged stakeholders to extort the agency and
threaten it into submission. And even the dedication to transparency
contributes to information capture because it flags for onlookers just
how complex the rule is without providing any incentive or
mechanism for them to engage in participating. At the same time, for
engaged and resourceful onlookers, a transparent rulemaking
provides more opportunity to trawl the record for weak assumptions
and concessions of uncertainty, and ultimately to increase the issues
in dispute.
Finally, information capture may begin to bridge legal analysis to
65
other areas of study, like information theory. Information theory has
been a robust discipline for more than half a century; indeed, when
administrative law is viewed from the perspective of information
theorists, its design appears curiously primitive. Nobel Prize–winning
thinkers like Herbert Simon have long stressed that the “major
problem” with organizations is their failure to realize that attention,
66
not information, is the limiting ingredient. These limitations are
most pressing when an organization faces time constraints in
67
decisionmaking. The desperate need for information-management
systems in large organizations, like regulatory agencies, is an
inescapable conclusion of this pioneering body of work. An entire
discipline—the mathematical theory of information—is dedicated to
studying ways to streamline communications and limit information
68
externalities. Within this theory, one of the central criteria for good
65. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1125 (“Because the stakes can be quite high in the
law, the costs involved in the informational tradeoff sometimes require intervention, so that
they may be more fully internalized by those sending messages about legal relations.”).
66. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 19, at 241–43. Dr. Simon observes that:
The major problems of organization today are not problems of departmentalization
and coordination of operating units. Instead, they are problems of organizing
information storage and information processing—not division of labor, but
factorization of decision-making. These organizational problems are best attacked, at
least to a first approximation, by examining the information system and the system of
decisions it supports in abstraction from agency and department structure.
Id. at 248–49.
67. See, e.g., id.
68. See, e.g., ROBERT ASH, INFORMATION THEORY (1965); CLAUDE E. SHANNON &
WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949).
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communication is minimizing information costs; for example, keeping
bits of information at the lowest level possible, much like Bell’s
invention of the alphabet for the telegraph, which used the shortest
symbols for the most frequently used letters. This work similarly
underscores the importance of processes that control information
costs as part of basic institutional design. The economic theory of
information, which studies inefficiencies and related defects created
69
by various types of information costs, is now a burgeoning field.
Even within law and economics, a number of scholars have developed
a robust literature examining how certain types of information
costs—most notably those resulting from asymmetrical information—
70
impair the effectiveness of legal rules. This work also suggests that
the law should pay closer attention to the need to filter information,
although legal analysts have their work cut out for them in
considering how to do so given the rather mature state of
administrative law.
At the same time, information capture also highlights blind spots
in both legal theory and information theory. Traditionally,
information theory has not engaged deeply in the study of deception
or abuse of information; instead, the primary focus is on streamlining
71
and making communications still more efficient. The mutual blind
spots between these respective fields make the challenge of linking
them together more difficult, but hopefully even more worthwhile.
C. Environmental Rulemakings and Their Susceptibility to
Information Capture
So far, this discussion of information capture has been largely
abstract. To make the concept at least a little more concrete, it may
be helpful to consider the concept of information capture in the
context of a typical EPA rulemaking.

69. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY
INFORMATION (1992); INÉS MACHO-STADLER & J. DAVID PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS (2d ed.
2001); LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION (1988); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J.
ECON. 1441 (2000).
70. For a sample of this body of scholarship, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989);
Smith, supra note 21, at 1111.
71. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1136.

AND
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In the vast majority of EPA rulemakings, the agency is tasked by
Congress with setting industry- or product-specific rules that limit
72
pollution or restrict the availability of chemicals or pesticides. In
most cases, the agency must also calculate the cost burden on industry
and factor it into the rule to ensure that the technologies, methods of
inspection, and so on are practically available to all affected
73
industries. These types of health-related regulations comprise not
only a large portion of the EPA’s workload but also a large share of
rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health
74
Administration (OSHA) for the workplace, by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) for a variety of consumer
75
products, and by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for
76
some food products, cosmetic products, food additives, and drugs.
Indeed, most public health and environmental protection occurs
through these product-, industry-, or site-specific rulemakings that
target particular risks and attempt to restrict them to reasonable
77
levels.
72. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a
(2006) (requiring manufacturers of new pesticides to conduct specific tests on the pesticide and
obtain registration from the EPA before marketing it); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2006) (requiring manufacturers of new chemicals to submit a premanufacture
notification); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (prohibiting the point source
discharge of pollution without a permit that, in turn, is based on the capabilities of the best
available technology); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6923–
25 (2006) (requiring transporters and treatment, storage, and disposal units handling hazardous
wastes to self-identify and follow regulatory requirements); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §
7412(i) (2006) (prohibiting the emissions of air toxins in major amounts without a permit that
specifies emissions limits for the source).
73. For example, in setting technology-based standards under the Clean Water Act, the
EPA must consider the cost to industry, but in doing so, it generally considers features such as
the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, potential process changes,
nonwater quality, environmental impacts including energy requirements, economic
achievability, and other such factors as the EPA Administrator deems appropriate. See, e.g.,
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Concentrated
Aquatic Animal Production Point Source Category, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,891, 51,896 (Aug. 23, 2004)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 451); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2) (2006).
74. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of Labor to establish
mandatory nationwide standards governing health and safety in the workplace).
75. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (2006) (allowing the Consumer Product Safety Commission
to set consumer safety standards for products).
76. See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006) (requiring the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate nationwide standards for food identity
and quality).
77. See generally JOHN APPLEGATE, JAN G. LAITOS & CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN, THE
REGULATION OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES ch. 6 (2000) (setting out
these different standard-setting programs in greater detail).
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Even though establishing pollution and product standards tends
to dominate the EPA’s rulemaking agenda, most of these standards
78
are rarely covered in the news. The agency rules that do gain the
most attention—setting air standards for the country and allowing
coal plants to trade mercury emissions—are atypical. These
newsworthy rules are almost always national in scope, their health
and environmental consequences are obvious and hence salient, and
they have a robust mix of affected parties engaged in a fight over
79
them.
But the EPA appears to issue only a few such very visible rules
each year. The other three hundred or more bread-and-butter rules
80
that the EPA promulgates annually get far less attention. And
indeed, their relative obscurity is central to understanding why they
may be uniquely susceptible to information capture. Although many
of these rules have significant implications for public health and
81
environmental protection, the EPA rulemaking process does not

78. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 30–32 (charting the frequency of news reports
on hazardous air pollutant regulation from 1990 to 2009).
79. See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 39, at 160 (characterizing each of these rules as being
“enormously important to regulatory decisions that sparked intense national debates and
implicated billions of dollars. . . . [and noting these same rules] would all unquestionably make a
short list of some of the most significant regulatory activity in more than a decade”).
80. Professor Coglianese estimated that the EPA promulgated 334 rules per year from
1986 to 1990. See Coglianese, supra note 47, at 1 n.2, app.1. In an ongoing empirical project to
gauge the “newsworthy” features of at least some of these rules, a Lexis search of major
newspapers was conducted for media coverage of the EPA’s promulgation of air toxic emissions
standards over a twenty-year period. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 31. The search found
that only about 15 percent of ninety emissions standards were referenced in a major newspaper,
despite their significance to public health protection. Id. Readers can gauge the newsworthy
quality of EPA rules for themselves by running random searches for examples of typical EPA
rulemakings in the Office of Management and Budget’s new Unified Agenda database. See
RegInfo.gov, Advanced Search – Select Publication(s), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaAdvancedSearch (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). This spontaneous, limited sampling
should provide further support for the general assertion that most EPA rulemakings remain
obscure and out of public view.
81. In the Clean Air Act, for example, Congress directs the EPA to reduce the incidence of
cancer attributable to the emission of air toxins from select sources in urban areas by at least 75
percent. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(1) (2006). Indeed, almost all pollution control
standards under the statutes cited at note 72, supra, impose some restrictions on industrial
operations that were initially unregulated with regard to pollution. A much more difficult
question arises with respect to what the public health consequences are for the range of
plausible alternative standards for each of these pollution control rules. In other words, how
many more lives does the most rigorous version of the pollution control standard save as
compared to the weakest plausible standard under consideration? Because these standards
involve multiple subissues that directly affect the timing and enforceability of the rule as well as
its coverage and stringency, there are likely to be potentially significant differences for many of
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require that actual public health benefits be calculated or
82
considered. In fact, because the agency is generally regulating the
pollution source, rather than the environment itself, the direct
implications for public health and the environment are not considered
83
germane to the rule. If an interest group—for or against the rule—is
interested in such information, it must model the health implications
84
of different source standards on its own. This seems rare, but in
cases in which it has been done, the public consequences can prove
85
quite significant.

the rules. See infra notes 94–111 and accompanying text; see also Wendy Wagner & Lynn Blais,
Children’s Health and Environmental Exposure Risks: Information Gaps, Scientific Uncertainty,
and Regulatory Reform, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 249, 256–58 (2007) (describing some of
the enforceability and related problems with these rules, which significantly undermine their
protective qualities). Indeed, the fact that environmental groups participate in nearly half of
these rules, despite the barriers discussed in Part III.A, infra, suggests that the EPA’s
development of these standards do matter, potentially very much, to public health.
82. This type of modeling is done only for “significant” rulemakings as determined by their
costs to industry. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2006). Bread-and-butter rules rise to this level only occasionally, see, e.g., Wagner
et al., supra note 37, at 18, but even in these cases, public health benefits are often characterized
incompletely and almost as an aside. See, e.g., Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard
D. Morgenstern, What We Learned, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 215, 224
(Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard D. Morgenstern eds., 2009) (advocating as a
reform of regulatory analysis greater attention to the specification of the public health benefits
of regulatory alternatives, and basing this proposal on infirmities detailed in preceding
chapters).
83. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REV. 83, 88–89, 96–97 (discussing this feature of technology-based standards when emissions
limits are based on the capabilities of existing pollution control technologies rather than on the
needs of the receiving environment).
84. See Nathanson, supra note 42, at 445 (arguing that a “credible risk” is needed to engage
the public). In discussing his difficulty in making worker-safety issues salient for the news and
foundations, a prominent epidemiologist confided to the Author off the record that, after laying
out all of the worrisome risks for a reporter, the reporter asked, “but where are the dying
orphans?”
85. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460, 34,461 (Sept. 11,
1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (“OSHA estimates that the new standard [for benzene
exposure in the workplace] will prevent a minimum of 326 deaths from leukemia and diseases of
the blood and blood-forming organs over a working lifetime of 45 years.”). Interestingly, the
public visibility of analogous pollution control standards may be even lower, as discussed in note
80, supra. Recently, however, there has been increased interest in the cumulative health risks
associated with these standards. See, e.g., Dina Cappiello & Lise Olsen, In Harm’s Way,
HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 16, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/
archive.mpl?id=2005_3836663 (reporting on a prize-winning investigative study of inexplicably
high concentrations of air toxins in local communities, some of which may be in compliance with
existing standards); see also Brad Heath & Blake Morrison, Health Risks Stack Up for Students
Near Industrial Plants, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2008, at A2 (documenting uncontrolled hazardous
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At the same time that the public benefits of pollutant standards
are unspecified, the consequences for industry are clear, immediate,
and direct. A worried regulated party can identify countless issues
relating to the imposition of a pollution control standard that may
affect its operations and ultimate profitability. For example, in a
decision about how to set technology-based controls for industry, the
following questions might be raised: What are the best technologies
available in the market? How good are they, or do they vary
according to the plant in which they are installed? Are most industry
participants the same, or do they break into subgroups that should be
treated differently? How easy are the various technologies to install
and operate in most industries? How should the new pollution control
technology be monitored and reported? The answers to these
questions, and many more like them, determine the rigor of the
86
standards the EPA promulgates.
In a proposed rule, the agency will offer a proposal for
addressing these many technical questions. Because the agency’s
proposal depends on mastering many of the issues of concern to
industry, these plans are typically developed with heavy industry
involvement years before the proposed rule is actually published and
87
formally shared with the public. And as might be expected,
regulatory energies tend to focus like a laser on the alternative
compliance options and their costs for industry, with the possible
differences in public benefits completely ignored or quickly drowned
88
out by the hubbub relating to the technical details. After the
air pollutants in potentially dangerous concentrations near a large number of schools
throughout the United States).
86. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection
Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 810–11 (1977) (specifying three steps in setting technology-based
standards: (1) categorizing industries; (2) identifying the contents of their respective
wastewaters; and (3) identifying the range of control technologies available); see also Sanford E.
Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 IOWA L. REV.
839, 853 (1977) (discussing questions regarding the effectiveness of pollution control
technologies under various plant ages, sizes, and manufacturing conditions).
87. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM, PETER GRABOSKY & DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 44 (1998) (noting the “clear imbalance of
knowledge between regulators and industry” with regard to setting technology-based
standards).
88. There are very powerful, public-benefitting reasons to bracket a consideration of these
health and environmental benefits in setting pollution control standards (whether technologybased or simply source- or waste-specific). Because the actual health and environmental
benefits are difficult to identify with quantitative precision, requiring an industry to “do its best”
given available technologies allows for less litigation (from industry) and, as a result, more
expeditious standard setting. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 83, at 83. The discussion here should
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resulting proposed rule is published, the agency must solicit
89
comments on the rule from all interested parties. Based on those
comments and any other information presented to it, the agency will
revise the rule and publish it in the Federal Register.
Both because the issues are so important to stakeholders and
because there is no limit on communications, it is not surprising that
most EPA rulemakings involve a large amount of documentation,
much of which is highly technical. (Although this technical
information is quite important to industry, it is largely obscure to the
public.) The index of the rulemaking record for a single pollution
90
control standard often runs into the hundreds of pages. The final
rule and supporting preamble published in the Federal Register is
generally at least several dozen pages and can reach over two
91
hundred pages in length. Virtually every page, moreover, is filled
with technical discussions that assume a high level of specialized
92
knowledge. Yet, in the hundreds of pages of documentation, it is
not be read as an argument that this approach to standard setting in many media is a mistake or
needs to be revised. As a matter of process, however, it does seem problematic for public health
consequences to be ignored for many and likely most EPA rulemakings, particularly because
these consequences highlight the public’s stake in the issue and thus generate greater public
oversight. This oversight, discussed later, should be redressed by a requirement—perhaps
imposed in place of the RIA process—that agencies always characterize the public and
environmental benefits of varying control options to provide the public and their
representatives a better basis for understanding the implications of the rule and gauging their
involvement in its design. See infra Part IV.A.3. If this cannot be done quantitatively for some
or all benefits, then qualitative estimates and descriptions are sufficient as well as discussions of
why the uncertainty remains. As is later suggested, if the analysis here is correct, then the RIA
process completely misses the true analytical needs of regulators—these low-salience rules—and
concentrates energies on issues (compliance costs) and rules (high salience) in which the
rulemaking process is least likely to fail. See infra Part III.A.4.c.
89. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (requiring that “the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments”).
90. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 13.
91. Id. at 18–19.
92. The detailed, technical features of the rules should not be underestimated. The
following excerpt is from the EPA’s explanation of how it responded to significant comments on
its pollutant standards for the emissions of hazardous air pollutants from acrylic and modacrylic
fiber production. This excerpt is not a random selection, but it is a relatively representative
sample of the level of specialized knowledge and background information that the EPA
demands from its readers:
ii. Can the pollution prevention control techniques being used by several of the plants
with suspension spinning operations be used for the solution process in existing
facilities? Although the air emission and source characteristics for all other emission
point types (i.e., tanks, equipment components, wastewater treatment units) are
similar throughout the source category, the solution and suspension processes
associated with the spinning operations differ from each other in the processing steps
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rare for even one sentence to discuss the implications of the rule for
public health or the environment. The final rule, with all of its
accompanying documentation, then forms the backdrop or record
against which the agency is tested to determine whether its final rule
93
is reasonable, or at least not arbitrary.
A closer look at a single, bread-and-butter rule illustrates at least
a few of the problems that can arise in these unwieldy rulemakings,
particularly when the agency is engaged in a time-sensitive project.
Consider, as an example, the rule promulgated in the mid-1990s
regulating the emissions of toxic air pollutants from chemical storage
94
tanks in tank farms at large petrochemical plants. In this rule, the
emissions standards were unusually straightforward—for most tanks,
the EPA required lids with tight seals to keep them from emitting
95
significant quantities of toxic pollutants into the air. But this
emissions standard did not resolve all critical regulatory issues; chief
among them was how to make sure that these tanks would not leak
hazardous air pollutants if the seal became loose or worn. On this
issue, the EPA could have required the industry to install continuous
emissions monitors at the rim of the tanks that would trigger an alert
if a worrisome level of toxins was detected at the edge or over the
and the acrylonitrile concentrations in the process materials and associated emissions.
Solution polymerization spin dope for fiber production contains, by product and
process design, a significantly higher concentration of residual AN monomer than
does suspension polymerization. The public comments [filed by industry] argued that
the application of the pollution prevention techniques being used for suspension
processes (e.g., steam stripping of excess monomer, scavenger solvents) to existing
solution processes is not viable because of the physical nature of the solution
polymerization process. Specifically, application of high efficiency residual AN
polymer steam stripping (incorporated to reduce downstream emissions) is
technically feasible to incorporate into the suspension process and is not feasible for a
solution polymerization process because the latter does not produce a solid polymer
product that can be introduced to direct steam contact without contamination. At
solution polymerization facilities, other pollution prevention or source reduction
measures which formed the initial technical basis for determining the 100 ppmw
action level for all spinning lines may not be capable of achieving the higher AN
removal rates of the higher residual monomer concentration present in solution
polymerization fiber spinning operations. We agree with the public comments that
incorporating the pollution prevention techniques to an existing solution process
spinning line is not viable.
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Generic Maximum Achievable
Control Technology (Generic MACT), 64 Fed. Reg. 34,853, 34,862 (June 29, 1999) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
93. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. OSHA, 849 F.2d 611, 617–18 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding
that more than the administrative record can be considered in judicial review).
94. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories,
40 C.F.R. §§ 63.100–.183 (2009).
95. See id. § 63.119(a) (providing extremely detailed requirements that amount to requiring
a seal and floating lid for most tanks).
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surface of a tank. Or the EPA could have required regular inspections
of the tanks with a sniffer, much like what natural gas companies use
to detect gas leaks. Instead, in the final rule, the EPA simply requires
visual inspections by a company employee to ensure the seal is
96
intact. With regard to the frequency of this self-monitoring, the EPA
could have required weekly or even monthly examinations given the
seemingly low expense of the visual self-inspection; instead, the EPA
97
set the inspection interval at one year. Indeed, under the rule, if a
leak is discovered in the course of this annual check-up, the company
is given another forty-five days to correct the problem, as well as the
opportunity to self-administer up to two additional, thirty-day
98
extensions. And to complete the picture, records of the industry’s
compliance with these self-inspection requirements are stored onsite
99
and are not filed with state agencies or the federal EPA.
How could these strikingly permissive enforcement requirements
survive the fierce adversarial pressures of administrative
rulemakings? The docket index, documents in the record, and
proposed rule itself provide a clue. The proposed rule, which included
100
three other subparts, was over 187 pages long. Just on the storage
tank rule alone, the EPA met with industry groups at least three
times before publishing the proposed rule, communicated with them
through letters, and prepared at least fifteen background
101
documents. After publication of the proposed rule, twenty-two
industries and industry associations—nearly all of them household
names—and a smattering of public interest advocates—more
precisely, two public interest groups and four states or state
regulatory associations—engaged first in formal notice and comment
just on the storage tank portion of the rule and then presented their
102
concerns at a public hearing. The EPA’s response to these and
other significant comments in the larger, four-part final rule identifies

96. See id. § 63.120(a)(1).
97. See id. § 63.120(a)(2).
98. See id. § 63.120(a)(4).
99. See id. § 63.123(c).
100. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories,
57 Fed. Reg. 62,607 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
101. See Hazardous Organic NESHAP Storage, Docket No. A-90-21, Document Nos. II-A1 to -6, II-B-1 to -7, II-E-4 (Oct. 29, 1992), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/
home.html# documentDetail?R=09000064800c084a.
102. See id. Document Nos. IV-D-1 to -28, IV-F-1 to -12.
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more than one hundred issues in contention. Not surprisingly,
moreover, this final rule and preamble gained still more girth—this
time reaching 223 pages and over 195,000 words in the Federal
104
Register. With a statutory deadline looming, the agency pushed the
105
rulemaking through in three-and-a-half years from start to finish.
Because of a vocal constituency of unhappy interest groups, however,
the EPA reopened public comment on one of the rulemaking’s key
issues eighteen days after publishing the final rule, and received
106
another sixty formal communications. Before it could issue a
revised rule, one of the regulated industries petitioned for
107
reconsideration of the entire rulemaking. The agency ultimately
issued a proposed clarification to the original rule two years later,
108
received another twenty comments on its proposed clarification,
109
and issued a final revised rule at the end of 1996.
Despite all this activity, the final rule offers no explanation as to
why the regulation of storage tank emissions is so lenient and
provides no indication that any stakeholders were unhappy with the
approach. One can surmise that there were simply too many battles—
each of them intricate and time-consuming—for the two public
interest representatives and four state regulatory groups to keep up
with all of the moving parts. One can also surmise that in slogging
through the more than one hundred significant contested issues
addressed under a tight schedule, the agency itself had to tread lightly
on issues for which the industry might have claimed superior

103. This number is based on counting each of the (significant) issues discussed by the EPA
in Sections V and VI of the Final Rule. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Source Categories, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,401, 19,411–48 (Apr. 22, 1994) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63) (describing the comments and significant changes to the rule based on those
comments).
104. See id.
105. The period of three-and-a-half years is based on comparing the date of the first
document listed in the docket index authored after 1990, which is the year the EPA’s mandate
was passed by Congress, and the date of the first final rule. For the first document in the docket,
dated August 10, 1990, see Hazardous Organic NESHAP Storage, Docket No. A-90-21,
Document No. II-B-1, available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#
documentDetail?R=09000064800c084a.
106. See Hazardous Organic NESHAP Process Vents, Docket No. A-90-19, Section VI
(Sept. 14, 1992), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#document
Detail? R=09000064800c07be.
107. See id. Document No. VI-B-63.
108. See id. Section VIII.
109. See id. Section IX.

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

FILTER FAILURE

1351

110

knowledge. Alternatively, perhaps the agency threw bones to
industry representatives as a way to get their buy-in on other issues—
particularly when it suspected that those concessions would not be
caught or litigated by public interest groups reluctant to delay the rule
with litigation unless the litigation involved a crucial issue cutting to
the very heart of the EPA’s air toxic program.
Ironically, demands by public interest groups that the EPA
promulgate the rule on time and in keeping with Congress’s
111
deadline may actually make the information capture phenomenon
worse. As lawyers know well, deadline suits are almost impossible to
lose and serve a vital public purpose; without the suits, industry has
no restrictions on their polluting activities, and the environment and
public health are unprotected. In the context of information capture,
however, these deadline suits put the agency between a rock
(information battering by the industry) and a hard place (a deadline
suit by environmental groups). When faced with lawsuits from all
sides, the natural path of least resistance is to promulgate a final rule
quickly and, if there is not time to respond to all of industry’s
complaints, to give in to many of them just to get the rule out the
door. As the nation’s top environmental lawyers, most of whom
worked first for the EPA before advising industry, observe: “The
reason that the Agency is generally receptive to well-reasoned
technical comments [from industry] . . . . [is to] withstand judicial
review. The heart of a regulatory program is thus more likely to
112
survive over the long term.”
II. HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ENABLES INFORMATION CAPTURE
113

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and related open
government statutes create the perfect substrate for the growth and
nourishment of information capture. Through a variety of judicially
created requirements, the APA lays the groundwork for information
gluts that can estrange marginally financed interest groups,

110. See supra note 103.
111. In fact, the EPA promulgated the air toxic emission standards just discussed under
deadline litigation presumably brought by public interest groups that demanded that the EPA
promulgate the standards in accordance with the congressional timeline. See National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories, 62 Fed. Reg. 2722, 2722 (Jan. 17,
1997) (amending the final rule).
112. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 50.
113. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006).
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undermine the hope of pluralistic engagement that could help the
agency sift through at least some of the incoming information, and
ultimately put the agency at the mercy of the party in control of most
of the relevant information.
Administrative law instructs interest groups that if they plan to
file comments that can be backed by legal challenge, then the
comments need to cover the waterfront of their concerns and ideally
do so in detail. At the same time, administrative law places no
restrictions on the size, number, detail, or technicality of the issues
that can be raised—the sky is the limit. As a result, parties can
inadvertently or deliberately exert substantial control over the
agency’s agenda in the number, diversity, detail, and even the framing
of the multiple comments they lodge, as well as with the information
they share earlier in the process. As long as the court reviews the
agency’s action based on an unlimited record that commenters have a
hand in creating, information becomes almost akin to a choke collar
that can be used at the whim of interest groups to control the agency’s
factual record and even its policymaking agenda.
Even worse, agencies themselves develop coping strategies that
can aggravate the information capture problem. If the agency receives
reams of unprocessed material from interest groups and is held
responsible for synthesizing it, then the agency’s own process is likely
to mirror these information pathologies, if not exacerbate them. An
enormous record of highly technical and somewhat extraneous
comments that delve into tedious and often unnecessary detail will
tend to be reflected in the agency’s own rule in order to avoid
accusations of insufficient attention to detail. Such an opaque rule
may have the added benefit of being more likely to escape rigorous
judicial scrutiny and may even discourage thinly financed parties from
taking on the rule as a litigation project. Along these same lines, if the
agency must respond to all comments yet cannot change the rule
substantially without starting over, then the agency will engage
interested parties much earlier in the process of developing the rule,
even though this might defeat the idea of ensuring balanced and
vigorous participation by a diverse set of interest groups. Even
litigation threats at the conclusion of a rule may cause the agency to
develop nontransparent coping mechanisms for adjusting rules after
the fact, an exercise made easier when the rule generally escapes
understanding by most onlookers.
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This Part isolates the various incentives caused by the
114
that not only tolerate excessive
“rulemaking review game”
information but also produce incentives for players, including the
agency itself, to overload the system with information or otherwise
gain an edge through their superior access to key information. These
rules of the game arise in part from the APA itself, but are both
clarified and made more perverse through a series of judicial opinions
that generally attempt, ironically, to make the process fairer. After
this Part explores the ways that the law creates perverse conditions
for information capture, Part III then surveys the current landscape
for signs of damage.
A. Filter Failure in the Administrative Procedure Act
The APA displays great faith in the capacity of agencies in
particular and the administrative state more generally to process
information, no matter how overwhelming. This confidence is
evidenced in nearly every nook and cranny of the APA. The APA’s
command that “the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments” is an inviolate principle for
115
rulemaking. The Senate Report supporting the original APA
aspired to ensure that an agency’s “notice must . . . fairly apprise
interested parties of the issues involved, so that they may present
116
responsive data or argument.” The Attorney General’s Manual on
the APA, issued one year later, similarly recommends that “each
agency should schedule its rule making in such fashion that there will
be sufficient time for affording interested persons an opportunity to
117
participate in the rule making.” Courts have taken these aspirations
seriously. “If an agency does neglect to provide this
information . . . and that neglect adversely affects a party’s ability to

114. This is Professor Mashaw’s term. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 166 (1999) (modeling out the
“rulemaking review game,” which is governed by the basic idea that “to the extent that an
opponent of rulemaking (regulatory or deregulatory) perceives the use of an external obstacle
to rulemaking to have a higher expected value than failing to use it, that external constraint will
be activated”).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
116. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.3, at 571 (citing S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 200 (1946)).
117. Id. (citing TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 29 (1947), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/
library/admin/1947cover.html).
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provide meaningful comments, a reviewing court will hold the rule
118
invalid.”
Accordingly, notice and comment—the period explicitly
designed to open the doors to any and all information that any party
wishes to provide—not only discourages agencies from placing any
limits on the content, technicality, or volume of this information but
also requires agencies to keep the period open long enough to ensure
119
that anyone with information to share can participate. A rule can
also be remanded if the agency has neglected—however
inadvertently—to make a complete library of relevant documents
120
available for commenters to use in formulating their arguments.
121
Agencies are further required by law to “consider,” which
generally means to process and then respond to, all significant
122
comments. If the agency does not do this, it again runs the risk that
123
a court will reject its rule. A court, for example, may remand a rule
if the agency too quickly dismisses a comment as unduly vague or
nonspecific and refuses to address the commenter’s concerns in the
124
final rule. As the Second Circuit held in reversing one of the FDA’s

118. Id. at 572 (citing Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 714 F.2d
1290 (5th Cir. 1983)).
119. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 114 (2003) (“Once the notice is given, anyone may
send the agency a comment, and agencies always accept these comments (indeed, how could
they not, unless they returned the envelope for insufficient postage?).”).
120. See, e.g., Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Fish
and Wildlife Service’s failure to make the map of an offsite mitigation area available for public
viewing in the issuance of an incidental take permit deprived plaintiff of the meaningful
opportunity to comment and required that the case be remanded back to the agency).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
122. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 44–49 (1988) (discussing the history of administrative law since
1946 and how the goal of expanding access to government led to the rule whereby interested
groups could provide comments to rulemaking agencies that these agencies must consider);
Stewart, supra note 6, at 1717–60 (discussing the importance of responding to comments in
surviving judicial review).
123. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1977)
(reversing an FDA regulation governing good practices for whitefish in part because the FDA
failed to respond to an important technical comment in its final rule); see also Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that an “agency
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”).
124. See, e.g., Adams v. U.S. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 51–53 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
EPA had erred in ignoring comments for vagueness and holding that the EPA had sufficient
notice from the comments for materiality purposes, which imposed a requirement on the EPA
to respond; because it had ignored the comments, the EPA’s resulting action was arbitrary and
capricious).
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good practices rules, “[i]t is not in keeping with the rational process to
leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of cogent
125
materiality, completely unanswered.”
As a result, agencies comply, perhaps too conscientiously, with
the letter of the law. Even for the minor rules, the EPA typically
prepares a one-hundred-plus-page report on its response to
126
comments, as well as anywhere from a few to dozens of pages of
“significant changes” in the small, three-column type of the Federal
127
Register. “[I]n one major rulemaking, EPA wrote thousands of
pages explaining how it resolved hundreds of issues based on its
consideration of over one hundred studies and over one hundred
thousand comments it received in response to its notice of proposed
128
rulemaking.”
B. Courts Encourage Information Excess
In the abstract, courts would seem ideally suited to provide a
reality check on Congress’s unrealistic faith in the agency’s ability to
stay abreast of the avalanche of information that must be processed
when developing a rule. But as lawyers fully appreciate, the courts’
substantive rules rarely succeed in simplifying processes and instead
129
tend to make complex systems worse. The courts’ interpretation of
administrative law is no exception. In APA case law, the courts have
generally reinforced, and even expanded, the incentives for
130
information excess and filter failure. They do this first by providing
unintended rewards for agencies to develop rules that are more
complex, detailed, and lengthy than needed to lower the risk of an
125. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252.
126. See BRUCE C. JORDAN, EPA, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS
AIR POLLUTANTS (NESHAP) FOR PRIMARY ALUMINUM REDUCTION PLANTS—
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROMULGATED STANDARDS, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC
COMMENTS AND RESPONSES (1997), as an example of the type of document the EPA prepares
for all rules, including smaller rules like this one, that explains the agency’s response to
significant comments.
127. See infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
128. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 595.
129. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578–79
(1988) (noting that courts can play a perverse role in “muddying” rules and that
“straightforward common law crystalline rules have been muddied repeatedly by exceptions and
equitable second-guessing, to the point that the various claimants . . . don’t know quite what
their rights and obligations really are”).
130. Cf. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 126 (“It seems virtually undeniable that the major
procedural developments in American administrative law from the Administrative Procedure
Act to the present have been the work largely of the courts or of the chief executive.”).
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adverse outcome in judicial review, and second by encouraging
parties to inundate the agency with excessive information in order to
make a record and protect all possible claims.
1. Incentives for the Agencies to Conduct Informationally
Excessive Rulemakings. The courts’ first unhelpful contribution to
administrative process is to relegate to obscurity the one provision
Congress did make for requiring agencies to filter information. In the
APA, the agency is required to provide a “concise general statement
131
of [its] basis and purpose [for the rule].” Congress intended this
provision to force the agencies to ensure that their rules are accessible
to the general public, as well as amenable to review by courts and the
legislature. “The rationale of this requirement is to enable the public
to determine the actual basis and objectives of the rule and to
132
facilitate meaningful judicial review.” With respect to its meaning,
the provision was initially understood, even by the courts, to require
agencies to explain in basic terms “what major issues of policy were
ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to
133
them as it did.”
Despite the intent of the provision, courts hold an agency in
violation of the “concise general statement” requirement only when
the agency fails to provide enough information, not when it provides
134
too much. There appear to be no cases in which a court has rejected
a rule because an agency’s lengthy and highly technical preamble was
not concise or comprehensible enough. By contrast, and although the
135
agency need not discuss every minor facet of its proposal, the courts

131. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
132. 3 JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL J. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 15.09, at 15-164 (1992) (citing, inter alia, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, H.R. REP. NO.
79-1980 (1946), Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), and various lower
court decisions).
133. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
134. See, e.g., Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 854–55 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that the Secretary of Transportation’s statement of basis and purpose failed to
provide an adequate account of how the rule served the Merchant Marine Act’s objectives, and
thus vacating the rule).
135. See, e.g., MCI Worldcom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“An agency
is not obliged to respond to every comment, only those that can be thought to challenge a
fundamental premise.” (citation omitted)); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding the EPA’s general statement in setting air quality standards because
the “regulation contains sufficient exposition of the purpose and basis of the regulation as a
whole to satisfy this legislative minimum”); Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n, 407 F.2d at 332
(rejecting a claim that the statement was insufficient because certain details were lacking).
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will remand rules for insufficiency when major issues are left
136
From this case law, Professor Richard Pierce
unaddressed.
concludes that “[t]he courts have replaced the statutory adjectives,
‘concise’ and ‘general’ with the judicial adjectives ‘detailed’ and
137
‘encyclopedic.’”
The demise of the concise general statement is just the beginning
of the trouble, however. Not only do the courts reject the need for
filters on the agencies’ communications (despite some congressional
intent otherwise) but also their opinions greatly exacerbate the risk of
information excess and inaccessible rulemakings. By far the strongest
incentive for agencies to actively load their rule and record with
138
details and defensive statements is the hard look doctrine. This test
emerged in the early 1970s as a way to increase oversight over what
was then viewed as unbridled agency discretion and a serious risk of
agencies being captured by the interests they were charged with
139
regulating. In hard look review, the court closely scrutinizes the
agency’s rule to ensure that it has adequately considered all
140
comments and supported its contested assumptions. As the D.C.
Circuit reminded the agencies: “What we are entitled to at all events
is a careful identification by the Secretary, when his proposed
136. See, e.g., Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1567 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the agency’s statement was inadequate because it “failed to give the facts
underlying the conclusion”); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d
Cir. 1975) (holding that the FDA has failed to provide an adequate statement supporting a rule
because it lacked a “detailed record” or “thorough and comprehensible statement of the
reasons for its decision” that establish the basis for the agency’s rule).
137. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 596.
138. Professor Pierce argues that:
To have any reasonable prospect of obtaining judicial affirmance of a major rule, an
agency must set forth the basis and purpose of the rule in a detailed statement, often
several hundred pages long, in which the agency refers to the evidentiary basis for all
factual predicates, explains its method of reasoning from factual predicates to the
expected effects of the rule, relates the factual predicates and expected effects of the
rule to each of the statutory goals or purposes the agency is required to further or to
consider, responds to all major criticisms contained in the comments on its proposed
rule, and explains why it has rejected at least some of the most plausible alternatives
to the rule it has adopted.
Id. at 593.
139. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (“[T]he courts’ assertiveness during the period from roughly 1967 to
1983 can be explained by judicial disenchantment with the idea of policymaking by expert and
nonpolitical elites. . . . The principal pathology emphasized during these years was “capture,”
meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to domination by the
industry they were charged with regulating.”).
140. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring)
(arguing for hard look review).
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standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one
141
course rather than another.” But when a rulemaking has dozens or
even hundreds of moving parts, this puts agencies in a no-win
situation. For substantial rules, the “reviewing court, assisted by able
counsel for petitioners, almost always can identify one or more issues
142
the agency addressed poorly in its statement of basis, and purpose.”
Adding to the litigation worries created by hard look review is
the occasional demand by courts that the agency develop substantial
143
evidence in support of its protective regulation. The Supreme Court
set the bar quite high for this substantial evidence requirement in
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the
144
Benzene case). In rejecting OSHA’s argument that the science was
too uncertain to determine the precise level at which the carcinogen
benzene became unsafe, the Court demanded that the agency
assemble “substantial evidence” in support of its standards to survive
145
judicial challenge. In response to the Supreme Court’s Benzene
decision, commentators observed that OSHA found itself forced to
engage “in this exceedingly precise analysis with full knowledge that
the estimates provided by existing risk assessment models could vary
146
millionfold, depending upon the model selected.” Other federal
agencies also felt compelled to provide detailed technical

141. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
142. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 614.
143. Benzene immediately produced ripples in the case law. In Gulf South Insulation v.
United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth
Circuit overturned the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s ban on the use of ureaformaldehyde insulation in residences and schools and held that the agency’s supporting record
was complete: “To make precise estimates, precise data are required.” Id. at 1146. Somewhat
similarly, in Leather Industries of America, Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C.
Circuit not only invalidated the EPA’s model because of the agency’s failure to refine the model
to address specific activities, but also invalidated the EPA’s working assumption regarding the
phytotoxicity of selenium, an assumption made necessary by limitations in available evidence:
“While the EPA ‘may ‘err’ on the side of overprotection,’ it ‘may not engage in sheer
guesswork.’” Id. at 408 (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1186–87 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)). The court did not suggest, however, that the agency had ignored relevant
information, nor did it explain how the EPA could go about gathering additional information.
144. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 614
(1980).
145. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 107–12 (2007) (describing the more tolerant view of OSHA standard
setting because of rampant uncertainties).
146. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1403 (1992).
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explanations for their standard-setting decisions to avoid the outcome
147
reached in Benzene.
The agency’s only responsible course of action when faced with
these doctrinal demands is to engage in defensive overkill when
148
developing rules. In the rulemaking environment created by the
case law, every comment that raises a credible-sounding issue, even a
peripheral one, must receive a complete and detailed response. In
preparing its rule for challenge, the agency will also work hard to
support, or at least give the appearance of supporting, every
assumption incorporated into the rule with information from the
technical and scientific literature. Moreover, because the agency is
not expected to be concise in its use of information, and because
there is no requirement that this information be even moderately
accessible to a general audience, there are no downsides for the
agency to include pages of technical verbiage designed to fend off
litigation. Indeed, it is rational for the agency to do so.
In practice, at least in contemporary judicial review, hard look
review and Benzene’s demand for a substantial scientific record are
the exception rather than the rule; most courts reviewing EPA
149
technical rulemakings grant the agency considerable deference. But

147. See, e.g., JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CHEMICALS AND CANCER
RISK 151 (1988) (“Since the Supreme Court's 1980 benzene decision, federal agencies have felt
compelled to use such numerical risk estimates to support both priority-setting and standardsetting decisions.”); Frank B. Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance
Threshold on Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 12–43 (1986) (arguing that judicial
review forces agencies to provide detailed technical explanations for standards); Howard Latin,
Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 132 (1988)
(“[T]he Court’s benzene decision has . . . induced federal agencies to conclude that they must
provide quantitative risk estimates even if they lack confidence in the resulting judgments.”
(citation omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
DUKE L.J. 300, 311 (arguing that courts often require “that agencies ‘find’ unfindable facts and
support those findings with unattainable evidence”).
148. Professor Pierce describes what the agencies must do to avoid the risk that courts will
remand their rules as arbitrary and capricious, which includes a demand that they
respond to all major points made in comments, state the factual predicates for its rule,
support the factual predicates by linking them to something in the record of the
rulemaking, explain its reasons for resolving issues as it did, relate its findings and its
reasoning to decisional factors made relevant by its statute, and give reasons for
rejecting plausible alternatives to the rule it adopted.
1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.1, at 559.
149. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 91 (1995) (“Judicial withdrawal from the supervision of technical decisions in the
1980s avoided the pitfalls of overzealous review but only by reinstating an unrealistic and
anachronistic vision of agency expertise.”); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS:
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there remains a distinct risk that the agency will get unlucky and draw
a hard look panel, and it is nearly impossible for an agency to know in
150
advance what the panel’s predilection will be. Professor Jerry
Mashaw observes that because of this significant unpredictability in
the applicable standard of review, the courts essentially function “as
robed roulette wheels churning out results—either ‘case dismissed’ or
‘remanded to the agency for further development’—in a fashion that
151
approximate[s] chance.”
It is this risk that the judicial roulette wheel will settle on a hard
152
look standard that leads agencies to assume the worst. Professor R.
Shep Melnick observes: “Since agencies do not like losing big court
cases, they reacted defensively [to the courts’ requirements],
accumulating more and more information, responding to all
comments, and covering their bets. The rulemaking record grew
153
enormously, far beyond any judge’s ability to review it.” And
“[t]hus began a vicious cycle: the more effort agencies put into
rulemaking, the more they feared losing, and the more defensive
154
rulemaking became.” Indeed, not only is there no filter to limit the
information agencies need to support their rulemakings, but also,
from their perspective, providing excessive information is a winning
strategy.
Although filter failure and information costs have not been
factored directly into the scholarly complaints about the current state
of judicial review, many critics do identify the adverse consequences
associated with the unnecessary expansion of the rulemaking and
accompanying record. Professor Pierce, a longtime critic of hard look
review, argues that this unrestricted form of judicial scrutiny has
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 356 (1983) (concluding that judges have wisely realized
their own limitations and overturned only those standards that are based on “glaring error”).
150. See ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 223,
225 (2003) (underscoring how uncertainty in judicial review, coupled with adversarialism, leads
to counterproductive delays and skews in the resulting influence and power of different groups
affected by a rulemaking); MASHAW, supra note 114, at 165 (underscoring that “most seem to
argue that the real impediment created by judicial review is uncertainty” in how courts will
analyze the rule).
151. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 181.
152. See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 600–01 (discussing how Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983),
requires an agency to respond to all comments and criticisms and noting the resultant adverse
effects that this has on the agency).
153. R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245,
247 (1992).
154. Id.
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forced agencies to engage in excessive data analysis and explanation,
filling hundreds of pages of the Federal Register that courts ultimately
“may, or may not, consider an adequate response to the 10,000–
155
1,000,000 pages of comments” received. In her study of the effects
of judicial review on the EPA, Professor Rosemary O’Leary similarly
concludes that “the proliferation of court decisions has forced what
one EPA staff member called ‘non-user-friendly’ regulations.
According to EPA technical staff, the Office of General Counsel
often rewrites regulations, notices, and proposals in anticipation that
a lawsuit is imminent. Lawyers have the last word in most EPA
156
actions.” And in an article on Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
157
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Professor Richard
Stewart also takes note of the informational consequences of hard
look review:
In response to these [hard look] rulings, agency lawyers sought to
bolster the agency’s position by elaborate documentation, while
respondents and intervenors submitted contrary documentation
which they themselves developed or obtained from agency files
through Freedom of Information Act litigation. These various
158
documents provided an elaborate record for judicial review . . . .

Yet even if the courts were consistently deferential, agencies
might still perceive some benefits to producing records and rules that
provide communications that are far more technical, lengthy, and
detailed than needed or justified under the circumstances. An overly
complex rulemaking offers an agency the benefit of exhausting its
adversaries. The enormous size and breathtaking detail and
technicality may even help discourage some courts that might
otherwise be inclined to review the agency’s decision with some care.
Professor Melnick speculates about “judicial exhaustion” that
159
characterizes some courts’ reviews of agency actions. In these cases,

155. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to
Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 920 (2007).
156. Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and
Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 566 (1989)
(citation omitted).
157. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
158. Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1812 (1978).
159. R. Shep Melnick, Courts and Agencies 14 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.bc.edu/schools/cas/polisci/meta-elements/pdf/melnick/courts-and-agencies.pdf.

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

1362

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1321

the courts may resort to a deferential approach simply because they
lack the stamina to do anything else.
Thus, what began in 1947 as a hopeful, concise general statement
rule has been transformed through sixty years of litigation into a
lengthy, technical, and often incomprehensible jumble. The goal of
hard look review may have been noble in theory, but in practice this
form of judicial review appears to have led to precisely the opposite
160
of what its proponents imagined. Instead of providing a means for
increasing meaningful oversight of agency rulemakings, hard look
review causes the agency to prepare a defensive rulemaking that will
tend to alienate some key interest groups (not to mention the general
161
public) and all but the most energetic (or ideologically bent) judges.
2. Parallel Incentives for Interest Groups to Engage in
Information Capture. The incentives for information excess arising
from judicial review affect not only the agencies but also the interest
groups that participate in the rulemaking process. Case law sends a
signal to these parties that is quite similar to that transmitted to the
agencies; namely, to include in their comments highly specific, very
detailed, extensively documented comments on every conceivable
point of contention, and to back up their comments with the threat of
160. In advocating for hard look review, William Pedersen itemized the types of
requirements that should be imposed on agencies. Note that, with the benefit of hindsight, it
becomes clear how each of these requirements ultimately imposes cumulative information
burdens on agencies that are likely to lead to excess from either the interest groups or the
agency itself:
First, both the essential factual data on which the rule is based and the methodology
used in reasoning from the data to the proposed standard must be disclosed for
comment at the time a rule is proposed. To the extent they are not available at that
time, they must be disclosed when they become available. Second, the agency's
discussion of the basis and purpose of its rule—generally contained in the
“preambles” to the notices of proposed and final rulemaking and in the
accompanying technical support documents—must detail the steps of the agency's
reasoning and its factual basis. Third, significant comments received during the public
comment period must be answered at the time of final promulgation. However,
comments must meet a standard of detail equal to that required of the agency in
promulgating its rule before they will be considered significant. Fourth, only
objections to the regulations which were raised with some specificity during the public
comment period, and to which the agency thus had an opportunity to respond, may
be raised during judicial review.
William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and Information Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 75–76
(1975) (footnotes omitted).
161. See, e.g., id. at 66–70 (describing how EPA attorneys play a large role in forming the
administrative record and tend to include a great deal of material to protect the agency from
suit); Melnick, supra note 153, at 256 (citing studies and concluding that because of aggressive
judicial review, agency lawyers are the biggest “winners” as “[f]requently—especially on
remand—they end up writing substantial portions of the regulations”).
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litigation. Attorneys working primarily for industry stress that the
most important task for their clients is to “build the best record” they
can, observing that “[w]ritten comments are the single most effective
technique” for doing so: “[m]ake sure that you submit to the Agency
all relevant information supporting your concerns in the rulemaking.
This is the best way to convince the Agency to respond favorably to
162
your concerns.” Because there are no limits to the information that
agencies are expected to process, there is no need for these
commenters to provide succinct statements of their complaints.
Instead, they can leave the task of processing the information to the
agencies.
Several unrelated doctrines further reinforce the incentives for
stakeholders to use information as an offensive weapon in their
dealings with agencies. First, the courts generally require that only
parties that file comments during the notice-and-comment period can
163
later be involved in litigation against the agency. This requirement
originates from the notion that before seeking judicial redress, a party
164
must exhaust its administrative remedies. Some operative statutes
165
also impose this requirement on rulemakings.
The courts’ demand that parties exhaust their administrative
remedies was originally conceived of as a way to save agency
resources, both by avoiding “premature interruption” of the
rulemaking process and by bringing the courts into the picture only as
166
a last resort. But when viewed from the perspective of information,
this requirement actually increases the burden on agencies. In order
to preserve their claims, rational parties will react by erring on the
side of providing too much rather than too little information. Indeed,
the rule suggests not only that a party must file a comment before it
can litigate but also that it must file that same, specific comment

162. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 9–10 (collecting the most important advice from the
top attorneys interviewed for their report).
163. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) (setting out the reasons for
exhausting remedies first within the agency before raising the issue with the court).
164. See generally Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1985) (outlining the rationale behind the
exhaustion requirement and arguing for the abolition of exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement).
165. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2006) (noting that “[o]nly an
objection to a rule or procedure which was raised with reasonable specificity during the period
for public comment (including any public hearing) may be raised during judicial review,” with
limited exceptions).
166. McKart, 395 U.S. at 193–95.
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before raising it in court. If a party neglects to raise an argument
during the comment period, however preliminarily, it is generally
167
foreclosed from raising the issue later. Because the threat of
litigation may be the only, or at least the best, way for stakeholders to
get the agency’s attention during the rulemaking process, they have
strong incentives to lay the groundwork for future legal action by
including every plausible argument in their comments.
Additionally, and more worrisome from the standpoint of
information excess, the courts have held that more general comments
from affected parties—even if lodged in writing and on time—are
168
usually not material enough to matter legally. To preserve issues for
litigation, affected parties are thus best-advised to provide comments
169
that are specific, detailed, and well documented. This seemingly
reasonable requirement for specificity again encourages interested
parties to provide too much documentation, too many specifics, and
170
too much detail, rather than too little.
Finally, the courts have signaled that the agency ignores these
171
material comments at its peril. This, however, creates a situation in
which interested parties can overwhelm the rulemaking process when
it is in their interest to do so. With no limits on the extent or nature of
the information they can file, the temptation to drown the agency in
criticisms and accompanying documentation is likely irresistible, at
least for some resourceful interested parties. As the D.C. Circuit
remarked in a case with a record that spanned more than ten
thousand pages:

167. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(holding that arguments not raised during the comment period may be foreclosed in later
proceedings).
168. See, e.g., Gordon C. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement
of Judicial Review “On the Record,” 10 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 179, 207 (1996) (“[T]he largely
unenforceable requirement that agencies consider comments was translated into the real
requirement that an agency, in explaining its decision, respond to any significant comment
which challenged its rationality.”).
169. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(holding that a commenter cannot merely assert that a general mistake was made, but must
provide specific evidence and argumentation as to the nature of that mistake and its
implications).
170. See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 594 (“If a comment criticizes in detail some
characteristic of the agency’s proposed rule . . . and the agency retains that characteristic in the
final rule without including in its statement of basis and purpose a relatively detailed response
to that criticism, a reviewing court is likely to hold the rule unlawful . . . .”).
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The record presented to us on appeal or petition for review is a
sump in which the parties have deposited a sundry mass of materials
that have neither passed through the filter of rules of evidence nor
undergone the refining fire of adversarial presentation. The lack of
discipline in such a record, coupled with its sheer mass . . . makes the
record of informal rulemaking a less than fertile ground for judicial
172
review.

In his case study of an OSHA rulemaking, Professor Patrick
Schmidt traces how the successful parties carefully laced the record
with multiple grounds for suit and then used these issues to hold the
173
agency hostage to their viewpoints. On the other hand, when a
participant fails to lodge comments and preserve its right to judicial
review, the agency discounts and in some cases completely ignores
174
their concerns.
In sum, the case law recommends that an interested party raise
every possible issue and criticism in writing, in detail, and ideally with
full documentation before the comment period closes. If this does not
occur, the party effectively waives its opportunity to raise the issues in
future litigation. Rational interest groups will respond to these legal
incentives by raising every imaginable point of difference so as to
preserve their right to judicial review. If an interest group thinks
strategically, it will also consider the added bonus that its excessive
175
communications and filings might even wear the agency down.
C. Administrative Processes in the Shadows
Because information is central to rulemakings, participants that
enjoy privileged access to information may find that they also enjoy
special advantages in the process. The agency becomes dependant on
their counsel. Yet rather than correct for these information
imbalances, the administrative process allows these groups to enjoy a

172. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted); see also Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1978)
(observing that judicial review was complicated by the record, which consisted of a “jumble of
letters, advertisements, comments, drafts, reports and publications . . . run[ning] for almost 2,000
pages . . . [with] no index”); Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th
Cir. 1974) (lamenting that the record is “some 238 documents occupying approximately two and
one half feet of shelf space” that contains a mix of technical information).
173. See Patrick Schmidt, Pursuing Regulatory Relief: Strategic Participation and Litigation
in U.S. OSHA Rulemaking, 4 BUS. & POL. 71 passim (2002).
174. Id. at 77.
175. See infra note 267.
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further edge on their opponents by creating opportunities and
incentives for agencies to meet with these particularly knowledgeable
groups outside of the formal process. The APA does require
communications between agencies and stakeholders to take place in
the sunlight, but such communications are practically limited to the
period between publication of the proposed and final rules. Both
before and after this transparent process, informationally endowed
stakeholders and agency staff can negotiate regulatory policies in the
shadows, where they are typically free of mandatory docket and
recordkeeping requirements. In these darkened settings,
unnecessarily high information costs arise more from information
inaccessibility than from information excess, and these costs fall
exclusively on those groups that are not included in the ex parte
communications. An analysis of the high information costs arising
from the case law is thus not complete without a discussion of how
some participants gain information-related advantages over others
during these other stages of the rulemaking process.
1. Participating in the Development of the Proposed Rule.
Despite the considerable attention devoted to open government as
memorialized through notice and comment and judicial review, these
events are only part of the larger rulemaking life cycle. Based on his
experience as general counsel of the EPA, Professor E. Donald
Elliott observes that “[n]otice-and-comment rulemaking is to public
participation as Japanese Kabuki theatre is to human passions—a
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of
176
something which in real life takes place in other venues.” These
venues range from “informal meetings with trade associations and
other constituency groups, to roundtables, to floating ‘trial balloons’
177
in speeches or leaks to the trade press.” Although proposed rules,
on the surface, appear to be drafted by agency staff based on internal
technical analyses, most of them are likely the result of extensive
negotiations with interested parties that remain unrecorded and
perhaps even unacknowledged. The only residual signs of this early
dealmaking may arise in vague, post hoc rationalizations scattered
178
throughout a proposed rule preamble.
176. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
177. Id. at 1493.
178. William Pedersen, then an attorney with the EPA, described how the “real”
decisionmaking process for rules often occurred. See Pedersen, supra note 160, at 55–57. Most, if
not all, of this information is considered “deliberative process” and thus is hidden from view.
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There are several strands of judicial doctrine that inadvertently
encourage agencies to work with affected parties in the shadows
rather than in the sunlight as anticipated by the APA. First, and
perhaps most importantly, the courts have made it painfully clear that
if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must be in essentially final
179
form at the proposed rule stage. Material changes made after this
point require a new notice-and-comment process and may even
180
require the agency to start over. To avoid the need to make
181
“material” changes, the agency is eager to get it right the first time.
In fact, the basic incentive for agencies to produce nearly complete
proposed rules arises from the commitment to due process embedded
by the courts into informal rulemakings, which in theory demands
that parties have an opportunity to comment on all significant aspects
182
of the rule.
The prospect of a seemingly endless cycle of notice and comment
provides a powerful incentive for the agency to publish a proposed
rule that has been heavily vetted before it is publicly aired as an
183
informal proposal. In doing so, the agency will find it in its interest
to reach out to the most knowledgeable and litigious stakeholders. At

179. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 757–63 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the
agency failed to provide meaningful notice-and-comment opportunities on issues in the final
rule; the issues were raised by commenters during the notice-and-comment process); Chocolate
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1099–100 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same); see also Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425
F.3d 992, 995–98 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating an EPA rule setting forth monitoring requirements
because the agency “flip flopped” after notice and comment and the final rule was not a logical
outgrowth of the proposed rule, thus violating the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements).
180. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 856, 893–900 (2007) (criticizing courts for adding the requirement that agencies
go through a second notice-and-comment process when the final rule is not the “logical
outgrowth” of the proposed rule and discussing how this requirement impedes agency
adaptability to new information during the notice-and-comment period). See generally 1
PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.3 (discussing the extensive case law on whether an agency’s notice was
adequate based on subsequent developments occurring after the proposed rule in the course of
the rulemaking).
181. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 176, at 1495 (“Because of the need to create a record, real
public participation—the kind of back and forth dialogue in which minds (and rules) are really
changed—primarily takes place in various fora well in advance of a notice of proposed
rulemaking appearing in the Federal Register.”).
182. Cf. Rubin, supra note 119, at 111 (arguing that this type of procedural requirement is
modeled after “due process” protections in adjudication).
183. See generally William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability
and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 66 (2004) (arguing that the pre-NPRM period provides rich opportunities for
informal contacts and engagement by agencies with stakeholders).

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

1368

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1321

the very least, these pre–Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (preNPRM) discussions will educate the agency about difficult technical
issues and provide it with a means of anticipating and addressing
these issues in the proposed rule without being caught off-guard. At
most, engaging stakeholders in the development of a proposed rule
may get their buy-in, making them less inclined to undo the proposed
rule by filing material comments later in the process.
The agency is also well-advised to dump all it has learned from
extensive pre-NPRM discussions directly into the preamble of the
184
proposed rule.
Because there are effectively no filtering
requirements on the agency’s proposal, and because including all of
this detail helps protect against the risk of material comments (which
can set the process back), the incentives for information excess in
proposed rulemakings are again unequivocal. The agency’s rational
response to these incentives, however, raises the risk that the
proposed rule and the final rule will be much less accessible,
particularly to those who were not involved in pre-NPRM
185
negotiations. If affected parties have been left out of pre–proposedrule discussions and are faced with the prospect of processing and
critiquing a one-hundred-page, opaque explanation and discussion
during a short notice-and-comment period, it is at least possible that
186
they will choose to forgo this rather time-intensive exercise.
Creating a voluminous record may thus ultimately benefit the agency
by lowering the risk of material comments and limiting the total
number of comments in need of response.
Ideally, the courts would foreclose substantive communications
between stakeholders and the agency that do not occur in the
sunlight. Instead, they allow the agency to freely negotiate its rules
during the pre–proposed-rule process without the significant
encumbrance of transparency requirements. The agency must log its
ex parte contacts in the public record only after publishing the
187
proposed rule and generally not before.

184. See infra notes 237–42 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 176, at 1492 (“What was once (perhaps) a means for
securing public input into agency decisions has become today primarily a method for compiling
a record for judicial review. No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-andcomment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested
parties.”).
186. See infra Part III.A.
187. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that
“communications which are received prior to issuance of a formal notice of rulemaking do not,
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In these darkened settings, unnecessarily high information costs
can arise, not only from excessive detail in the agency’s proposal, but
also from the fact that some of this detail may be unexplained and
effectively unintelligible to those who did not take part in pre-NPRM
deliberations. Still more problematic, the added costs generally fall on
only one sector—in environmental rulemakings, this is often the same
sector of affected parties that is already strapped for resources to
participate. Somewhat ironically, processes intended by the courts to
help ensure that rulemakings are accessible and accountable to the
public are responsible for causing this inequitable access.
2. Renegotiating the Final Rule After Publication. Rulemaking in
the shadows occurs again after the rule is finalized, but this time the
agency’s interest in continuing to work on the rule arises only in cases
in which a party has filed, or perhaps threatens to file, a petition for
judicial review. During this post-rule litigation, court processes
impose some structure on the parties. These court processes,
however, require only very limited transparency for negotiations that
188
take place between the litigants.
Litigation thus opens the doors to a second round of negotiations
that, even more than the pre-NPRM period, can involve secret deals
over details, interpretations, and related features of a rule with only a
189
narrow slice of the affected interests. In his study of the EPA’s
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) rulemakings, for
example, Professor Cary Coglianese concludes that post-rule
“litigation offers interest groups and the agency an opportunity to do
in general, have to be put in a public file. . . . [but] [o]nce a notice of proposed rulemaking has
been issued . . . any agency official or employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be
involved in the decisional process of the rulemaking proceeding, should [avoid ex parte contacts
and place any such contacts in the public file]”).
188. Even after a court opinion is issued, negotiations often continue and can lead to
mutually accommodating resolutions. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 47, at 118–20. But it
seems more likely that in these post-opinion negotiations, accountability is slightly higher not
only because the results are more visible but because the options have been potentially limited
by the court’s ruling and by the litigation process itself, which tends to tee up and simplify the
issues under dispute.
189. As one regulator insider summarized in an interview with Professor Coglianese:
I see this litigation as just a continuation and a narrowing of the regulatory process,
and I think most of the players do too. . . . Once it’s all over at the official stage, you
start the second stage and you start it by filing litigation so that you can be at the table
and work it out with only those people who are really interested. You’ve narrowed
the universe from the general public down to those who really care, and you can get
down to business. Litigation just happens to be the way you do it.
Id. at 108.
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something they were not permitted to do in the notice-and-comment
190
period: negotiate in secret.” A trade association’s general counsel
elaborated: “[Litigation] is often a vehicle to kind of lead to a revision
of regulations. . . . There are a number of cases that are filed and
automatically stayed because we are filing them just so we go back to
191
the agency and basically kind of renegotiate the regs.” Another
corporate counsel remarked: “It is almost like having another
rulemaking with those people who care enough about the issues to
192
spend the time, being the ones who get to play.” These negotiations
193
also “hold an added degree of secrecy given their privileged status”
and can help “immunize agency officials from oversight by third
194
parties such as the Office of Management and Budget.” Information
costs rise as accountability mechanisms decline at this late stage in the
rulemaking.
In most cases, there is also a fair amount of room remaining in
the post-rule stage to negotiate with respect to the substance of a rule.
Although any direct changes to the rule’s text must go through a new
notice-and-comment period, other changes, including official
interpretations, policy guidances, and enforcement priorities, escape
195
this fate. As Professor Schmidt found in his case study, these
interpretive guidances can be sufficiently meaningful to lead a litigant
196
to voluntarily dismiss its case.
The significance of post-rule negotiations is spotlighted in
Professor Coglianese’s study but is surprisingly unexplored elsewhere
in the literature. To the extent that post-litigation settlements occur—
and Professor Coglianese’s findings suggest that they occur
197
frequently —they provide yet another vehicle for driving up

190. Id. at 107.
191. Id. at 88.
192. Id. at 91.
193. Id. at 107.
194. Id. at 131.
195. See, e.g., Richard Stoll, Coping with the RCRA Hazardous Waste System: A Few
Practical Points for Fun and Profit, 1 ENVTL. HAZARDS 6, 6 (1989), reprinted in PERCIVAL ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 257 (2d ed. 1996)
(describing how the EPA’s private letters, obscure guidance documents, and hidden statements
in unrelated final rule preambles have given industry participants considerable wiggle room in
satisfying compliance requirements in hazardous waste rules).
196. See Schmidt, supra note 173, at 74 (highlighting the significance of interpretive
guidance).
197. Professor Coglianese found that at least one petition for judicial review was filed for 35
percent of significant RCRA and Clean Air Act rules. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 66 tbl.3-2.
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information costs for outsiders who are not included in the
negotiations. It is particularly problematic that these secret
negotiations with a small group of affected parties occur in response
to the liberalized judicial review process, a legal intervention that was
intended specifically to heighten rather than reduce agency
accountability.
D. Administrative Law and Information: A Conceptual Summary
Administrative law is not simply passive in its tolerance of
unlimited information; it exacerbates the problem of information
excess by creating multiple incentives for rulemaking participants to
overload the system with a variety of information costs. The
rulemaking review game, for example, produces incentives for
stakeholders to fill the record with intricate details, raise every
conceivable argument, err on the side of including attachments that
may not be terribly helpful, engage in negotiations outside of formal
notice-and-comment parameters, and raise every litigation threat
within their grasp. For their part, agencies are foreclosed from trying
to limit the information presented to them. They must respond to all
material comments, no matter how many, how technical, or how
poorly framed. They must solicit input and keep comment periods
open until everyone has the chance to submit volumes of information.
They, too, face incentives to present their analysis in undigested,
often incomprehensible form to the larger public and, perhaps worse,
to work closely with at least some affected parties in the shadow of
the APA, before proposing a rule and after publishing the final rule.
The resulting process treats information as an undiminishing
good that not only welcomes excessive information but also
encourages it at all stages of the process. In a system that rewards
interest groups for creating elaborate records for review and agencies
for delving into minute details to insulate their rules from attack,
regulatory participants come to understand that “the more
information, the better.” In fact, a related empirical study of EPA air
toxic rules found exactly this relationship between information input
and output, at least during notice and comment: as comments
198
increase, so do changes made to the rules.

Nearly half of those challenges were voluntairly dismissed, id. at 97 n.17, suggesting that many
of those cases involved settlement.
198. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 21 tbl.8.
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Yet common sense, contemporary scholarship, and basic
economic models all predict that there is a point of diminishing
returns on information, at least if there is some limit on the time and
199
resources available to the agency to process the input. One way the
resulting quality of decisions could drop, for example, is when the
information becomes so excessive and detailed that it must be
processed by agency contractors who, in turn, suggest cumulative
addenda to the rule in rote fashion that further mire the rule down in
unnecessary complexity and detail. Problems arise not only because
parties naturally load excess information into the system, but also
because the system’s inattention to information excess provides
opportunities for strategic action. Clever participants can use
excessive filings to deliberately move the rulemaking into more
hopeless areas of information overload so that they may gain control
over outcomes or throw the regulatory process into dysfunction.
Adversarial or more balanced contests between interest groups, when
they do occur, may spotlight the main issues and overcome judicial
and administrative incentives for information overload by forcing the
rule into the information sweet spot of political and administrative
oversight. But for complex rules, this jump down the information
incline is likely to be the exception rather than the rule.
III. CONSEQUENCES
“The ‘rules of the game’ powerfully affect who wins, who loses,
200
or who even is allowed to play.” The rules of the game discussed in
the previous Part tolerate unlimited and unnecessarily excessive
information; create positive incentives for participants to control the
agency agenda with excessive and nitpicking filings; and ultimately
encourage the agency to work more closely with these participants,
largely out of the reach of the APA, which in turn allows them to gain
an information-based edge over their opponents.
This Part considers consequences that logically flow from this
game. If all participants and agencies behave rationally in response to
these rules, what are the consequences for policymaking and

199. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
200. CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PUBLIC
ISSUE 13 (1987); see also CROLEY, supra note 39, at 69 (arguing that “focusing only on
decisionmakers’ incentives, motives, and goals without consideration of how they are shaped,
reinforced, and altered by the decisionmaking procedures will yield incomplete understandings
of regulatory outcomes”).
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accountable government? The analysis makes a best-case assumption
that the agency is generally operating in good faith and—all things
being equal—would prefer to make its rules accessible and its results
democratically responsive. The analysis does not, in other words,
assume that the agency acts secretly or on behalf of politically
preferred constituencies or is subject to capture in the more
traditional sense. The reason for this optimistic assumption is that it
catches the more pessimistic view of agencies as well. If agencies
unintentionally produce rules that are inaccessible and lead to
imbalanced participation, it is easy to see how they could do so
deliberately by making the discussions unintelligible.
In this discussion, however, it is important to put the problem of
information capture and filter failure within the larger administrative
context. Administrative law scholars have long worried about a
variety of maladies that impair the agencies’ ability to do their job of
producing high-quality and democratic-resembling rules. Scarce and
diminishing resources of agencies with an increasing workload,
assaults on the integrity of agency staff that take a toll on morale and
on the recruitment and retention of the best and brightest, and
gradual White House takeover and reversals of agency decisions that
reduce agency independence and motivation all are understood to
201
impair the quality of regulatory decisionmaking.
Information
capture does not overwhelm these other, simultaneous problems, but
rather moves in the same direction. The extent to which the
consequences or outcomes discussed here are specifically linked to
information capture as opposed to agency impotence or malaise is
impossible to determine. Nevertheless, because the forces operate
simultaneously and generally in complementary ways, it seems likely
that at least some of the consequences can be attributable to
information capture.
This Part highlights four main consequences that emerge from
information capture, the first of which—the loss of pluralistic
oversight—is the most significant and thus is discussed in the most
detail. This Part’s three remaining Sections explore other adverse
consequences of filter failure and information capture for agency

201. For a comprehensive discussion of these problems, see generally RENA STEINZOR &
SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACCOUNTABILITY AND
SECRECY IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (forthcoming 2010), and Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy
of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
311 (1991).

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

1374

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1321

governance, which include the inhibition of creative policymaking,
the limitations of transparency and open government as means for
ensuring agency accountability, and the difficulties of reversing
information excesses once they have entered the system. Figure 2
diagrams these consequences, a schematic that not only forms the
organization for this Part but also becomes the template for reforms
discussed in the final Part.
Figure 2. A Schematic of the Adverse Consequences of Information
Capture

A. Implications for Pluralistic Oversight
The administrative state is built on an assumption that pluralistic
processes will provide the primary means for keeping agencies
accountable. Rigorous engagement by a diverse and balanced
assortment of affected interests, reinforced by an ability to challenge
regulations in court, equates roughly with a form of democratic
oversight. Professor Edward Rubin argues that this pluralistic
engagement is so important to current conceptions of administrative
process that the APA is essentially a “one-trick pony”: “[a]ll of its
basic provisions rely on a single method for controlling the actions of
202
administrative agencies, namely, participation by private parties.”
Indeed, even in the Attorney General’s Report that helped make the
case for the APA’s passage, the need for pluralistic oversight of
202. Rubin, supra note 119, at 101.
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agencies was considered pivotal to the success of the administrative
state: “[p]articipation by these groups [economic and communitybased] in the rule-making process is essential to permit administrative
agencies to inform themselves and to afford adequate safeguards to
203
private interests.”
Scholars writing in administrative law echo this faith in pluralistic
processes and observe its success over the decades, with particular
204
emphasis on environmental regulation. Professor James Q. Wilson,
for example, observes: “EPA has had to deal with as many complaints
and lawsuits from environmentalists as from industry, despite the
205
economic and political advantages industry presumably enjoys.” In
their study of interest group politics, Professors Burdett Loomis and
Allan Cigler conclude that by the early 1980s, a “participation
revolution” had arisen comprising citizens and special interest groups
seeking collective material benefits for the public at large: “[t]he freerider problem has proven not to be an insurmountable barrier to
group formation, and many new interest groups do not use selective
206
material benefits to gain support.” Professor Christopher Bosso
adds to this positive characterization in his study of pesticide politics:
“[b]y the mid-1980s, however, we find a diversity in representation
207
that, on the surface at least, gives pluralists some vindication.” More
recently, in his book on public interest regulation, Professor Steven
Croley argues that “[w]hile one can still distinguish among regulatory
decisions according to the amount of public attention they generate
or the number of outside participants they involve, few agency
decisions with significant stakes escape public attention or
participation completely. Regulatory decisionmaking is seldom done
208
in the dark anymore.”
The conventional wisdom that environmental rulemakings are
subject to input from a diverse and wide range of affected parties is
203. ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 103 (1941).
204. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1683 (“Today, the exercise of agency discretion is
inevitably seen as the essentially legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various
private interests affected by agency policy.” (footnote omitted)).
205. WILSON, supra note 50, at 385.
206. Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics,
in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1, 11 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 1983).
207. BOSSO, supra note 200, at 245. This is in part because “[e]nvironmental policies, by
their nature, prompt acrid disputes among equally determined and almost permanently
mobilized sets of claimants because they exhibit structures of incentives more contagious to
conflict than do agricultural subsidies or water projects.” Id. at 252.
208. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 291–92.
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further reinforced by the work of Professors Cass Sunstein and thenJudge Stephen Breyer. They both write about a regulatory system
that they worry is too easily influenced by misinformed public opinion
and even hysteria that derails sensible regulation and leads to
209
inefficient pollution standards. Their reforms attempt to circumvent
these public passions and biases through the use of more rational
210
regulatory tools and expert bodies.
The existence of filter failure and the possibility of information
capture, however, cast doubt on these optimistic portrayals of the
regulatory process, at least for a potentially important area of
211
regulatory activity in which information costs are particularly high.
This is because information costs not only substantially increase the
costs of participation, particularly for groups that lack inside
information, but also—through the resulting clouding of the issues—
work simultaneously to reduce the payoff or benefits of participation
212
for these same groups. The escalating information costs, in turn,
may tilt the playing field so significantly against those with the least
resources that the natural pluralistic processes that underlie
rulemaking systems cease to function.
This Section collects evidence of possible imbalance in interest
group engagement in EPA rulemakings in which information costs
are likely to be very high and uncontrolled by adversarial
counterpressure. Preexisting sources of imbalances in participatory
capabilities among sectors of affected interests are considered first.
Layered on top of this asymmetry are additional information

209. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 33 (1993) (describing how public perceptions trigger a “vicious circle” of
legislation and regulation of trivial risks that impose unjustified costs on regulated parties);
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 741 (1999) (discussing how salient and accessible claims about environmental risks, often
promoted by public interest groups, can cascade through the public to lead to unsupported
urgent calls for regulation of trivial risks, and offering recommendations for insulating civil
servants from these mass demands).
210. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 209, at 68–72 (recommending that an elite group of
“super regulators” make regulatory decisions rather than basing regulations on public
preferences, as is currently the case); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000) (recommending the use of cost-benefit analysis to correct for
numerous cognitive deficits in public assessment of risk); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION passim (1996)
(recommending the use of cost-benefit analysis to correct for various undesirable effects of
public governance).
211. See supra Part I.B.
212. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
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advantages arising from the administrative process that accrue
primarily to regulated parties. These additional advantages are
discussed in the second Section. As regulatory proposals become
more detailed and costly to penetrate, due in part to the heavy
engagement of a narrow slice of affected parties earlier in the process,
public interest groups continue to drop out during the public noticeand-comment process, a problem discussed in the third Section. The
final Section then considers countervailing institutional mechanisms
for representation of less well-financed interests and finds them
lacking. The cumulative result is a badly skewed participatory
process. Information capture is not the only explanation for a
breakdown in pluralistic oversight mechanisms, but it is the primary
contender and, at the very least, should be taken seriously.
Before continuing, it is important to underscore that information
capture will not afflict all rules. Some rulemakings are very much in
the public eye, despite their complexity, and thus manage to rise
above the battles over details in ways that highlight their implications
for a broader audience. In these settings, a balanced array of interest
groups compete for the short attention span of political officials and
the public, dedicating considerable time to determining how to make
their case persuasively. The resulting, self-imposed filtering of
information and more balanced engagement evidenced in these rules
occur because natural pluralistic processes are working. In his book,
Professor Croley provides compelling case studies of such high213
visibility rules promulgated by several agencies, including the EPA.
His case studies focus on examples that not only involved vigorous
engagement by the public interest community but were actually
214
triggered by petitions filed by these very groups. These rulemakings,
however, may well be the exception rather than the rule, at least at
215
the EPA.
The exploration of the information capture phenomenon in this
Part considers only those rules that generally do not make it into the
newspaper and are largely obscure to the public, even though they
make an important contribution to the protection of public health and

213. These are the case studies that Professor Croley considers in his book. See CROLEY,
supra note 39, at 242 (conceding that his primary case studies were all prompted by lawsuits by
public interest organizations against the agencies).
214. See id. at 242–43.
215. See supra Part I.B; infra Part III.B.2–3.
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216

the environment. It is difficult to determine how many rules fit into
this group relative to newsworthy rules. But the fact that the EPA
promulgates more than three hundred rules per year, coupled with
the fact that most of the EPA’s rulemaking assignments involve
217
highly technical pollution control regulations, suggests that a
significant share of EPA rulemakings might be susceptible to
information capture.
1. The First Challenge for Pluralistic Oversight: Basic Imbalances
in Resources and Information. The most obvious way that filter
failure exacerbates preexisting imbalances in interest group
participation is by making the costs of participation much higher than
necessary—so high that in many cases, it functions as a barrier to
entry. When a regulatory participant is not required to filter the
information it shares with the agency—indeed, when the system
actually encourages information excess—then other participants may
find themselves investing a good deal of resources and energy merely
trying to keep up with the flood of issues and information, much of
which might be peripheral or even irrelevant. As a strategic matter,
excessive detail, technical issues, and side-bars may help price out
these less well-financed adversaries, or at least drive up their costs of
engaging in the regulatory exercise.
Pluralistic processes are undermined by a system that becomes
oblivious to the costs imposed on participants to engage in a
meaningful way, particularly when there is no chance of fee
reimbursement at the end of the process. Groups that already
struggle against organizational and related collective action
impediments to represent the public interest cannot keep up. In such
a system, the rich become richer (or at least more dominant) by
glutting the system with information excess, forcing their opposition
218
out of rulemaking proceedings.
In regulatory settings characterized by escalating information
costs, it is generally (but perhaps not always) the public interest
groups that find themselves on the short end of the participation stick.
The resources of public nonprofits are typically smaller in comparison

216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
218. This is precisely Professor Gormley’s intuition in identifying “complexity” as one of the
two variables that can cause regulatory problems to fall out of direct mechanisms of public
oversight and engagement. See Gormley, supra note 52, at 597.
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to their regulated opponents, particularly with respect to the
resources available to participate throughout the entire rulemaking
219
life cycle. It is also the case that these public interest groups have a
stake in almost all of the EPA’s rulemakings; regulated parties, by
contrast, will find only a few rules directly relevant to their individual
220
operations. As a result, environmental nonprofits have much less to
spend and far more to spend it on, as compared to particular
industries. These cumulative disparities in resources do not mean that
public interest groups cannot be effective, but it underscores how
221
they must pick their battles among rules.
There is one last source of possible disparity in participation that
arises from differing levels of access to key information relevant to
the rule. Some of this critical information is more readily available
(due to greater access and specialized knowledge) to some groups
than to others. Regulated industries, for example, enjoy considerably
more inside information about how their plants run, how pollution
control equipment might or might not work once in place, what
approaches have and have not been considered or tried, and a host of
222
other technical issues central to the rulemaking.
In these
rulemakings, the cost for a nonprofit to participate is higher relative
to its industry counterpart because of the added resources necessary
for them first to access and then to master such technical, inside
information. Thus, public interest groups not only have fewer
resources but also may face higher costs to participation per rule than
their adversaries.
Resource and information disparities are only the beginning of
the trouble when it comes to ensuring pluralistic oversight of
complicated rulemakings. The remainder of this Section highlights
more subtle but potentially significant information-related factors
that further increase the gap between the haves and have-nots as they
participate in highly technical and complex EPA rules.

219. See generally HREBENAR, supra note 40, at 261–67, 329–30 (describing underfunded
public interest groups); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1767–70 (describing the same and highlighting
process-related handicaps that result from imbalance).
220. Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.
221. It might be further argued that the stakes for these regulated industries are actually
higher per capita than for environmental nonprofits. But because this involves
incommensurables—life versus profit losses—it is more contestable. In any event, because this
added skewing factor only further tilts the rulemaking toward the regulated industry, it can be
bracketed as yet another reinforcing factor for purposes of argument.
222. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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2. The Second Challenge for Pluralistic Oversight: Information
Symbiosis between the Agency and Regulated Parties.
The
administrative process encourages the agency to know its enemies, at
least if these groups hold in their possession technical facts and details
223
that might prove particularly successful in challenging the rule later.
Interest groups with extra knowledge or facts relevant to a rule are
likely to enjoy special participatory advantages in the process and
may even find themselves working side-by-side with the agency as it
develops its proposed rule.
In most complex rulemakings, the agency appears to be quite
dependant on knowledgeable stakeholders to educate it about critical
issues peculiarly within their grasp. Such communications can be
quite a bonus for these select groups, too, providing them with the
opportunity to shape or even frame the agency’s regulatory project in
the course of their tutorials and informal discussions. Despite the
dangers of this pre-proposal intimacy, the agency as a legal matter
appreciates that if it does not engage in this type of due diligence and
reach out to the most knowledgeable stakeholders, they are likely to
torpedo its final rule using specialized information to support their
contention that the rule will pose undue costs, operational difficulties,
or a range of other hardships. Conveniently, the law also places no
restrictions on preproposed rule communications with interest
groups. Conferences, meetings, telephone conversations, shared
drafts of a proposed rule, and the like are not limited, and need not
even be recorded in the rule’s administrative record if the agency
224
prefers to keep them under wraps.
Under these circumstances, even agency staffers skeptical of
industry claims may actively seek out industry’s help in developing
223. As Professor Croley notes, “agencies depend upon information to do whatever they
aim to do. Those with the most information, with the most credible and verifiable information,
will have a greater opportunity to influence administrative decisionmakers.” CROLEY, supra
note 39, at 135. He suggests, however, that this neutral test of providing valuable information
means that administrative processes produce a leveling effect on participation. Id. at 136. But
this logical inference neglects the information costs and the possibility that they can be so high
as to actually screen participation or viable engagement.
224. Interested parties engaged in these communications, however, will include them in the
administrative record when it suits their purpose. In some cases, interest groups even request
EPA background documents through the Freedom of Information Act and include them in
their comments to make sure they are part of the record. See, e.g., Pedersen, supra note 160, at
68–70 (observing that “this tactic [to use FOIA to access agency documents and then to
communicate them back to the agency to ensure that they make their way into the
administrative record] has worked fairly well for those who use it, even though the statute
probably wasn’t intended for that purpose”).
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the proposed rule to reduce the risk of successful challenges down the
225
road. As one agency staffer put it, “[w]e help them; they help us.”
These relationships do not necessarily form because staff members
hope to be employed later by industry, because they enjoy meals and
conferences in luxurious locations, or even because they are directed
by an appointed agency official to “play nice” with favored interest
groups, as traditional capture predicts. Under the analysis here,
working relationships, primarily with regulated parties, form at the
pre-proposal stage in large part because of the agency’s desire to
226
produce a rule that withstands judicial review. For environmentally
minded staff eager to get the final rule in place so as to create some
binding requirement on the polluting activities of industry, such preNPRM collaborations are legal necessities.
The incentives for industry to engage in rule development before
publication of the proposed rule are substantial as well. Given the
high level of deference that typically occurs during judicial review,
regulated parties will perceive major advantages to getting in at the
227
ground floor, before the proposed rule is published. By contrast,
public interest groups are likely to face fewer incentives to invest
their scarce resources heavily in pre-NPRM communications because
they will face various difficulties getting credit for gains won at this
early, informal stage. That is, one cannot trace cause and effect as
easily at this stage, nor would the agency necessarily engage openly
with groups that did advertise the gains won during pre-NPRM
communications. To the extent that administrative processes
encourage agencies to work closely with industries in the
development of the proposed rule, then, they may create significant
imbalances in interest group representation at this critical stage of the
rulemaking process.
There is little scholarly attention to these incentives for extensive
pre-NPRM interest group communications, but what has been written

225. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 9.
226. Specifically, one attorney interviewed in the Field and Robb report observed:
The reason that the Agency is generally receptive to well-reasoned technical
comments, explains Rogers, is that if you point out specific problems with a
regulatory program, then those drafting the rules will generally try to solve those
problems. They will do so not only because they want to appear to be reasonable and
responsive to public comments, but also because their willingness to refine a
regulatory program—to address identified flaws in the program—should help that
program withstand judicial review.
Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 50.
227. See supra Part II.B.1.

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

1382

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1321

presents a persuasive case that early contacts with interest groups,
particularly those with specialized knowledge, are likely to be both
228
extensive and influential. The scant systemic evidence currently
available confirms these predictions. In a preliminary study
examining interest group participation in EPA rules governing
hazardous air pollutant standards, industry had on average more than
seven hundred times more docketed communications (meetings,
letters, and telephone calls) with the EPA during the pre-NPRM
stage than public interest groups, and more than fifty times more
229
recorded contacts with the EPA than state regulators. These
striking disparities in participation on air toxic standards are
reinforced by Professor Coglianese’s study of significant hazardous
230
waste rules promulgated by the EPA from 1988 to 1991. Based on
more than forty interviews with the EPA and stakeholders involved
in EPA rules, Coglianese concludes that “[i]n the rule development
phase, industry groups tend to dominate because of the information
they can provide to the agency staff as they write a
rule. . . . Corporations and trade associations get involved in the
231
development of nearly every significant EPA rule.”
What develops from the administrative process during the
development of the actual rule, then, is a form of information
symbiosis between the agencies and the most knowledgeable and
resourceful groups. The agency appreciates that the only way to get
its rule through the process is to work closely with its fiercest allies
early in the rulemaking. Indeed, the EPA’s own training materials
openly encourage these early contacts with its adversaries.
“Negotiation and consultation with outside parties are an important
228. See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY passim (2003) (noting the possibility for important
participatory opportunities in the development of the proposed rule); Scott R. Furlong &
Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rulemaking: A Decade of Change, 15 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 369 (2005) (same); West, supra note 183, at 70–72 (same).
229. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 22–23 (reporting that based on pre-NPRM contacts
that the EPA did docket, there were—on average, per rulemaking—153 communications
(including meetings, telephone conversations, and letters) with industry; 0.7 communications
with public interest groups; and 9 communications with state and local regulators).
230. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 47–52.
231. Id. at 51–52. Professor Coglianese’s dissertation is brimming with illustrative
quotations. Among them is a quote from an EPA official who praised litigious trade groups for
their diligence in assisting the EPA, even after suing the agency for the same rule that the
official helped developed: The trade association “cooperate[d] with the agency, bend[ing] over
backwards to help us in any way that we wanted. All we had to do was ask and they would do
that. It was literally a pleasure working with those people.” Id. at 132.
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part of the rulemaking process at EPA . . . . [This contact] brings
outside information and perspectives to the Agency’s
decisions[,] . . . builds support for the Agency’s decisions[,] and
232
increases the overall efficiency of EPA’s decision making process.”
Professor Coglianese quotes an EPA official who further underscores
the importance of close relations with industry during the
development of the proposed rule:
We try to bring them in as early as possible on what we are required
to do and request their help very early on and usually this is
appreciated because that way they have input as opposed to EPA
unilaterally going out and looking at various textbooks and writing
rules that are ridiculous because we don’t fully understand what the
hell we are regulating. So it works out better by working very closely
with the people that we are going to regulate and we do this in
various ways. We meet with them, we have industry-agency
233
workgroups that will meet together.

This enthusiasm for early and frequent stakeholder input is not
lost on regulatory participants. Industry in particular appreciates that
its best shot at having a significant influence is during the rule’s
formative stages. Legal counsel for industry participants advise them
to “[g]et involved during the preproposal phase of an Agency
rulemaking. That is when the regulation writers want reliable
technical information . . . and are thus most receptive to comments
234
from interested persons.” Indeed, there are several accounts of
industry not only commenting but also actually drafting the proposed
235
rule as part of these pre-NPRM discussions.
232. Id. at 32–33 (alterations in original) (citing EPA, FACT SHEET 12 (1992)).
233. Id. at 26.
234. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 9; see also supra note 226.
235. See Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 52 (crediting one attorney with pointing out the
advantages of providing draft language for the proposed rule and concluding that “whatever the
Agency does not take out [of your draft rule] reflects your thinking and has your perspective”).
As an official in a corporate office explained with respect to involvement with the EPA on a
rule:
I led an effort—which took about 9 months—to develop using our internal design and
operating practices for our [operations], to develop an actual regulation and a
preamble and it wound up being a 300-page document with lots of technical data to
submit to the agency before they even really started their regulatory process, as a way
to influence their thinking on what it ought to look like. And we carefully tied it to
the statutory mandate and documented all of the design standards and operating
procedures that we used—why they were important, where they were used, what the
benefits were—and put that in front of the agency well in advance of their process to
influence how they went about it. It had a tremendous impact.
Coglianese, supra note 47, at 32 (alteration in original).
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3. The Third Challenge for Pluralistic Oversight: Imbalances in
Participation in Expensive Public Processes. In an idealized version
of administrative rulemaking, the agency single-handedly prepares a
proposal that provides a thoughtful, holistic approach to the
236
problem. The proposed rule is simple, clear, and accessible, so that
all affected parties can engage in the core issues. In keeping with the
APA’s aspirations, the proposal is then subjected to vigorous and
diverse comments, leading to a final rule that is a bit more complex,
intricate, and technical, but that generally does not deviate in material
ways from the agency’s initial proposal. Although interest groups in
this ideal process might differ in the resources and information
available to them, their disparities do not significantly advantage
some groups over others, particularly because they all come to the
proposal without extensive prior involvement.
But if the pre-NPRM process discussed in the previous Section is
even partly accurate, then in practice the prospect of balanced
engagement by a diverse group of stakeholders is unlikely. Much like
a contract between elite parties, a number of proposed rules and
perambulatory explanations may be extraordinarily detailed and even
unfocussed or meandering—well beyond what might be expected to
237
truly attract public notice and comment. Because pre-NPRM
discussions allow select parties to fill the proposal with multiple
caveats, anticipatory exemptions, and other details that can expand
the volume and technicality and reduce the coherence of the
proposal, the proposed rule may be anything but accessible and
concise at this stage. Indeed, because the agency is not required to
filter or limit any of its discussion or even the text of its proposed
rule, the agency is likely to err on the side of overreacting and
overexplaining. With the threat of judicial review looming, the agency
operates defensively, working overtime to anticipate all major issues

236. Cf. WESLEY A. MAGAT, ALAN J. KRUPNICK & WINSTON HARRINGTON, RULES IN THE
MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 31–38 (1986)
(providing a flow chart and elaboration on this ideal (and possibly historic) approach to
rulemaking).
237. As Professor Watts observes:
[A] notice of a final rule could be thought of as speaking to interested parties and to
the courts in that it aims to justify the validity of that particular rule in terms sufficient
to stave off or to withstand judicial challenge and perhaps also to win a broader
public relations battle.
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE
L.J. 2, 25 (2009). For further discussion of many rules’ excessive length and detail, see supra Part
II.B.1.
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in its proposed rule in an effort to stave off litigation and devastating
material comments, without worrying about the barriers that its lessexpert readers might encounter in understanding and evaluating the
proposed rule.
In this prolix state, affected groups require greater resources to
offer meaningful comments on the proposed rule, especially if they
were not privy to much of the specialized information that went into
238
the proposal. There have been no efforts to measure the resources
needed to understand an average EPA proposed rule, but the
literature offers a number of anecdotes suggesting that the barriers
239
can be quite high. Indeed, a random sample of any of the EPA’s
technology-based standards should convince a skeptical reader of the
near-unintelligibility of these rules, even without reading the more
240
dense preambles the agency prepares to defend its rule. Reinforcing
these general claims about a very high and likely excessive level of
detail and technicality in many EPA rulemakings are some
241
preliminary measures that reveal relatively long rules and debates
238. Indeed, buried deep under technical assumptions and impenetrable draft rules could
lurk significant concessions that occurred during pre-NPRM discussions. Other long passages
may be a defensive maneuver by the agency first to anticipate detailed criticisms and then to
respond to them. But an interest group that is not engaged in pre-NPRM discussions may find
these cumulative passages quite time-consuming to decipher and understand, and often may
decide after this investment that it is unable to assess the passages’ significance for how public
health might be affected. Certain adjustments or decisions—monitoring requirements that must
be conducted annually rather than weekly, techniques for measuring emissions that involve
larger margins of error than more expensive measurement techniques, pollution control
equipment that does not function well at high temperatures—may impact pollution levels going
into the air. But given the main source of litigation concern, these issues will be framed and
addressed primarily to the agency’s most fearsome opponent—industry.
239. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO
AND WHY THEY DO IT 283 (1991) (citing as an example a huge record compiled for an OSHA
standard that took the agency four years to process and that included 105,000 pages of
testimony “in addition to uncounted pages of documents”); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 1
(asking in despair: “How can we make sense of environmental law? Our legislators churn out
great undigestible masses of statutes about the environment, which in turn are interpreted by
mounds of regulations, all densely packed with bizarre terms and opaque acronyms.”);
Coglianese, supra note 47, at 34–35 n.39 (quoting an EPA staff member discussing how one rule,
for example, involved 481 commenters, required “800 hours from one contractor alone in one
week” to begin to assemble and process the comments, and demanded sixteen hundred hours of
EPA staff time in one week alone to process the comments before the final rule was
promulgated).
240. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2009) (technology-based standards for hazardous air
pollutants).
241. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 18 (finding an average of thirty-nine pages per final
rule, with some rules reaching above two hundred pages).
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over dozens of significant issues for each rule in at least one set of
242
pollution control standards. Thus, although the EPA’s rules are
likely to vary in their complexity, the fact that they are generally quite
complicated and technical seems uncontestable.
More revealing of actual barriers to participation in public health
rules are early empirical studies that document significant imbalances
between regulated parties and public interest groups during the
comment process. Although these studies do not provide any
diagnosis for this imbalance, they are at least consistent with the
consequences expected to flow from information capture. For
example, in the previously mentioned study on hazardous air
pollutant rules, industry comments (by industry players as well as
industrial associations) accounted for more than 76 percent of all
comments received by the EPA, with extensive industry involvement
243
in 100 percent of the rulemakings. By contrast, public interest
representatives, including state and local regulators as well as
nonprofits, participated in less than half of the rulemakings, with
244
comments across all rules averaging 5 percent of total comments. In
his study of RCRA rules, Professor Coglianese found a similar
imbalance, with businesses participating in 96 percent and national
245
environmental groups participating in 44 percent of rules. He also
found that “[n]early 60 percent of all the participants in RCRA
rulemakings . . . came from industry; only 4 percent from the
246
environmental community.”
These EPA-focused studies are
complemented by Professors Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb
Yackee’s study of forty low-salience rules from four different
247
agencies. They found that business interests submitted 57 percent of
comments, whereas nongovernmental organizations submitted 22
percent of comments, 6 percent of which came from public interest
248
groups. The study concludes that business interests dominate the

242. See id. at 20 tbl.6 (finding an average of twenty-seven issues, and a maximum of 121
issues, raised per proposed rule in a study of the EPA’s HAPs rulemakings).
243. Id. at 17.
244. Id.
245. See Coglianese, supra note 47, at 50 tbl.2-2.
246. Id. at 48; see also id. at 48 tbl.2-1 (noting that 17.3 percent of participants came from
state and local governments and 10.5 percent came from the federal government; the total
number of participants was 1607).
247. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006).
248. Id. at 133.
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comment process in these low-salience rulemakings, but the authors
do not provide measures of the rules’ technicality. Hence, it is not
possible to determine how their results intersect with the information
capture hypothesis.
At the same time that the costs required of interest groups rise,
the currency of greatest value to public interest groups—positive
credit for success that is then advertised in the media and donor
circles—drops as the issues become more mired in details and
technicalities. In the air toxic regulation study previously mentioned,
media attention on the substance of EPA rulemakings was extremely
limited, with less than 15 percent of the rules covered at least once in
249
more than one hundred major newspapers. In this setting, the ratio
of costs to benefits of public interest participation may fall more
sharply relative to industry because costs increase and benefits drop
once information loading reaches the point of diminishing returns.
These dropping benefits to engagement might also explain why public
interest groups, to the extent that they do engage, appear to reserve
their fire power for deadline suits and litigation at the very end of a
rulemaking, when the possibility for positive media attention is the
250
highest.
Equally important in assessing the strength of pluralistic
oversight is an assessment of the actual influence of commenters. One
can at least hold out some hope that parties that dominate the
information flow may not necessarily enjoy similar levels of influence
in affecting the actual substance of the final rule. But based on several
snippets of evidence, it appears that voluminous filings of technical
comments do translate relatively directly into influence over the final
rule. First, if each detailed and well-supported comment raises a
litigation risk, then the agency can be expected to make changes that
are roughly proportional to the total number of comments, rather
251
than favoring the comments of an underrepresented constituency.
In his case study of OSHA, for example, Professor Schmidt found
that litigation-backed comments were the most influential precisely
252
because they posed immediate risks to the fate of the rule. Second,
and in this same vein, industry comments are likely to be more
factually and technically oriented given industry’s specialized

249. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 30.
250. See Coglianese, supra note 47, at 28; Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 27–30.
251. See supra notes 148–58 and accompanying text.
252. See Schmidt, supra note 173, at 80, 82, 86–87.
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knowledge and attentiveness to compliance-related details. These
technical facts constitute an agency’s soft spot in litigation, and
agencies are purported to be particularly amenable to making
changes in their final rules based on comments that are technical in
253
nature. Finally, the preliminary empirical evidence that bears on
commenter influence reveals that industry continues to dominate the
changes made between publication of the proposed and final rule.
Both the Yackee and Yackee study and the preliminary study on
hazardous air pollutants traced influence by statistically linking
254
comments with changes in the final rule. The studies found that the
number of comments was the best predictor of influence; industry
dominated the comment process as well as the changes the agency
made in the final rule. In the hazardous air pollutant study, for
example, agencies made an average of more than ten changes
weakening a rule, presumably in response to industry demands, as
255
compared with an average of two changes that strengthened a rule.
4. Reasons for Comfort? Possible Sources of Counterpressure
Against Pluralistic Losses. Even if the pressures for information
capture are in fact strong and unrelenting, there are other
institutional mechanisms that would seem, in theory, to help agencies
resist the pressure. Such counterpressure could occur, for example,
through the courts’ imposition of vigorous information filters on
participants or by offsetting interest group imbalances with some
form of political or staff pushback. This Section considers these
additional institutional interventions. Ultimately, however, none

253. See, e.g., Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 10 (noting that industry counsel agree that
“[t]he arguments that stand the greatest chance of being listened to by the Agency are those
that address technical aspects of a proposed rule rather than the legal basis of that rule”); see
also id. at 50. Moreover, if industry has already had extensive discussions with the agency to
convince it to consider its material changes during the pre-NPRM, its formal comments are
likely to be aimed primarily at chipping away at the rule on smaller details rather than radically
reconfiguring the proposal. By contrast, the public interest groups’ primary concerns and
comments may take on some basic framing decisions fundamental to the development of the
rule. To the extent that these groups’ changes tend in this more “material” direction, they are
more likely to receive a chilly reception from the agency because they technically require the
agency to promulgate a supplemental or second proposed rule, which involves an additional
notice-and-comment process. In terms of the time involved, it may be quicker to reject these
groups’ significant comments and risk being sued than to accept their changes and trigger notice
and comment all over again.
254. See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 247, at 135; Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 7–8.
255. Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 20 tbl.6.
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appear capable of counteracting information capture, at least not in a
significant way.
a. Courts as Filters. The courts create many of the significant
incentives for information capture through their interpretation of the
APA, but in the narrow context of individual cases, they are actually
256
quite adept at forcing powerful information filters on participants.
Through page and brief limitations, litigation helps focus and narrow
257
the issues in dispute. Adversarial disagreements also tend to limit
and sharpen the issues and cull out peripheral or weak arguments.
Finally, there are generally far fewer information-related imbalances
at the appellate stage because factual disagreements are generally
258
limited to the finite administrative record. Thus, though appellate
cases still can be unwieldy, the judicial process provides incentives for
259
parties to process the information before they communicate it.
The effectiveness of the courts as information filters, however, is
only as good as the cases that come to them, and this proves to be a
significant limitation in several respects. First, courts will not preside
over all cases in which information capture has taken hold, but only
those challenges that are brought to them for adjudication. In some
cases, public interest groups may select captured rulemakings
specifically to highlight for the court the imbalance in the agency’s
analysis. The existing empirical evidence suggests, however, that a
number of EPA rules may not be subjected to judicial scrutiny.
Professor Coglianese’s statistics indicate that of the EPA’s significant
hazardous waste regulations promulgated over a three-year period,
260
only about a quarter of the rules were actually briefed in court.
More than half were not challenged, and about half of the remaining
261
cases settled before oral argument. Interestingly, some of these
cases may have settled precisely because the parties did not want to
invest the time or energy (or litigation risk) in processing their claims
for the courts. Professor Coglianese found in his study that “[o]ne

256. Cf. Smith, supra note 21, at 1125 (observing how formal forums can involve more
extensive filtering for the participants).
257. See supra note 26.
258. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. OSHA, 849 F.2d 611, 617–18 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
259. But see WILSON, supra note 239, at 284 (observing that court access is expensive).
260. See supra note 197.
261. See supra note 197.
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reason groups select or settle issues is that the court imposes page
262
limits on briefs and a time limit on oral argument.”
Adding to the courts’ limitations is the fact that settlements that
occur on the courthouse steps may make information capture worse,
rather than better. As discussed earlier, the litigants in these judicial
settlements (which may be disproportionately the same parties that
263
dominated earlier phases of the rulemaking) are able to take one
last bite out of the rulemaking through confidential settlement
264
negotiations. Even more troubling, in some cases, these post-rule
settlement negotiations may undo some of the pluralistic gains made
earlier in the process. Professor Coglianese, for example, observed
that
[i]n the wood preserving rule, the 267 individuals and groups filing
comments on the rule narrowed down to three groups in court.
Greenpeace and the Environmental Defense Fund were extremely
active in the rulemaking, but did not enter the litigation. As a result,
positions these environmental groups successfully advanced in the
265
rulemaking were later directly undercut in the litigation process.

A second and related limitation to the courts’ filtering
effectiveness is their dependence on litigants to raise the issues in
need of vetting. Specifically, if industry is the primary litigant, then
only industry’s complaints will be aired in court; the possibility that
the rule is not protective enough will not be presented to the court for
resolution. The resulting narrowing of the issues raised in litigation
will likely mirror the imbalance in interest group representation
occurring at earlier phases of the rulemaking. As noted previously,
public interest groups appear to file comments on about half of EPA
rulemakings (whereas industry files comments on nearly all of
266
them). As a result, environmental groups are only able to file suit

262. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 114.
263. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
264. Also as discussed, the resulting settlements can lead to significant changes that affect,
for example, how the agency will interpret or enforce the rule; but these changes may not be
subject to notice and comment and may not even be shared openly with the public. See supra
notes 195–96 and accompanying text; cf. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 52–53 (stressing the
advantages of negotiating with the agency rather than litigating against it, and how such
negotiations further allow other issues to be addressed, even if they were not part of the original
legal challenge); Schmidt, supra note 173, at 79 (discussing OSHA’s settlement with one party,
which involved altering its enforcement guidance).
265. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 107.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 243–46.
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for half of all rulemakings because they have not exhausted their
remedies on the other half. Additionally, evidence reveals that the
delay common to litigation is highly attractive to industry, but
constitutes a negative feature for environmental groups because it
267
delays pollution regulation. Thus, even when they have a claim and
can file suit, the very different payoffs may make environmental
268
groups less inclined to file suit against the substance of EPA rules.
The available evidence on challenges to the EPA supports these
concerns: industry players challenge more EPA rules than
269
environmental groups.
267. For example, Professors Owen and Braeutigam suggest in their “[s]trategies for
[e]stablished [f]irms and [i]ndustries” to game the APA:
The delay which can be purchased by litigation offers an opportunity to undertake
other measures to reduce or eliminate the costs of an eventual adverse decision.
These measures include strategic innovation, legislative proposals, and lobbying
activity. If the administrative process goes on long enough, it is even possible to ask
for a new hearing on the grounds that new and more accurate information may be
available. The agency usually cannot resist the effort to delay through exhaustion of
process because this would be grounds for reversal on appeal to the courts.
OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 59, at 4–5; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O.
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J.
729, 737–38 (observing that “[b]ecause judicial review ‘delay[s] the implementation of OSHA
standards by an average of two years,’ a company or trade association could save its industry
$320,000 by filing an appeal, assuming an eight percent annual interest rate. . . . [Thus a trade]
association could afford legal fees of up to $640 an hour and still save its members money
compared to the costs of immediate compliance with the OSHA standard” (second alteration in
original) (footnote omitted)).
By contrast, environmental groups often see delay as a window during which health is
not sufficiently protected. See, e.g., HREBENAR, supra note 40, at 262 (observing that “[t]ime
delays often benefit the corporate interests while creating a disadvantage for consumer groups”
and linking this not only to regulatory consequences but to the costs of engaging in the process).
Though the EPA’s standards may be a disappointment, further delaying their implementation
could be worse. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1772 (“Increased procedural formalities [like
judicial review] may work to the disadvantage of public interest groups by exhausting their
limited resources and providing organized interests a basis for delaying agency enforcement
actions.”); cf. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 174 (noting that the timing of review and associated
compliance costs affect a party’s stake in challenging a rule in court).
268. For the same reasons, environmental groups will be more inclined to sue the EPA for
missing the statutory deadlines set for issuing the rule.
269. See, e.g., Lettie McSpadden Wenner, The Reagan Era in Environmental Regulation, in
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 41, 48 (Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990) (reporting
based on an empirical study of appellate litigation from 1970 to 1985 that “[i]ndustry exceeded
environmental groups’ complaints against government actions at the appellate level as early as
1976, and this was reversed only once, in 1983, when industry’s inputs fell off,” and positing that
scarce resources of the environmental groups may help explain why these groups were not more
vigorous in challenging the Reagan EPA in court); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 247, at 133.
Professor Coglianese’s study, which considers hazardous waste rules closest to those likely to be
subject to filter failure, reports that among the thirteen of twenty-eight significant rules
challenged in court, 101 total petitions were filed; “91 percent of these 65 groups were
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b. Offsetting Imbalance in Interest Group Participation with
Civic-Minded Government Employees. One correction that could be
quite effective in counteracting imbalances in participation (though it
would not stem rising information costs) is the civic commitment of
agency staff. Agency staffers are not automatons that respond
unthinkingly to gluts of information that threaten to undermine their
regulatory mission. Committed EPA staff is likely to be an extremely
important force in pushing back against unilateral pressure from one
group, particularly industry. In his excellent study, Professor Croley
notes—with ample evidence—the important role of agency leadership
270
and staff in keeping public beneficiaries in mind.
In practice, however, this professional ballast might not be
sufficient to eradicate, or even significantly reduce, the information
capture phenomenon. First, given the incentives created by the
structure of administrative law itself, particularly those created
through judicial review, civic-minded staff will face an uphill legal
battle to surmount all of the one-sided pressures described in this
Article. Preliminary evidence of changes made to final rules based on
skewed industry participation further increases concerns that the
agency may be capitulating to a number of industry demands—
though the importance of these numerous concessions remains to be
271
seen. Even assuming that the legal obstacles are not overpowering,
however, this model of administrative law presents a very different
mechanism for accountability than the process outlined in the law
books. For example, if agency staff are the primary means for
promoting the public interest (and pluralistic mechanisms of oversight
are effectively abandoned), the hiring of staff must be done in a
transparent and explicit way that consistently favors those with views
like those working in public interest groups. Administrative law will
also have to come to terms with the notion of reduced accountability
and transparency when decisionmaking authority is delegated
wholesale to a trustworthy professional workforce. None of this is to

corporations or trade associations, while only 8 percent were environmental organizations.”
Coglianese, supra note 47, at 70.
270. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 159 (positing that “[i]t is plausible that agency regulators are
motivated to do so as a result of their own commitments to the common good, which might after
all account for why they became regulators in the first place”); id. at 282 (concluding from his
case studies how the APA processes helped agencies inoculate rules from interest group
pressures and allowed “public-interested administrators . . . to pursue regulatory goals they
believed advanced social welfare in the face of substantial opposition”).
271. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
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suggest that the agency may not help buffer against information
capture, but it does suggest that this more informal role played by
agency staff needs more systematic confirmation and may need
additional process checks before information capture’s potential
significance can be dismissed.
c. Offsetting Pluralistic Imbalance with Civic-Minded White
House Interventions.
A number of legislative and executive
innovations, such as cost-benefit analysis, would seem, in the abstract,
to counteract filter failure head-on by forcing agencies to analyze the
272
implications of their rules and share these analyses with the public.
Such requirements endeavor to provide onlookers with even more
accessible and digestible snapshots of the costs and benefits of
regulation, as well as the implications of regulation for irreversible
environmental commitments and for vulnerable groups, like small
273
businesses.
These analytical requirements are quite appealing from an
information-processing perspective, but they have not lived up to
their potential in practice and seem to suffer from filter failure as
274
well. Retrospective studies of the National Environmental Policy

272. Some of the more significant information-generation requirements imposed on the
agencies that can apply during informal rulemaking include: the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70f (2006), which assesses environmental impacts; the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–21 (2006), which requires clearance procedures
for federal forms, recordkeeping, and amendments pertaining to electronic information; the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2006), which requires comprehensive reviews of
regulatory activities and consideration of the impacts of rules on small businesses; and
Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006),
which requires a regulatory impact assessment (otherwise known as a cost-benefit analysis) of
influential rules and that these rules be cleared through the Office of Management and Budget.
Individual statutes may impose still more information-intensive demands, such as allowing
parties the right of cross-examination. See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, §§ 7.7, 7.11.
273. Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard D. Morgenstern, Controversies
Surrounding Regulatory Impact Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,
supra note 82, at 10, 12–13 (touting these advantages of the RIA process). At the same time,
these salience-raising analyses provide a door through which White House offices can enter to
review the agency’s preferred course of action. In theory, this form of political oversight offers
the opportunity for push-back on information capture.
274. Some and perhaps most of this failure may be attributed to how these provisions are
designed. For example, virtually all of the information and analysis requirements are imposed
on agencies without protecting them from candid disclosures or litigation-generating admissions
against interest. These added analyses are also often prepared near the end of the process, when
the decision is close to final. Harrington et al., supra note 82, at 224–25. As a result, the reports
serve in practice only to increase the agency’s vulnerability to lawsuits and unwelcome political
pressure if the agency slips and includes, in writing, some admissions against interest. Not
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Act (NEPA) and the regulatory impact assessment (RIA) process
consistently find that the agency’s analyses tend to be very lengthy
(reaching into the hundreds or thousands of pages), highly technical,
and so laden with assumptions that the summary tables provide an
275
unreliable overview of the contents of the larger document. For
example, in its comprehensive study of the agency’s compliance with
NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality concluded that rather
than providing a candid assessment of the project, the agencies
generally turned the environmental impact statement into a
“litigation-proof” document that did not adequately raise or consider
276
alternatives or engage with the underlying facts in a rigorous way.
Even if these centralized analyses cannot completely counteract
filter failure, they still might provide valuable mechanisms for the
White House or other high-level political officials to gain purchase on
regulatory issues and intervene more directly in ways that offset
277
participatory imbalances arising from information capture. Much
like the model for civic-minded staff within the agency, this political
ballast—occurring through the White House and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)—would in theory push back against
one-sided pressure to keep these rules on a level playing field. Most
would prefer this political counterpressure to take place in the light
278
rather than outside public oversight, as is currently the case. But the

surprisingly, agency general counsel and other high level officials appear to play a very heavy
hand in drafting the document, just as they do for proposed and final rules, and sometimes limit
the analysis, potentially substantially. Id. at 221–22 (recounting how the agency may consider
only one option instead of comparing it to a possibly more efficient alternative). The ability of
these analytical documents to penetrate the informational fog appears well out of reach, at least
currently.
275. Id. at 226 (observing, based on case studies, that “RIAs have become huge, dense
documents that are almost impenetrable to all but those with training in the relevant technical
fields . . . . [and that] [e]ven to the well-trained eye, RIAs are often opaque”).
276. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A
STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, at iii (1997).
277. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Saving Law Through Administrative Law and Economics,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 473–74 (2008) (describing White House deliberations over features of
EPA rules that were not clear from the RIAs, but related to the costs and benefits of the
regulation).
278. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 78, 86 (2006) (noting
that “97% of EPA respondents stated that White House involvement was either not
visible . . . or only somewhat visible to the public” and that a majority of EPA respondents
believe that the White House is more susceptible to faction capture than the EPA); see also
Sally Katzen, Correspondence, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside
the Administrative State,” 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1502–03 (2007) (conceding the lack of
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fact that it occurs at all may be chalked up as a victory over the
skewed results that might otherwise arise from information capture.
Current evidence of OMB’s involvement in EPA rulemakings
suggests that rather than taking the side of environmental groups,
OMB far more often sides with industry. One of the primary
justifications for stronger White House and OMB involvement is to
counteract the perceived ideological bent of mission-oriented
279
bureaucrats. Former OMB appointees openly concede that they
regard balancing out the “laser”-like focus of the environment280
minded EPA as one of their more important roles. More recent
studies of OMB in particular confirm its generally anti-environmental
281
bent. Thus, if information capture tends to cause a skew toward
business, existing studies provide no basis for thinking that White
282
House and OMB review helps protect against it.

transparency but arguing that the results of White House involvement provided greater political
accountability, a point discussed later).
279. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 40, at 1261–62 (discussing how OMB review is an
antiregulatory force that descended from the Reagan-era assumption that agencies will
overregulate due to capture by groups like prohealth and prosafety constituencies).
280. Katzen, supra note 278, at 1505 (observing how the EPA “focus[es] like a laser” on
protecting the environment, whereas the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
takes “a broader view and consider[s] how, for example, an environmental proposal will affect
energy resources, tax revenues, health policy, etc.”).
281. In their study of top EPA officials’ views of OIRA during the Bush I and Clinton
administrations, Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh report that the strong majority (70
percent) reported that the “White House readily sought changes that would reduce burdens on
regulated entities, and veered from those that would increase such burdens.” Bressman &
Vandenbergh, supra note 278, at 87. Professor Croley made similar, although not quite as
strong, observations about OIRA’s tilt during the White House review process: 56 percent of
the meetings OIRA conducted to discuss rulemakings were exclusively with industry, as
compared with 10 percent held exclusively with public interest groups. Steven Croley, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 853,
871 (2003). Finally, in a study by the Government Accountability Office, about two-thirds of the
rules that OIRA “significantly affected” and for which comments were available involved
reinforcing the views of industry. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO-03-929,
RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE
TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 11 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/
d03929.pdf.
282. To the extent that these centralized review processes could ultimately make matters
worse with regard to information filtering, the good news is that they only apply to some of the
most significant rules, which are likely to be the most salient. But the glass is more likely half
empty. Significant rules seem to be those most likely to escape the most entrenched forms of
information capture. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. That these salient rules
actually escape information capture only to be placed, because of their significance, into a more
highly politicized setting—where they are at real risk of old-fashioned political capture—
presents a bleak picture of administrative process.
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5. Summary. In the process just described, as costs mount at
each successive stage of a rulemaking, the participants drop out. The
resulting information capture causes adversarial and pluralistic
processes to break down due to the substantial demands on the time
and energy of interest groups that must keep up with the growing
issues and record. Once information costs are factored into the
evaluation of administrative processes, then, these processes may not
283
be neutral after all. In the end, the result looks much the same as
the type of agency capture that initially motivated these oversight
processes in the beginning.
B. Other Adverse Consequences
1. Constrained Decisionmaking that Leads to Satisficing Rather
than Comprehensive Regulatory Decisions. Professor James Q.
Wilson writes that “government management tends to be driven by
the constraints on the organization, not the tasks of the
284
organization.” The possibility that the agency may spend more time
with the constraint of organizing, processing, and responding to
information than actually synthesizing it into a coherent regulatory
policy seems more than a hypothetical worry. The mounds of highly
283. This is the fundamental point at which this Article departs from Professor Croley’s
analysis. See CROLEY, supra note 39, at 74–75 (arguing that regulatory agencies may avoid bias
from information capture because many sources of information are available). Once
information costs are considered, the processes are not neutral. Information costs do provide a
way for more powerful interests to outcompete less powerful interest groups. Indeed, these
advantages occur because of administrative processes and rules, not in spite of them. More
specifically, Professor Croley seems to assume that access in most cases will be both a necessary
and a sufficient condition for participation. This Article argues that it may be a necessary
condition, but it is not sufficient in most cases. For example, he argues that
[b]ecause the procedures through which agencies identify and evaluate regulatory
alternatives provide opportunities for a wide variety of interests to supply
administrators with facts and arguments, and similarly to question the facts and
arguments provided by competing interest or generated by agencies themselves,
regulatory decisionmaking procedures provide significant protection against
informational capture.
Id. at 75. But if the information involved is extremely voluminous and technical, then access is
not “free” in practice and information begins to impede the extent to which parties can
participate. This Article’s analysis also takes issue with Professor Croley’s argument that
administrative processes provide agencies with the discretion to consider information
comprehensively. See, e.g., id. (“[A]gencies are equipped [through administrative procedures] to
assess information about regulatory ends and means, and in particular to do so with
informational independence from those interests with the biggest stake in regulatory
outcomes.”). Instead, this Article argues that administrative processes tend to tether the agency
to the informational priorities of the dominant stakeholders.
284. WILSON, supra note 239, at 115.
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technical information streaming in, coupled with a judicially enforced
requirement that the agency must “consider” all of it, puts a strain on
the agency’s ability to make coherent decisions. The most obvious
effect of this strain is to divert some of the agency’s limited attention
away from producing coherent regulatory policies and toward
285
Indeed, processing this incoming
information management.
information can become so central to the agency’s daily work that
organizing and processing information could even surpass the
energies dedicated to the agency’s mission of producing creative,
effective public-benefitting regulations.
Agencies, wisely, have tried to delegate much of the burden of
information management to contractors, but separating information
management from decisionmaking is not always easy in these
286
settings. For example, contractors are often assigned the job of
summarizing public comments and preparing the agency’s
287
comprehensive response to them. They are also heavily involved in
the technical analysis that precedes development of the proposed
288
rule. Both of these responsibilities place the contractors in key roles
of regulation development. As a result of contractors’ intimate
involvement, there is growing concern that contractors, rather than
the EPA, may be left making key policy decisions simply by virtue of
fulfilling their contracts. Professor Paul Verkuil, for example, worries
that because of this extensive contractor involvement in rulemakings,
“[r]ationality review by the agency may be fast becoming a
289
misnomer.” An increasingly heavy reliance on contractors to
process large amounts of the information relevant to a regulation may
also lead the EPA to “look ‘less for technical geniuses’ [in hiring staff]
and more for generalists who can oversee and communicate with

285. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 19, at 242 (“[Many] systems were not designed to conserve
the critical scarce resource—the attention of managers—and they tended to ignore the fact that
the information most important to top managers comes mainly from external sources and not
from the internal records that were immediately accessible for mechanized processing.”).
286. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 928 (2007) (“Agency officials, overwhelmed by a workload
produced in part by perceived views of hard-look review requirements, are increasingly
delegating the rationality assignment to private contractors and signing off on the results.”).
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., MAGAT ET AL., supra note 236, at 31–38 (describing the role of contractor
analyses and reports in the rulemaking process).
289. Verkuil, supra note 286, at 929.
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technical consultants. This has affected morale, as EPA technical staff
290
at times resent not being able to use their expertise.”
Filter failure and the resulting risk of information capture in
administrative process not only divert agency attention away from the
central task of policymaking but also risk allowing the participants to
control the regulatory agenda. Incremental muddling through in
response to interest group input—or satisficing—will replace
291
comprehensive problem solving. This is exacerbated by the fact that
under the current structure of notice and comment, “private parties
can be relied upon to tell the agency what it is doing wrong [in
292
specific rulemakings], but not how it might improve.” In such a
system, the agency is given little or no credit for imaginative problem
solving.
In fact, a rule seems more likely to survive judicial review if the
agency is particularly vigilant about responding to the priorities and
issues its adversaries raise, even if it means forgoing the development
of its own conception of a more holistic regulation. This judicially
imposed demand puts the agency at the mercy of its adversaries and
cedes to them some measure of control over the regulatory blueprint.
One group of commentators concludes that, based on these processbased incentives, “it seems best to regard the regulatory agency as an
endogenous force whose behavior can be strategically manipulated by
293
the firms it regulates.”
The most significant problem with satisficing as a way to develop
regulatory policy, however, is the possibility that the groups that
constrain the agency in these ways will not represent a cross section of
the affected interests but instead will be badly skewed or even one294
sided. In her study of the effects of judicial review on the EPA,
Professor O’Leary concludes that “[m]atters suitable for litigation are
290. O’Leary, supra note 156, at 565.
291. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 239, at 283 (expressing concern and quoting others with
the concern that the threat of judicial review will cause agencies to resist change or take risks on
policies, “especially those that embody novel ideas or approaches”).
292. Rubin, supra note 119, at 103; see also id. at 114 (arguing that “policy formation
concerns a much less strict conception of notice, grounded in considerations of optimal
information flow, not fairness to individuals”).
293. OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 59, at 9.
294. Judge Garland suggests this worry in passing, but with respect only to economic
regulation. With respect to economic regulation, his concern is apparently that incumbents will
engage the agency and that future beneficiaries will not be represented in judicial review or
interest representation. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 505, 591 (1985).

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

FILTER FAILURE

1399

the ‘squeaky wheels that get the grease,’ while other important
295
environmental problems fall by the wayside.” Squeaky wheels drive
the formulation and solutions to the regulatory problem at hand, thus
narrowing the conception and analysis as well as limiting the range of
296
best policy responses. And the agency’s legally based preoccupation
with these squeaky wheels may be badly out of line with the public
interest, the aggregate views of all affected parties, and the original
goal of the statute. As a result, a “system predicated on building
consensus and refracting interests may prove painfully incapable of
297
policymaking that transcends particularistic demands.”
If administrative incentives do cause the agency to aim for a
proposal that withstands the criticisms of litigious interest groups
rather than one that provides comprehensive and responsible
regulation, then the ideal of agencies has been significantly
298
compromised. The solution lies not in providing more process and
judicial review, but elsewhere.
2. Strategic Uses of Information Capture that Pervert Open
Government Processes. Information capture represents the dark side
of a transparent, equal, and open system of government: it enables
participants to legally undercut one another and manipulate the
299
agency with elaborate information-based strategies. Principles for
open government can even exacerbate basic inequities among interest
groups with regard to the resources available to participate, at least in
some settings. As Professor Mashaw intuits, “if interest group theory
295. O’Leary, supra note 156, at 562.
296. Professor Stewart worried—even in the early years of the interest representation
model—that “[j]udicialization of agency procedures and the expansion of participation rights
may . . . aggravate the tendency for the agency to assume a passive role, focusing on the unique
character of each controversy in order to reach an ad hoc accommodation of the particular
constellation of interests presented.” Stewart, supra note 6, at 1773 (footnote omitted). The
possibility of these ad hoc, unprincipled decisions arising from interest representation seemed to
be Professor Stewart’s largest concern as well, though he gestured to the added possibility that
ad hoc analysis also might not take into account all affected interests. Id. at 1789.
297. BOSSO, supra note 200, at 255.
298. Professor Schiller recounts how in the New Deal, agencies were supposed to serve “as a
counterweight to the incredible power wielded by large corporations. . . . The administrative
state equalized the playing field by placing the government on the side of the people rather than
having it simply act as a neutral ‘umpire’ in a dispute between two unequal parties.” Schiller,
supra note 29, at 429; see also MELNICK, supra note 149, at 76–80, 129–35, 157–62, 261–69
(discussing cases in which courts emphasized that the agency role was to protect public health
and the environment).
299. Cf. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 305 (touting how APA processes stave off rent-seekers
and keep regulatory outcomes more public benefitting).
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works even somewhat similarly to what the public choice fraternity
300
believes, transparency is a double-edged sword.”
Indeed, the abuse of transparency and open government are well
known by regulatory insiders. More than thirty years ago, Professors
Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam underscored how stakeholders’
“ability to control the flow of information to the regulatory agency is
301
a crucial element in affecting decisions.” Based on this power, they
observe how these stakeholders can make available “carefully
selected facts,” withhold others, and if delay is useful, “flood the
302
agency with more information than it can absorb.” When the agency
seeks a particularly damaging piece of information that cannot be
withheld legally, the interest group’s “best tactic is to bury it in a
mountain of irrelevant material” or provide it but simultaneously
“deny its reliability and to commence a study to acquire more reliable
303
data.”
Published advice by legal counsel to industry betray similar,
albeit less candid strategies to use information strategically during the
rulemaking process. One interviewee in Professor Coglianese’s
study—a corporate counsel—provided a succinct summary of these
methods: “We will try to build a record that’s persuasive . . . to sort of
overwhelm the agency and create for them the impression that the
304
world out there wants them to do something else.” Another group
of industry attorneys observed that the EPA’s aversion to litigation
was often exploited: “many people may file suit [against the EPA]
305
just to ‘get a seat at the negotiating table.’”
Good government reforms can also be used as Trojan horses to
surreptitiously introduce new strategic tools for controlling regulatory
processes through information capture. For example, the tobacco

300. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 190.
301. OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 59, at 4.
302. Id.
303. Id. These techniques can also be deployed in more adversarial settings to overcome the
opposition’s efforts. For example, “[i]f another party has supplied damaging information, it is
important to supply contrary information in as technical a form as possible so that a hearing is
necessary to settle the issues of ‘fact.’” Id. The techniques even advise regulated parties to
deploy decentralized information systems so that officials can be selected who can testify
truthfully on what they know, but be carefully protected from other conflicting or damaging
sources of information. Id.
304. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 35–36.
305. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 53.
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lobby was the architect of both the Data Access and the Data
307
Quality Acts, which Congress passed as appropriation riders about
308
a decade ago. Both acts were purportedly passed to improve the
scientific integrity of regulatory decisions. Yet, as their sponsorship
might suggest, these provisions were motivated by more than
tobacco’s selfless effort to get government running on the right
scientific track. The Data Access Act, for example, allows any party
to access the data from any federally funded study that forms the
basis for regulation; but private research that informs regulatory
requirements (most of which is produced by regulated parties) is
309
unaffected and remains out of public reach.
A companion
appropriations rider passed one year later, the Data Quality Act,
allows any interested party to file an unlimited number of complaints
(and appeals) of unlimited size against an agency alleging that some
piece of information used at some point in the regulatory process was
310
unreliable. The provision includes no sanctions or costs for abusive
filings. In the case of the Data Quality Act, however, the agencies got
the last laugh. The courts and Congress declined to provide judicial
311
review of the complaint process, and at the same time, industry use
of the Act was put under the spotlight because of concerns about
312
abuse. As a result, and much to the disappointment of its
proponents, the Data Quality Act falls short of providing a judicially
enforced mechanism for launching additional, information-based
challenges to agency rulemakings.

306. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-495 (1998).
307. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-153 to -154 (2000).
308. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jim Tozzi to Matthew Winokur (Oct. 12, 1998) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing the origin and effects of the Data Access Act); Chris
Mooney, Interrogations: Thanks to a Little-Known Piece of Legislation, Scientists at the EPA and
Other Agencies Find Their Work Questioned Not Only by Industry, but by Their Own
Government, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2005, at C1 (describing the origins of the Data Quality
Act).
309. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science:
Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM.
J.L. & MED. 119, 138 (2004) (noting these inequitable features).
310. See id. at 138–39 (describing the effect of the Data Quality Act on the regulatory
process).
311. See, e.g., Salt Inst. v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“Neither the
Act itself nor its very limited legislative history provide a mechanism for judicial review of
information quality or any avenue for judicial relief.”).
312. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 308.
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In settings in which information capture is likely to take hold,
rules providing for transparency and open government should be
313
vigorously examined for signs of mischief. Information capture is
also a reminder that a commitment to open government is not an end
in itself, but merely an “institutional design tool” used to effectuate
314
good government. The effectiveness of transparency and open
government thus should not be taken for granted without examining
the opportunities for abuse.
3. An Information Avalanche.
One of the fundamental
characteristics of information capture, at least in theory, is that the
information excesses and accompanying imbalances in participation
will worsen over time and resist easy fixes. Professor Peter Schuck
writes eloquently about a related phenomenon, which he calls legal
315
complexity. In these complex legal landscapes, he writes,
it is no longer enough to know one’s location and destination; one
cannot survive without a great deal of local knowledge about when
the buses run, whether cabs will venture into certain
neighborhoods, . . . and where it is safe to walk. . . . Experienced
guides equipped with maps and special know-how are
316
essential . . . .

As this dense landscape becomes more complex and labyrinthine, it
may even begin to outstrip the ability of these experts to navigate the
terrain. At some point, the issues, volume, specialized knowledge, and
other features may simply take on a shape of their own, resisting
mastery by any of the parties.
Some EPA rules and regulatory programs appear destined to be
on a path toward potentially hopeless complexity. In an article now
more than a decade old, Professor Eric Orts writes about the problem
of juridification, when laws and requirements proliferate and become
increasingly complex until the entire regulatory structure “breaks
317
down under its own weight.” Others have echoed these concerns.
313. Cf. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 293 (concluding that the best antidote for a rigorous
regulatory system is “increased transparency and participation”).
314. Cf. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 191 (“‘Transparency’ thus becomes a strategic
institutional design tool, not an end in itself.”); Jasanoff, supra note 28, at 22 (noting the limits
of transparency in promoting rigorous regulatory science).
315. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1, 22 (1992).
316. Id. at 20.
317. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1241 (1995).
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Professor Thomas McGarity, in his classic article on ossification,
noticed an upward trajectory in the complexity and technical detail in
318
In his study of pesticide policy,
Federal Register preambles.
spanning from the 1940s through the 1980s, Professor Bosso similarly
observes that the “[o]ne dynamic [that] stands out . . . [is that]
objective conditions have evolved to higher orders of complexity, but
the fundamental relationships paradoxically remain pretty much the
319
same.”
All of these observations raise the rather obvious question of
how to put the brakes on a system that is likely to grow only more
informationally overloaded and complex over time, in ways that
might even lose sight of regulation’s original motivating purpose. It is
difficult to imagine that agencies will be able to resist this pull toward
increasing complexity on their own, particularly in light of the
mandatory open-door policies that they have maintained for so long.
Instead, process changes coming from outside the agencies are
needed. Several possible reforms are discussed in the next Part.
IV. REFORM
The problem of filter failure runs deep in administrative law, and
redressing it may involve a long process of experimentation. The
reforms presented here are simply efforts to begin a discussion about
reform possibilities. Although some of the reforms seem unduly
specific and prescriptive, they are offered primarily in the hope of
generating new ways to think about administrative process rather
320
than attempting to cut specific paths through the forest. At the same
time, although some of the proposals are unconventional, none of
321
them require radical changes to the existing administrative system.
318. See McGarity, supra note 146, at 1387. For a visual representation of the growth of
environmental regulations from 1972 to 2008, see http://www.law.drake.edu/ facStaff/docs/T_40_
compared.JPG (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (provided by Prof. Jerry Anderson, Drake Law
School).
319. BOSSO, supra note 200, at 235.
320. Information capture may also be more amenable to reform than more systemic
problems such as scarce resources, White House overrides, and organizational and structural
problems that are more deeply engrained within agency structure. See supra note 201 and
accompanying text. Indeed, if some of the perverse legal approaches to information can be
reversed, then it will leave a clearer picture of the intractable regulatory and administrative
problems that remain and provide some hope that they can be whittled away gradually.
321. In identifying possible reforms, particular care should be taken to ensure that the fixes
proposed for these technical and complex rules will not have adverse side effects on other
sectors of regulation in which regulatory problems may be quite different. See, e.g., Gormley,
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The reforms track the adverse consequences discussed in Part III and
are presented in roughly the same order. See Figure 3.
The bulk of the reforms suggested here attempt to fix the
breakdown in the pluralistic process that results when information
capture afflicts administrative rulemaking. The adversarial back-andforth between interest groups, when it works, helps filter information
naturally by eliminating some of the peripheral or poorly supported
arguments and sharpening the discussion of issues most critical to
decisionmaking. It thus not only revives the possibility for more
balanced decisions within the agency but also helps make the debates
and contests more accessible to a broader audience, including the
322
media, thereby improving the operation of the political process.
Although an adversarial approach to regulatory deliberations is
323
inefficient and creates a range of problems, it is, and likely will
remain, a primary mechanism for ensuring administrative
324
accountability. Therefore, the most straightforward approach for

supra note 52 (describing four types of politics (boardroom, hearing room, street-level, and
operating room) that arise depending on the relative salience and complexity of the subject
matter). In fact, some of the sharpest criticisms of Professor Sunstein and then-Judge Breyer’s
work take issue with their tendency to overgeneralize about the regulatory state from their
more narrow examples of problematic rulemaking and to ignore the dominant role of industry
in their analysis. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING passim (2005) (systematically
arguing against the use of cost-benefit analysis as urged by Professor Sunstein and others);
David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution, 74
B.U. L. REV. 365, 376–81 (1994) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 209) (questioning Judge
Breyer’s neglect of interest group politics in his analysis and suggesting that this is a serious
omission); Eric J. Gouvin, A Square Peg in a Vicious Circle: Stephen Breyer’s Optimistic
Prescription for the Regulatory Mess, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 482–83 (1995) (reviewing
BREYER, supra note 209) (criticizing Judge Breyer’s analysis for totally ignoring public choice
theory); Lisa Heinzerling, Justice Breyer’s Hard Look, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 767, 767 (1995)
(arguing “that the set of agency decisions that are ‘in fact highly irrational’ is, for Breyer, small
but not empty” (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 395 (1986))); Stephen F. Williams, Risk Regulation and Its Hazards, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1498, 1503–06 (1995) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 209) (criticizing Judge
Breyer for neglecting to account for interest group politics in his analysis).
322. See generally Nathanson, supra note 42 (explaining that policy arguments must be both
socially and scientifically credible).
323. See generally KAGAN, supra note 150 (studying the problems that the adversarial
process introduces into American law); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1670, 1686 (describing the
rulemaking process as muddled by competition between governmental authority and private
autonomy and by inadequate consideration of important interests).
324. Implicit in this effort to reinforce pluralistic processes (though as will be discussed, that
is not the sole ingredient to reform) is the argument that adversarialism should not be dismissed
across the board and is sometimes beneficial (at least in settings in which there are no
alternatives for sharpening the deliberations). Cf. KAGAN, supra note 150, at 226 (conceding the
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reform is to revitalize the pluralistic process in these complex
rulemakings.
Figure 3. Matching Reforms Tied to the Adverse Consequences of
Information Capture

A second type of reform circumvents adversarial processes
altogether and instead proposes a litigation-free space in which
regulators are expected to innovate and devise effective regulatory
solutions free of constraints imposed by interest group pressures. One
of the disadvantages of rigorous adversarial processes, even when
they work, is that the participants’ agenda can control the regulators’

benefits of adversarial legalism with respect to its potential to “give all interests a voice,” but
arguing that, when used without limits, it “can make the government disproportionately
responsive to those who do wield” the mechanisms of adversarial legalism). In situations in
which information costs are likely to rise very high and the parties are equally matched,
adversarialism may be one of the best mechanisms available to control information costs,
particularly if these costs have grown higher than can be realistically addressed through other
means.
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framework for thinking about the problem. This reform would create
an opportunity for the agency to initiate the regulatory project
without the constraints imposed by interest groups. Indeed, under this
reform, the agency would not only have the opportunity but would
also be required to consider regulatory alternatives free from
stakeholder and legal distractions.
A third reform proposes a triage strategy that divides and
conquers dominant participants who have captured the process by
using competition-based strategies to pit them against one another.
Specifically, some first movers among the regulated sector can enjoy
advantages in the market and regulatory process by identifying gaps
in regulatory coverage that, when filled, give them a competitive edge
over laggards. This competition-based approach is particularly useful
for redressing the more deeply embedded information capture
problems of the past because it provides incentives for heavily
invested parties to penetrate enormous rulemaking records. The net
result, however, is that the public benefits because these parties’
efforts will ultimately highlight areas of slippage and thus ensure that
regulations do not drift too far from their statutory and public
missions.
A. Reforms to Reinvigorate Pluralistic Engagement in Rulemakings
Although existing administrative procedures impose no filter on
the information used to support the rulemaking process, there
appears to be an assumption that some filtering will nevertheless take
place through pluralistic oversight. The problem with this assumption
is that in some, and perhaps many, settings, the information-related
costs associated with participation are so high that an entire sector of
affected interests may not be able to participate. When this happens,
the adversarial process breaks down, leading to information capture.
There are several ways to reinvigorate more balanced and
diverse interest group engagement in complicated rulemakings. This
Section discusses each in turn.
1. A Participation-Based Standard for Judicial Review. Given
that the courts inadvertently create many of the incentives for
regulatory participants to engage in information capture, correcting
the standards for judicial review should be a top priority. The courts’
current approach to judicial review is to evaluate the agency’s rule
based on the information filed by interest groups in protest to the rule
and to determine, as a substantive matter, whether the agency’s

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

FILTER FAILURE

1407

325

response was arbitrary. Agencies risk being reversed if their final
rule is considered inadequate in light of a significant comment raised
on the proposal.
The proposal here shifts the courts’ focus from substance to
326
process. The proposed reform links the standard for review to the
rigor of interest group engagement in a rulemaking. Rulemakings
dominated by one set of interests from start to finish would trigger a
skeptical review. On the other hand, if the underlying interest group
representation was healthy, vigorous, and diverse, the court would
create a strong presumption in favor of the result the agency reached.
The logic behind the approach is that a robust, pluralistic process
is likely to discipline the agency’s outcomes and results. By contrast,
when it is evident that the development of the rules did not involve
diverse participation from affected interest groups, the courts are
needed to ensure that the deals incorporated into the rule do not
stray too far from the statutory goals. Indeed, for rules that are
developed without strong political oversight and adversarial vetting,
the courts may be the last hope in providing some accountability.
The standard for review, then, would depend on the robustness
of interest group participation in the rulemaking. See Figure 4. If a
diverse and balanced group of affected parties is involved throughout
the rulemaking, then the agency’s rule would be afforded
considerable deference from the court—a “[s]oft [g]lance” or
327
something similar. On the other hand, if one party dominates all
phases of the rulemaking and then sues the agency for failing to make
certain accommodations based on its comments, the court would have

325. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
326. Professor Rubin’s idea of breaking the ties between rulemaking and stakeholder
comments helped generate some of this Article’s recommendations. See Rubin, supra note 119,
at 157 (arguing that rulemaking should be dictated by “instrumental rationality, rather
than . . . public participation”). Specifically, Professor Rubin proposes a significant shift in the
basis for judicial review that parallels, or at least seems quite complementary to this proposal
because it tries to break the link between stakeholder pressure and regulatory analysis. See id. at
157–63. As discussed in note 375, infra, however, there are some significant differences that lead
the proposals in slightly different directions with respect to redressing information capture.
327. Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2371 (2002);
see also id. at 2372 (agreeing with Professor Sunstein on the idea of a more deferential standard
of review in which “courts should play an exceedingly deferential role” and “should give
agencies the benefit of every reasonable doubt” (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of
Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2259 (2002))). In an earlier article, Professor McGarity provided
greater elaboration on how this more deferential test might work. Under his formulation, judges
would adopt the posture of a “pass-fail” professor reviewing a research paper about a complex
problem on a topic outside her field of expertise. McGarity, supra note 146, at 1452–54.
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a strong presumption against the challenger. In this case, the court
would afford the agency still more deference, along the lines of the
clear error standard used in the appeal of fact from jury trials. By
contrast, if a challenger was unable to engage in the rulemaking
process because it lacked sufficient resources or specialized
knowledge, but its members took a great interest in the consequences
of the rule, then the court (almost like it treats parties proceeding pro
se) would adopt a presumption in favor of the challenger’s petition
and afford the rule a hard look. Effectively, the courts’ review—
ranging from hard look to considerable deference—would be
calibrated to the robustness of the pluralistic process.
Figure 4. A Flow Chart of the Participation-Based Standard for
Judicial Review

At present, there appears to be little connection between the
robustness of the pluralistic process and the level of scrutiny afforded
to an agency’s rule. Instead, the rigor of the agency’s process is

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

FILTER FAILURE

1409

evaluated only with regard to whether the agency complied with a
short checklist of APA requirements, like providing a publicly
accessible record, providing ample opportunity for notice and
comment, and so on. The apparent assumption underlying the courts’
process-based review is “if you build it [an open and transparent
administrative system], they will come.” If, as it now seems, many
affected interests might not come when information capture has taken
328
hold of the rulemaking process, the courts’ obligation to dig deeper
into the record to evaluate the rigor of the pluralistic process seems
inescapable.
This participation-based standard for judicial review thus seeks
to use the courts to help level inherent participatory imbalances,
rather than allowing them to aggravate these imbalances, however
unwittingly. If the agency is not attentive to vigorous engagement by
the full range of affected parties, for example, it would risk a hard
look review of its rule if one of the underrepresented groups decides
to file a challenge. Indeed, because of this risk, the agency would have
litigation-based incentives to take the comments of underrepresented
parties quite seriously, despite their small number. Even more
importantly, they would have strong incentives to reach out and
engage groups that are likely to be underrepresented in the
rulemaking process. The retention of hard look review thus reserves
an important role for courts when important affected interests are
absent and when the likelihood for democratic lapses, whether
inadvertent or deliberate, are high.
Calibrating the judicial review standard to the level of pluralistic
participation in the rulemaking process may even provide dominant
stakeholders with some incentives to engage their adversaries in the
substance of a rulemaking. If dominant stakeholders wish to threaten
the agency with a credible risk of reversal by the courts (that is, a soft
glance review standard rather than clear error), they would need their
adversaries to be present at least during the notice-and-comment
period. Incentives for balanced involvement in the rulemaking
process might at least partly counteract the incentives these same
stakeholders currently have, via information capture, to overwhelm
adversaries with voluminous information about specialized issues and

328. This in fact seemed clear at least to political scientists more than two decades ago. See
Gormley, supra note 52.
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contestations that weigh down the rulemaking and make it less
329
accessible.
The recommended adjustment to judicial review—tying judicial
deference to the robustness of the pluralistic process—might even
make judicial review more predictable. A number of commentators
have suggested that the uncertainty associated with judicial review
330
causes some of the most serious problems in agency behavior. This
uncertainty can cause agencies to act defensively, bloating the record
and rule well out of proportion to what is necessary. Even more
importantly, stakeholders can take advantage of the situation by using
the threat of judicial review as a strategic tool, even when their claims
331
are weak. To the extent that the test suggested here can be
implemented in a more consistent and predictable way than the
current approach to judicial review, it will reduce at least some of this
332
uncertainty.

329. Cf. Elliott, supra note 176, at 1495–96 (“If the notice-and-comment procedure is to
function to promote genuine dialogue, as opposed to merely giving parties a chance to put their
objections and the agency’s answers on the record for judicial review, it will have to be reengineered to promote the substance of dialogue through the process of representation.”).
330. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 114, at 165 (concluding that the most commentators
“seem to argue that the real impediment created by judicial review is uncertainty”); see also
supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text.
332. Given that judicial review can be employed not only to alter the rule but also to delay
the proceedings and forestall compliance costs or other unwanted outcomes, the proposal will
not protect against all information-related abuses. An additional adjustment to this pluralisticbased review standard would attempt to reduce even more of the benefit (and incentive) for
using litigation in part as a way to delay rulemaking. The most obvious approach would be to
keep the final rule in place pending ultimate reversal by the courts, or even better, to delay the
ability of a stakeholder to bring a case until it is ripe and imposes specific losses on a party.
Professor Mashaw persuasively argues for the complete elimination of preenforcement review,
not only to redress some of this strategic abuse, but also to reduce some of the uncertainties
faced by the courts in resolving preenforcement challenges. See MASHAW, supra note 114, at
177–80 (suggesting that altering the timing of judicial review may help reverse the strong
incentives that some parties have to challenge rules excessively). If the parties must wait for a
tangible harm to the challenger, then in adjudicating the claim, the court will be presented with
real facts rather than abstracted argument and hypothetical worries. See id. As Professor
Mashaw concedes, however, there are risks associated with legally requiring parties to comply
with a contested standard, only to determine through a legal challenge filed years later that the
standards were in fact set arbitrarily high. See id. Ultimately, additional research on past cases
and settlements may reveal that the risks of eliminating preenforcement review are quite
inflated and that the harm in most cases of delaying litigation will be trivial or at least not very
significant. Alternatively, higher sanctions could be imposed on a party for petitioning for
judicial review when a court later finds the claims to be largely nonmeritorious. This more timid
proposal might be the best way to begin, as it presents the fewest risks of unintended side
effects.
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This calibrated approach to judicial review is not a panacea,
however. A number of impediments must be addressed if the reform
is to be successful. First, the courts would need a way to determine,
with some consistency, when this imbalance has occurred. This
involves first identifying who the potential affected groups are and
fitting them into categories of affected interests. Conveniently, for
most environmental rulemakings, categorizing participants according
333
to the interests they represent should not be difficult. Second, the
test requires determining when the ratio between a dominant group
and other affected parties constitutes an unacceptable imbalance. For
a variety of reasons, this point of imbalance must be more dramatic
than simply the point at which the number of commenters from
industry are slightly greater or fewer than the number of commenters
334
from public interest groups. Instead, imbalance would need to be a
point at which, for example, the ratio of one set of affected parties
relative to the other set is four to one, ten to one, or even twenty-five
to one. Under current docket rules, the comment process may
provide the appropriate place to assess this balance or imbalance. If
docketing were required for all communications, including those
occurring during the pre-NPRM stage, then all contacts could be
added from the rulemaking docket to determine the extent to which
participation is balanced or imbalanced.
Even with relatively clear rules for determining imbalance and
the corresponding standard for review, there will be inevitable
variations in how courts employ the applicable soft glance or hard
look tests. These variations, however, are likely to be more modest
and less worrisome than the current roulette-like variations in the
courts’ opinions, which range from hard look to super deference,
335
depending on the panel.
If the recommended reform were

333. For example, empirical studies of stakeholder participation in EPA rulemakings by
Professor Coglianese, supra note 47, and Professors Yackee & Yackee, supra note 247, did not
suggest any difficulty with categorizing stakeholders into affected groups.
334. Such a point of imbalance would mean that the use of “soft glance” is the exception
rather than the rule because rarely would rules receive this kind of balanced vetting.
335. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. At the Supreme Court level, it is
possible that clearer tests may not overcome the lack of structure and consistency in applying
the various deference tests. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge & Connor N. Raso, Chevron as a
Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Test of What Motivates Judges in Agency Deference Cases
(Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Jul. 28, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1440392 (finding motive-based explanations for the Supreme Court’s varying
approaches to judicial review of agency decisions). It seems plausible, however, that the use of

WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC

1412

3/4/2010 2:04:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1321

implemented, this variation would at least be within categories of a
single standard of review, rather than the full range of possible
standards.
There are other possible problems with practical implementation
of
this
proposal.
First,
although
a
party’s
dramatic
underrepresentation creates the risk of hard look review, a party that
is not present at all in notice and comment (that is, its presence is
336
zero) would lose the opportunity to sue because it lacks standing.
As an unintended side effect, then, the proposal might make the
agency and dominant stakeholders more, not less, eager to use
information capture as a means of cutting underrepresented groups
out of the rulemaking process. The solution here might be to broaden
standing to include, in extreme cases, those parties who did not file
comments but who have a compelling reason to enlist the courts in
review and can justify their inactivity during the notice-and-comment
period.
Second, a collection of stakeholders, particularly public interest
groups, may actually game the revised approach by holding back on
their comments during notice and comment in the hope of using the
hard look threat against the agency later, during litigation (or
settlement negotiations). Although this does not seem likely for a
337
host of reasons, the suggested rules do open the door to this new

clear guidelines in the appellate courts could improve the state of judicial review at this critical
level of agency review.
336. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. This may not be unusual. The
Coglianese study found that environmental groups provided comments on only 44 percent of
the EPA rules governing hazardous waste handling and disposal during the period under study;
industry, by contrast, provided comments on 96 percent of the rules. See Coglianese, supra note
47, at 50 tbl.2-2. State and local regulators may have been involved in the 56 percent of
rulemakings that lacked public interest representations, thus picking up the slack for their
absence. It is possible, however, that for at least a significant set of rules—say 30 percent or so—
there was no public interest representation at all, either by the nonprofits or by government
regulators who sometimes (though not always) step in the shoes of the public interest.
337. If some of the current figures are correct, then industry, if it used this strategy, would
be able to file very few comments—perhaps no more than one comment among themselves—to
be considered underrepresented relative to environmental groups. See Coglianese, supra note
47, at 48 (observing in his study that the relative ratio of industry to public interest commenters
was about fifteen to one, whereas the ratio of industry to state or local regulators was about
three to one). The public interest groups, by contrast, would have to come to terms with the
delay that resulted from their legal challenge. This might not be problematic, however, for rules
for which delay is actually environmentally beneficial (when standards are being loosened,
rather than strengthened). It also may not be terribly problematic if the public interest group is
petitioning for suit with the intention of settling the case swiftly, and thus plans to use the threat
only to gain more concessions from the agency through post-rule negotiations.
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type of strategic action. The solution here may be to add a more
rigorously enforced good faith requirement to the petition process.
The petitioners would need to explain why they were not able to
participate more vigorously during the rulemaking process and
convince the court that they were proceeding in good faith in the
challenge that followed.
Third, some stakeholders might be tempted to further redirect
their energies from formally participating in the process during notice
and comment to informally communicating with the agency,
particularly during the pre-NPRM stage of the rulemaking. The
corrective in this case could be to require a complete accounting of all
interest group participation occurring throughout the entire life cycle
of the rule’s development and to have the courts consider those
338
docketed communications when assessing imbalance. Additionally,
the courts could overrule current precedent that requires the
proposed rule to be reopened for comment if the agency makes
339
material changes in a final rule. Instead, material changes (provided
they result from comments) would be allowed as long as the changes
do not substantially handicap one or more affected parties in
significant and inequitable ways.
If this revised approach to judicial review still seems sensible
once the kinks are worked out, it could be implemented interstitially
by the courts or, ideally, passed into law as an amendment to the
APA. A congressional amendment would provide the clearest and
most democratic way to usher in the new approach to judicial review.
340
This may be politically unrealistic, however. The courts could also
make many of these recommended changes through their
interpretative authority; indeed, in most cases, this Article’s proposals
341
simply scale back previous judicial inventions.
Incremental
experimentation by the courts may, in fact, be desirable to give the
approach a test run before it becomes codified as law.

338. See supra notes 334–35 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text.
340. Such a revision to the APA may not be amenable to industry because it would curb
some of their gains from defects in the system over the last four decades. This could fracture
congressional support for what would otherwise seem a bipartisan, process-neutral amendment.
341. Cf. Pierce, supra note 155, at 910–20 (arguing that the Supreme Court should abolish
three administrative law doctrines: limits on ex parte communication between agencies and
interested parties during informal rulemaking; bans on bias and prejudgment of issues by agency
officials; and requirements that (a) a final rule be the logical outgrowth of the rulemaking
process, and (b) the agency disclose all data and studies relied upon in forming the final rule).
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2. Appointed Advocates or Adjudicators to Replace the Lack of
Balanced Engagement. Reformed judicial review may help encourage
more pluralistic engagement in rulemakings, but it will not be
sufficient to ensure that missing interests are represented in all
rulemakings vulnerable to information capture. A more
comprehensive, but also more costly, method to redress pluralistic
imbalance would deploy government intermediaries—agencyselected ombudsmen, advocates, advisory groups or even
administrative law judges (ALJs)—to stand in for significantly
affected interests that might otherwise be underrepresented in
rulemakings. The concept of formal, government-provided advocates
342
in these types of settings is not new. In fact, the proposal has some
of the flavor of the Small Business Reform Act, which institutes a
rather elaborate network to ensure that the interests of small
343
businesses are adequately considered.
There are different ways that this type of government
intermediary might ensure that missing interests are represented.
Agency ombudsmen or advocates acting on behalf of missing
interests could scrutinize all rulemakings to ensure, for example, that
the agency is considering not just the economic costs of standards but
also the public health benefits, particularly with regard to vulnerable
344
populations. If these interests are not adequately considered in the

342. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1711 (discussing, with some reservations, the possible
use of a specialized, high-level government advocate to represent diffuse interests); see also id.
at 1761 n.439 (providing a relatively extensive bibliography of proposals in the early 1970s for
the creation of advocate agencies to represent the interests of poor or other underrepresented
groups in consumer protection and related proceedings).
343. The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
110 Stat. 857, was based in part on a concern that information excesses precluded smaller
businesses from keeping up with bigger competitors in the provision of regulation. See id.
§§ 202–03, 110 Stat. at 857–58 (finding that small businesses were disproportionately burdened
by current regulatory procedures and declaring the intention of simplifying the regulatory
process and making it more cooperative and accessible to small businesses). The Act, among
other things, provides small businesses with an agency ombudsman and related advocates to
help protect their interests. See, e.g., Thomas O. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 123, 131 (1997) (describing these qualities of the
Act).
344. The need for adequate representation in public health and environmental regulation is
at least as pressing for communities located in areas with heavy pollutant loads as it is for small
businesses, for example. Currently these groups—without or even with legal assistance—
confront a wall of complexity and strategic evasion that makes it next to impossible for them to
press their claims or even determine the source of excess pollution in their communities. See,
e.g., Cappiello & Olsen, supra note 85 (commencing a five-part series on industrial pollution in
low-income Houston neighborhoods).
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proposed rule stage, the advocate would be required to file comments
and build a record for review that could be used by other regulatory
participants in the course of judicial review. Because the effectiveness
of this representation may be difficult to measure and oversee,
however, the use of government advocates may be an incomplete
remedy.
Alternatively, rulemakings that are highly technical and suffer
from imbalanced engagement during notice and comment could
trigger an advisory review process in which an expert committee is
assembled to review the rule to ensure that issues relevant to missing
affected interests (for example, diffuse public benefits such as health
345
protection) have been adequately considered in developing the rule.
As in current law, the agency would not be required to adopt the
suggestions of advisory groups, but a record would be created that
could be used as the basis for judicial review. The agency may even be
required to respond to critical advisory group opinions or risk the
chance of increased judicial scrutiny. The resulting record thus would
not only provide an added hook for judicial review challenges
brought by an underrepresented group but also should make the
346
underlying issues more accessible to the broader political process.
A hybrid rulemaking, which employs some requirements of
formal rulemakings in an informal rulemaking process, could provide
an even more rigorous mechanism for ensuring that the most
important affected interests are represented, albeit with a higher price
tag. There are many permutations, but the basic idea is for an ALJ to
preside over a hybrid rulemaking, either conducted on paper or
through a formal hearing, with the agency representing the proposed
345. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(B)–(C) (2006) (establishing that the Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee (CASAC) should review the EPA’s ambient air quality standards at fiveyear intervals). A similar type of scientific review is required for the EPA’s registration of
pesticides. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d)–(e) (2006) (requiring the Scientific Advisory Panel established
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to review the scientific
basis for major regulatory proposals concerning pesticides and to adopt peer-review procedures
for scientific studies carried out pursuant to FIFRA).
346. The EPA’s recent decision to reject CASAC’s advice on a more stringent revised
standard for fine particulates serves as a case in point. See, e.g., Erik Stokstad, EPA Draws Fire
over Air-Review Revisions, 314 SCIENCE 1672, 1672–73 (2006) (noting that criticism of the
EPA’s revision of its review policies largely stemmed from the EPA’s rejection of CASAC’s
advice to tighten air quality standards for soot); Jane Kay, EPA Ignores Advice for Annual
Limits on Tiny Soot, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=c/a/2006/09/22/MNGJBLABRM1.DTL (detailing the disappointment among
environmental and health groups when the EPA ignored a recommendation agreed to by
twenty of the twenty-two members of CASAC).
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rule and an advocate, either private or government-appointed,
commenting on weaknesses of the proposed rule from the standpoint
of underrepresented affected interests. Such a hybrid rulemaking
would provide even more formal assurance that all interests affected
by the rulemaking have received adequate consideration. Due to the
added time and cost, the hybrid process would need to be reserved
for rules that involve substantial effects on important affected
interests wholly unrepresented during the notice-and-comment
347
process. The advantage of this more formal process is that the ALJ
would issue binding decisions rather than act merely as a government
advocate or advisor.
3. Reinvigorating Representation of Underrepresented Groups
Like the Diffuse Public Interest. A less radical approach to increasing
balanced engagement in at-risk rulemakings is to subsidize
participation on specific rulemakings in which certain sets of interests,
such as those representing the diffuse public, will be otherwise
348
underrepresented.
Alternatively, rewards could be offered to
indirectly increase incentives for this same type of public-benefitting
349
For example, a monetary prize and positive
representation.
publicity could be awarded to the author of the most meaningful
public-benefitting set of comments on a complex rule, particularly if
the party approaches the issues from the perspective of improving
public health or environmental protection. Much like architectural
prizes, there could even be law school or graduate student
competitions not only for commenting on a rule but also for
350
proposing compelling policy innovations. An interest group would

347. This could be required for rules with significant implications for unrepresented affected
parties, a finding that is made along with other determinations of significance already required
under Executive Order 12,866.
348. If public interest groups are subsidized, however, it is critically important that the
subsidies require them to engage in the low-salience, highly technical rules vulnerable to
information capture rather than other more publicly visible controversies in which they are
likely to have a presence with or without public subsidies.
349. For more general discussions of the desirability of bolstering participation of the diffuse
public, see, for example, Gerald E. Frug, Administrative Democracy, in HANDBOOK OF
REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 519, 529–31 (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard D.
Schwartz eds., 1994); Steven Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict
Resolution in Public Policymaking, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178, 200–03 (1992); Robert
B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J.
1617, 1635–40 (1985).
350. Cf. EPA, P3: People, Prosperity and the Planet Student Design Competition for
Sustainability, http://www.epa.gov/ncer/p3/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
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then be permitted to challenge the rulemaking on behalf of the
winning submitter if the agency ignores those comments, and would
be entitled to reasonable attorney fees if the group substantially
prevailed in the litigation. Through these mechanisms, interest groups
and like-minded experts might find that the prospect of remuneration
provides an incentive to engage in complex rulemakings that
overcomes the disincentives of participation created by the
information capture phenomenon.
A more indirect approach to increasing the benefits of
participation for public interest groups is to raise the public visibility
of more obscure and complex environmental rulemakings. A
rulemaking that becomes newsworthy because of its public interest
implications also becomes one that interest groups will find
marketable, donor-friendly, and worthy of investment. On the other
hand, if nonprofit resources are scarce and finite, raising the salience
of one rule may simply lead the groups to withdraw their engagement
from another less-newsworthy rule.
If increasing the salience of a rule does increase the resources
available for public interest engagement, the agency under this
proposal would be required to provide an estimate of the rule’s public
health benefits and an assessment of what alternate versions of the
rule might accomplish in public health terms. For example, the agency
would be required to estimate the health and environmental benefits
that would result from the promulgation of a particular pollution
control standard and to estimate these same benefits associated with
other, alternative versions of the standard. Public health assessments
in these cases, by their nature, cannot be very detailed—the
uncertainties make this futile—but the results of a basic assessment
might help identify an informative range of possible health and
environmental consequences, at least qualitatively. Resources
currently devoted to regulatory impact assessments, which tend to
highlight the costs of regulation at the expense of assessing and
raising the visibility of public health benefits, could be used to fund
351
these public health–oriented analyses.
The regulatory impact
assessment may be a valuable innovation, but as implemented it
misses the core analytical problem with much public health and

351. Cf. Harrington et al., supra note 273 passim (providing case studies of high-profile
RIAs at the EPA that raise a number of challenging questions about the value of the RIA
process, at least as currently practiced, and open the door to considering the reallocation of
these analytical resources to more productive endeavors).
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environmental regulation—the obscure, unspecified public benefits—
and exacerbates this blind spot by focusing almost exclusively on the
costs to regulated parties.
More attention may also need to be given to the choice of
legislative standards and regulatory tools with respect to their
352
potential for increasing the salience of EPA rules. For example,
performance standards, like ambient air standards or related types of
innovations, seem more likely to engage balanced constituencies in
discussions about how they are set as compared with technology353
based standards and standards governing industrial activities and
operations (like many of the rules governing hazardous waste
354
operations in RCRA). Technology-based standards may be at
higher risk of falling prey to information capture because they involve
complex processes and because the health implications associated
355
with them are more difficult to evaluate. On the other hand, these

352. As a legislative matter, information capture may also provide a barometer to help
identify when certain added requirements on regulatory agencies are likely to improve or
instead exacerbate information capture. Evidence that a new process requirement might inflate
information costs or make a process susceptible to information capture could create a
presumption against the new process that must be overcome by the proponent. See, e.g.,
Sargentich, supra note 343, at 137 (arguing that this problem afflicts the Small Business Reform
Act); supra notes 308–12 and accompanying text. Alternatively, there could be mandatory lookback studies, perhaps every three years, prepared by the Congressional Research Service to
evaluate how various processes affect information management in the agencies and also to
determine whether they are used by a balanced constellation of groups or instead used primarily
by dominant or rich stakeholders.
353. I have been a longtime proponent of these standards. See Wagner, supra note 83.
354. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7409(b)(1) (2006). For a slightly more extended discussion of why these standards are likely to
invite a more balanced group of affected parties, see Lynn Blais & Wendy Wagner, Emerging
Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1733
(2008). These performance standards are generally premised on health outcomes or related
measures, so the salience accompanies the exercise and is harder to shake out, even with
voluminous records and very complicated and technical issues. Indeed, commentators who are
particularly enamored with performance standards as a preferred means of regulation seem to
intuitively appreciate that they work better because they are direct and goal-oriented, cutting
through the many steps and assumptions that underlie many other types of regulatory standards.
See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood Obesity Through
Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DUKE L.J. 1403, 1411–13 (2007)
(touting the virtues of performance standards, based on these general attributes, as compared to
command-and-control standards).
355. Market-based programs may also suffer from information capture if there are a number
of hidden details that determine how well the market will work or how well it will address the
health issues on the table. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 318, 320–25 (1995) (concluding, based on detailed investigation of the
congressional debates, that the title IV market “created by the 1990 Amendments owes much of
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standards have important virtues (expediency, for example) that may
significantly outweigh their vulnerability to information capture and
356
that therefore must be taken into account.
4. Information Filters on Participants. A final reform to
reinvigorate more balanced engagement by all affected interests
would encourage or even mandate flat restrictions on the information
357
that participants can load into the rulemaking process. Establishing
simple filters on the amount and type of these communications will
not solve all problems—there will still be a temptation to fill
comments with highly specialized and undigested information.
Nonetheless, establishing these filters would be a good start. At the
very least, the filters would force all participants to begin to control
information excess at the margin.
The first set of recommended reforms advocate limits on the size
of the communications that participants can share with the agency,
including minimum standards to ensure the reliability of technical
assertions. These restrictions could be quite simple—for example,
imposing page and volume limits on the filings, much like the limits
358
placed by appellate courts on appellants. Courts could also play a

its content to the influence of special interest groups” but that many of these deals were
invisible and hidden under the seemingly accessible market-based approach).
356. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 83, at 92–107 (recounting some of these virtues).
357. The possibility of infringements on the First Amendment right to free speech arising
from page and related restrictions on formal communications in the administrative process seem
unlikely, but are nevertheless conceivable. Cf. Burriola v. Nev. Dept. of Corr., No. 3:07-CV-102
JCM (VPC), 2008 WL 510231, at *6 (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2008) (discussing, without issuing a
holding on, a prisoner’s contention that page limits allegedly imposed by the prison on his
correspondence abridged his First Amendment rights and concluding ultimately that “there is
no evidence, nor does plaintiff contend, that his speech was chilled or he suffered ‘actual harm’
as a result of the denial of this general correspondence due to page limits”). If size restrictions
placed on formal administrative communications are reasonable and are likely to advance the
goals of administrative process, then the general sense seems to be that they are safe from a
successful First Amendment challenge. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free
Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1999) (observing that “[r]ules of evidence and procedure, bans on
revealing grand jury testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions for frivolous pleadings, to
name a few, are examples of speech limitations that are widely accepted as functional necessities
in the administration of justice, much like rules of order in a town meeting” and concluding
ultimately that restrictions imposed to streamline the administration of justice are typically
given wider berth under the First Amendment).
358. See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT, CHECKLIST FOR PREPARATION OF
BRIEFS AND RECORD EXCERPTS (2008), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ clerk/docs/
brchecklist.pdf (specifying very specific and strict limits on the form and size of briefs filed in
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supporting role by scrutinizing comments to ensure that the issues
raised to the agency were clear and accessible and not obscured by
dozens of detailed sub-issues. Participants could also be required to
verify the reliability of the data presented and provide supporting
analysis for critical assertions of fact. Although these suggestions are
simple, they might be quite effective in capping the amount of
359
information that a party can introduce into the regulatory system.
Evidence suggests that investing energy and time in collating,
digesting, and communicating issues in a succinct way can
dramatically improve the quality of a communication, while also
increasing the likelihood that the recipient (here, the agency) will
360
receive the intended message. As one trade association explained to
Professor Coglianese in his study:
EPA started its proposals and our comments took up a space on my
bookshelf this thick [respondent holds hands about one-and-a-half
feet apart]. So to me the fact that we whittled it down to 100 pages
[to meet the appellate court’s page limit] is pretty remarkable. There
were a lot more issues that we conceded later were not—you know
we were just whining—we didn’t have a good recommendation for
an alternative approach for EPA to take. So a lot of issues fell off
361
over the years.

Even if encouraging or requiring limits on communications does not
yield significant benefits in every case, establishing these limits would
signal that information flowing into the agencies should be restricted
and, at the very least, would initiate a conversation about how to

the Fifth Circuit). For a short discussion of the fate of possible First Amendment challenges to
such restrictions, see supra note 357.
359. This proposal also shifts primary information filtering responsibility onto participants,
who generally are best able to do this processing at the lowest cost. But see Alan Raul & Julie
Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency
Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 8 (2003) (effectively recommending that the agency be held responsible for filtering
the reliability of communications coming from affected parties).
360. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1150 (observing that information theory suggests that
“[t]he more impersonal contexts will require greater formality, so that the typical audience
member will not incur large processing costs”).
361. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 112. Another attorney conceded that the appellate brief
was unsuccessful in part because the brief writers had failed to do an adequate job of controlling
information excess: the brief “was so filled with so many issues of such a technical nature that I
think we got lost in explaining basically how simple this one [issue] was.” Id. at 111 (alteration in
original).
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encourage participants to be more concise and clear in the
information they submit to the agency.
A second, related information filter involves limiting the number
of contacts between agency staff and stakeholders throughout the
rulemaking cycle. This is probably best accomplished by requiring the
agency to log all ex parte communications into the rulemaking docket
and ensuring that detailed records of each communication are
362
available upon request. Unlike the current process, which places no
limits or recording requirements on ex parte communications
occurring before the publication of the proposed rule, a requirement
of greater transparency for communications has the potential to
improve accountability and may even cause participants engaging in
pre-NPRM contacts to use them sparingly.
Finally, the agency itself should be encouraged to filter the
communications incorporated into proposed and final rules to ensure
that the rules are accessible to a diverse, albeit sophisticated, group of
363
affected parties. As discussed earlier, the APA’s concise general
statement requirement has effectively been ignored and, if anything,
rewritten by the courts to demand a defensive, “encyclopedic”
364
statement from the agency. The judicial demands that cause the
agency to behave in this way should be significantly altered (as
365
discussed in the following Section), but the courts should also give
some meaning to the concise general statement, if for no other reason
than to signal the value of its underlying aspiration. Doing so would
involve encouraging the courts to remand rules that are too obtuse
and disjointed and that assume too high a level of technical
information for the average elite reader. The court has this authority
366
under the APA’s concise general statement clause. Although the
interpretation of such an aesthetic-based test could vary across

362. This might not be practical without a modification of the current rules discussed later,
however. Because a flat restriction on the number of communications can be circumvented
through trade associations, subsidiaries, and the like, the best approach may simply involve
requiring a complete record of all communications.
363. The proposal here does not suggest that the general public should be able to pick up
the Federal Register and understand the EPA’s perambulatory explanation of a proposed rule. It
is intended to suggest, however, that an environmental lawyer or even a law student should be
able to read a preamble and understand most of it, at least after spending a few hours with it.
364. See supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text.
365. See infra Part IV.B.
366. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
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367

judicial panels, any damage resulting from this variability would be
limited. After all, the court would be remanding the rule only for a
clearer explanation, a demand that might annoy and embarrass the
368
agency but should take no more than a month or two to satisfy.
B. Bypassing Adversarial Constraints: Policy in the Raw
Even if the previously recommended reforms are implemented,
agencies are still likely to focus most of their attention on comments
that present a credible risk of judicial review and, as a result, may
have less time to develop creative and more comprehensive solutions
to regulation. As discussed in Part III, the courts, by requiring the
agency to be responsive to all criticisms, effectively place the agency
in a reactive role. Rather than focusing its energies on developing
public-oriented regulatory policy, the agency finds instead that it must
devote most of its analysis to preparing rules that can withstand fierce
attack from an aggressive group of affected interests and respond to
the flood of information loaded into the system by these same
369
groups.
Unlike the reforms presented in the previous Section, the
proposal presented in this Section attempts to address the problems
created by information capture not by reinforcing adversarial
processes, but by circumventing them, at least at an early stage of
370
policy development.
Specifically, this policy-in-the-raw reform
requires the agency to be largely, if not completely, insulated from
stakeholders and political input during the embryonic stage of the
development of its regulatory proposal. Although affected parties
367. Such a test would require, for example, that the basic thrust and requirements of the
rule be discernable from the preamble and that important passages (like the significant changes
from the proposed rule) be comprehensible to those who otherwise lack specialized knowledge.
368. The biggest problem with this reform is that it suggests that the courts only require a
succinct statement at the final rule stage, a point at which such a demand may be the least
helpful to stakeholders. To remand a rule for lacking a “concise general statement” at the
proposed rule stage, however, would necessitate an entirely new notice-and-comment period,
which could pose a hardship on the pace of rulemaking and invite more strategic use of the
requirement by those interest groups that benefit from delay.
369. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
370. Cf. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1807 (“The only conceivable way out of the labyrinth
would seem to be a new and comprehensive theory of government and law that would
successfully reconcile our traditional ideals of formal justice, individual autonomy, and
responsible mechanisms for collective choice, with the contemporary realities of decentralized,
uncoordinated, discretionary exercises of governmental authority and substantial disparities in
the cohesiveness and political power of private interests. Such a conception may well be
unattainable, and in any event will not be achieved in the foreseeable future.”).
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would become important later in refining and even rejecting the
proposals developed during this period, they would become involved
only after the agency has had the opportunity to frame and consider
371
regulatory solutions free from their input and pressure.
Although the details are best left for a later discussion, the
policy-in-the-raw proposal in broad strokes involves a two-step ruledevelopment process. At the raw stage, a small team of highly
regarded policy wonks from inside the agency would develop a preproposal. This team would start with the statutory mandate and
372
sketch out a goal statement based on that text alone. It would then
work—essentially in complete isolation—to develop a pre-proposal
373
that best accomplishes that goal. Unlike the current approach to
rulemaking, this policy-in-the-raw stage would be led by an agency
team that is completely unconnected with and ideally not even aware
of stakeholder pressures, litigation concerns, or other legal risks
374
associated with the rulemaking. Its deliberations would be shielded
from all stakeholder input, including friendly guidance from staff in
the general counsel’s office or from politically appointed officials. The
team would also be free to approach the proposal in whatever way it
sees fit. There would be no requirement that it use analytical tools
like cost-benefit analysis, formal alternatives analyses, or other forms
of impact assessment, although the team would be free to develop or
use these analytic tools if it felt that doing so would be helpful and
consistent with the statute’s goal.
The pre-proposal developed by this team would be subject to
peer review or, as appropriate, input from a Federal Advisory

371. Cf. Rubin, supra note 119, at 157–63 (advocating for insulating the agency from
stakeholder pressure by the standard of review—an instrumental rationality standard—rather
than actually isolating the agency staff, as proposed here).
372. This is similar to the “goal statement” urged by Professor Rubin, although it is more
preliminary and is not vetted through interested parties. See id. at 163 (“A new APA should
require that a document published at the time the agency decides to proceed with rulemaking
explicitly state this goal before any effort has been made to determine the means by which the
goal should be implemented.”).
373. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1644–46 (2008) (advocating “limit[ed] contacts between political appointees
and nonmanagement career technical staff during the technical stages of regulatory
development” to improve the integrity of science used for policy).
374. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70–73 (1991) (discussing how the EPA initiates a rulemaking and
describing the composition of the initial “workgroup” that drafts the first proposal, which can
include agency lawyers who may invoke legal considerations at an early stage of proposal
development).
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Committee Act (FACA) advisory group comprised of a mix of policy
analysts and other specialists (but not stakeholders). The team would
have the option of using the comments, suggestions, and questions
raised during this review process to modify the pre-proposal, but it
would be under no obligation to do so. Any modifications would be
wholly at the agency team’s discretion, and there would be no risk of
judicial reprimand if the team chose to disregard suggestions made
during this review.
The final pre-proposal, along with the comments of peer
reviewers or the FACA committee, would be published on the
Internet and available in hard copy. The preliminary proposal would
be expected to be detailed and comprehensive, yet also accessible to
regulatory experts who lack specialized knowledge about the issues
addressed by the rule. The agency team members responsible for
preparing the pre-proposal would operate much like academics—
producing innovative yet effective proposals and enjoying
reputational rewards based on the quality of their work. Particularly
good teams or team members might find their visibility among
policymakers and academics to be enhanced when they produce
particularly inspired proposals. Ideally, the teams would attract highcaliber candidates both because the unconstrained nature of the work
would be inviting and because there would be opportunities for
individual accolades for work well done. To maintain these
reputational benefits, the team would be encouraged to develop preproposals that are detailed, thoughtful and well supported. Poor
analysis, half-baked innovations, or proposals with little support could
lead to embarrassment within the policy analysis community.
Establishing an initial raw stage for regulatory policy
development would counteract information capture in a number of
subtle but important ways. First, the proposals developed as part of
this process would likely be much more accessible to a wide group of
affected parties than existing proposals. Unlike the existing
policymaking process, which is rife with incentives to inflate
information costs (from the perspective of some stakeholders, the
more esoteric the rule the better), proposals developed in the raw
would be designed to engage a broad audience. After all, reputational
advantages will not accrue to team members if very few individuals
understand the rule. Pre-proposals developed in the raw therefore
will be written to give interested parties an appreciation of the nature
of the rulemaking project, its likely direction, and how it might fit
with other rules. Moreover, because the implications of the rule will
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be easier to understand, public interest groups will be better able to
highlight the value of their engagement for donors and members. A
more accessible and coherent proposal also provides a benchmark or
point of reference against which future (potentially more complex
and detail-oriented) proposals can be compared and evaluated. This
is a particularly valuable benefit in light of the fact that the complex
proposed and final rules discussed earlier seem inaccessible in part
because there is no clear point of entry for developing an
understanding of the relevant issues.
Second, policy in the raw allows an agency team to innovate in
ways that are decoupled from the participatory and litigation
processes. This creates the opportunity for more candid and creative
analysis. Similar to the proposal advanced by Professor Rubin for an
“instrumental rationality” approach to rulemaking, the agency would
focus on the policy puzzle at hand during the raw stage of
policymaking, rather than on simply anticipating and reacting to what
375
the stakeholders might say about its proposal.
Finally, the raw period of policy development provides the
agency with a litigation-free zone for conducting meaningful
alternatives assessments on competing proposals. Currently, agency
lawyers and political advisors appear to exert a heavy hand in the
agency self-assessments required under Executive Order or by
statute. These advisors rightfully worry that an agency’s honest
evaluation of its proposal against alternatives may actually put its
preferred policies at risk by exposing important advantages of
375. As mentioned in note 372, supra, Professor Rubin also proposes a policymaking
process that strives to decouple the process from stakeholders by basing judicial review on
“whether the rule that the agency has promulgated is likely to achieve its stated goal.” See
Rubin, supra note 119, at 163. Professor Rubin sees this instrumental rationality goal
operationalized, at least in part, through cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 159–61. Unlike Professor
Rubin’s approach, however, the judicial review approach proposed here is more deferential to
the agency on the substance of its rule, and the pre-proposal is insulated from stakeholders
entirely and is also largely free of any threat of judicial review other than ensuring that the raw
proposal is completed. Although both approaches seem eager to provide the agency with more
incentives to develop comprehensive, intelligent, and innovative policies, this proposal is
concerned exclusively with the problem of information capture. By contrast, because
information capture is not among the evils that Professor Rubin considers, see id. at 162–63, his
proposals are largely insensitive to the danger—and some facets of his proposal may risk
exacerbating these problems, at least for the subset of rules susceptible to information capture.
See, e.g., id. at 164–65 (recommending early involvement of stakeholders and harder look by
courts, which together could perpetuate information capture in at-risk rules); see also id. at 164
(“There is evidence . . . that the influence of special interests on government decision makers is
less disproportionate than is often assumed, and the multiplicity of voices may ultimately
counterbalance each other.” (footnote omitted)).
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competing approaches that might otherwise have gone unnoticed by
376
opponents. Conducting analyses in an environment free from these
political and litigation pressures at the very early stages of a
rulemaking should result in a more meaningful assessment of
377
alternatives.
The crux of this proposal is to establish an early, unconstrained
period of policy development during which the agency can develop
one or more basic proposals for addressing the regulatory problem at
hand. How this pre-proposal then fits into the existing rulemaking
process warrants further discussion. One approach would be to use
the pre-proposal as the principle background document upon which
the proposed rule is based. A team of EPA staff (including
representatives from the program office and the general counsel’s
office) would ground the proposal in light of various interest group
inputs and legal constraints. This team could alter or even reject the
pre-proposal in its entirety in the development of the proposed rule.
To afford the pre-proposal some stature and significance, however,
there should be a presumption that the pre-proposal would form the
basis for the proposed rule. The agency would need to explain in the
preamble of its proposed and final rules why it chose to deviate in
significant ways from the pre-proposal. These explanations, in turn,
would be subject to judicial review.
It bears mention that this policy-in-the-raw recommendation
parallels negotiated rulemaking but takes essentially the opposite
tack. In negotiated rulemaking, the agency identifies the major
378
interested parties and meets with them to negotiate a proposed rule.
Here, rather than looking to the stakeholders to assist in developing a
regulatory proposal, the policy-in-the-raw approach eschews the use
of stakeholders during the initial stages of policy development unless
specific information is needed. The hope is that policies developed in
the raw will be more complete and targeted than proposals that are
developed based on the idiosyncratic concerns of selected interest

376. Wendy Wagner, The Clean Air Interstate Rule RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy
Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 82, at 56, 59–60
(detailing these litigation-based incentives in the RIA process).
377. See, e.g., Harrington et al., supra note 82, at 224–25 (proposing that RIAs be done
somewhat earlier in the process to ensure that they provide a meaningful analysis of
alternatives).
378. See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006) (establishing a framework for the conduct of negotiated
rulemaking).
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379

groups. The resulting proposal should also be much clearer and
more accessible with respect to the logic and assumptions underlying
380
the rule. Likewise, the contribution the rule makes to the protection
of health and the environment should be more explicit and easy to
understand.
C. Competition-Based Regulation
Thus far, this Article’s reforms have addressed the substantive
implications of information capture: the lack of balanced oversight
and engagement in complex rules and the inability of the agency to
think comprehensively or creatively about the regulatory task at
hand. This final set of reform proposals attempts to address the more
deeply embedded ways that information capture may take hold of the
process itself. Noble goals of greater administrative transparency can
381
actually be surreptitiously used to facilitate information capture.
Moreover, as information continues to be loaded into the system, the
system may become so bloated and overwhelmed that it is difficult to
382
reverse the information avalanche. The reforms in this Section
attempt to target these problems—namely, the potential for abuse of
open government provisions and the information avalanche that can
result.
Rather than engage the missing interests more adversarially or
impose filters on participants’ regulatory communications, this final
reform attempts to scramble the incentives of the most engaged and
powerful interest groups and pit these otherwise like-minded interests
against one another. Specifically, the proposal takes a divide-andconquer approach to rectifying more entrenched forms of information
379. Judge Wald, for example, expresses concern about the consensual nature of negotiated
rulemaking and the after-the-fact nature of the agency's explanation for a proposed regulation:
“The consensus could also be pure political logrolling . . . rather than rational decisionmaking.”
Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (1985).
380. Concerns have been raised about the public accessibility of negotiated rulemakings.
See, e.g., William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public
Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 79 (1987) (expressing concern over the
EPA’s preamble being an “after-the-fact rationale attempting to justify decisions made by the
negotiating committee for reasons we can never know”); id. at 88–89 (discussing the adverse
impact on public participation resulting specifically from the negotiation of scientific
information and methodology); Derek R. McDonald, Note, Judicial Review of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 12 REV. LITIG. 467, 477–78 (1993) (discussing the concern that the public is not
adequately included in negotiated rulemakings).
381. See supra Part III.B.2.
382. See supra Part III.B.3.
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capture. By creating an adversarial climate within the most vigorous
and unified coalition, the reform essentially creates fresh incentives
for talented and resourceful advocates to whittle down the record to a
manageable size and to use transparency and open government not to
overwhelm regulatory participants but to better isolate problems with
competitors’ positions.
Competition-based regulation, like pluralism, thus relies on a
somewhat unconventional adversarial process to address the
383
problems of information capture. But unlike the reforms for
reinvigorating pluralistic engagement in proposed rulemakings
presented previously, ensuring a diverse mix of affected parties is not
important to this reform. Rather, this proposal focuses instead on
dividing and conquering those parties that have successfully used
information capture in the past by creating competition among
384
them.
Competition-based regulation is easiest to understand in the
context of product licensing. In current product licensing, the EPA
determines which products are not “unreasonably unsafe” (or the
equivalent) through complex and generally unopposed processes that
often involve only the manufacturers of the product at issue. Because
these manufacturers may dominate the procedures, the EPA’s
deliberations may not benefit from pluralistic oversight. As a result,
there is a risk that the agency’s decisions will diverge from both

383. Information specialists may have other organization-based or process-based
suggestions for how past information excesses can be brought under control in the future. If a
rule remains highly complex and opaque, even after implementation, then information audits
may be used to clarify or sort the issues according to their significance and to reduce
unnecessary ambiguities or technical details in the future. These systems may also help organize
the constant influx of administrative materials by, for example, sorting documents and inputs
according to their materiality, reliability, and relevance with different electronic signatures for
high-, medium-, and low-quality filings based on these factors (material, reliable, relevant).
Regardless of how this is accomplished, the point here is simply that these types of
informational economics should be brought to bear with some force on the administrative state.
As Professor Simon observes: “When we find the right way to summarize and characterize that
information—when we find the pattern hidden in it—its vast bulk compresses into succinct laws,
each one enormously informative.” SIMON, supra note 19, at 227. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article to identify how these types of informational management schemes might be
implemented, it appears that the capacity to accomplish this type of informational downsizing
and filtering, even for existing rules, exists and could prove helpful.
384. See Wendy E. Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data
Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629 passim (2008) (providing a fuller version of this proposal); see also DAVID
DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 153–61 (2003) (introducing
the idea of a competitive-based private claim available to first-movers to recoup costs associated
with environmental innovation).
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statutory goals and what rigorous factfinding might otherwise reveal
due to information capture.
The EPA does not have the resources to review these past
decisions, and even if it did, it seems unlikely that reviews would
involve participation from a diverse set of interest groups. The
alternative here attempts to devise ways to encourage the regulated
parties themselves to challenge licensing decisions that are too
lenient. Specifically, the manufacturer of a green product could file a
petition alleging that a competitor’s product, which occupies the same
market niche, is much more hazardous in a variety of ways and
therefore should be regulated more stringently. The types of
regulatory requirements that might be imposed on this inferior
competitor could range from labeling requirements (that highlight the
risks associated with using the product relative to superior products)
to actually banning the inferior product if its risks are unreasonable in
light of the alternatives. The process would be initiated by a petition
filed by the green company and would involve an adjudicatory
hearing in which the manufacturers would battle each other on the
facts. The EPA would make a final decision on the merits and issue
385
regulations accordingly.
A similar process might be established for reviewing pollution
control standards. A green company could petition the EPA to set
more stringent limits for discharges from a category of industry
because of the ready availability of green methods and technologies
that significantly reduce pollution below permitted levels.
One of this approach’s key attributes is that it provides incentives
for adversaries to dredge up useful information regarding optimal
environmental solutions that might otherwise be lost in the mounds of
undigested regulatory filings. By relying on manufacturers to root out
information on inferior competitors, and providing a forum for
establishing more stringent regulation of those competitors, the
proposal unleashes energy that those outside the competitive process,
386
including regulators, will have difficulty duplicating. An added
385. EPA regulators would adjudicate these competitive claims through adversarial hearings
in formal rulemaking fashion. If a product is certified as superior, the certification could be
useful not only to consumers but also to insurers and investors, and might even ward off tort
litigation by indicating that the manufacturer produced at least a “reasonable alternative
design.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
386. Undoubtedly, manufacturers will sometimes overstate the risks of competitor products,
but adversarial adjudications help protect against this overstatement by providing competitors
with a full opportunity to rebut or disprove allegations of risk.
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benefit of this approach is that market forces will help triage the
regulatory process. Competitive energy will focus on the worst
products and processes (for example, those for which green
alternatives have the greatest competitive edge). The striking
similarity of this proposal with recent proposals for competitionbased reform of the patent system—in which non-patent holders
could file petitions to cancel a patent as invalid—attests to
policymakers’ increasing recognition of the valuable role market
387
forces can serve in supporting regulatory decisions and processes.
The petition process could also be open to any party willing to
bring a case against an inferior product, not just the manufacturers or
other regulated parties who stand to benefit financially. Thus, if
industry proves reluctant to engage in the process but there are
established differences between products, public interest advocates
388
could press the charge in their stead. In these settings, in which the
petitioner is not the company standing to profit monetarily from the
claim, the petitioner could also be awarded attorney fees for
substantially prevailing, as well as a possible bonus fee to be paid at
the discretion of the superior company as an expected but not
389
mandated thank you.

387. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 321 (2007) (providing that
anyone “who is not the patent owner may file with the Office a petition for cancellation seeking
to institute a post-grant review proceeding to cancel as unpatentable any claim of a patent”); see
also COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 96–97 (Stephen A. Merrill,
Richard Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (“The committee recommends that Congress
seriously consider legislation creating an Open Review procedure, enabling third parties to
challenge the validity of issued patents on any grounds in an administrative proceeding within
the USPTO.”).
388. See Wagner, supra note 384, at 643–44 (discussing an example based on asphalt
sealant).
389. Although the competitive-based approach to regulation targets existing products and
regulations, it might also be available to work prospectively in cases in which regulated
participants are well established and new regulations—perhaps climate change or
nanotechnology—are coming along the pike. In these settings, if the agency has several
alternative proposals that emerge from its rulemaking process, there could be a brief six-month
or one-year window during which competitors could advocate for the most ambitious proposal
to establish a market edge. Some of this adversarialism may emerge (or be squelched) in
comment periods; but by attaching a clear reward to the claim or position, it may draw
competitors out of the closet and turn them against one another.
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CONCLUSION
A commitment to open government and equal access is
appropriately central to the administrative process, and these
objectives remain the continuing focus of legislators, administrators,
and the courts. The assumption that these goals alone will ensure
accountable government, however, has generally been taken for
granted; and over time, it has become increasingly evident that
significant design flaws are emerging in the system that threaten to
undermine these objectives. Chief among these design flaws is
administrative law’s obliviousness to the impact that excessive
information can have on the effective functioning of the system.
There are no provisions in administrative law for regulating the flow
of information entering or leaving the system or for ensuring that
regulatory participants can keep up with the rising tide of issues,
details, and technicalities. Indeed, a number of doctrinal refinements
intended originally to ensure that executive branch decisions are
made in the sunlight inadvertently create incentives to overwhelm the
administrative system with information. Rather than illuminating the
process, these reams of comments and reports replete with
inaccessible techno-jargon create a dark cloud that obscures the
decisionmaking process and ultimately undermines pluralistic
oversight, productive judicial review, and opportunities for intelligent
agency decisionmaking.
A number of public-benefitting rules emerging from the
regulatory state may be influenced heavily by only one set of
interests—typically
regulated
parties—with
little
to
no
counterpressure to ensure that the public interest is represented or
protected. The result is information capture: embedded participatory
imbalances that emerge from the administrative legal system’s infinite
tolerance of and even tendency to encourage information excess.
Information capture allows strategic parties to effect considerable
control over the agency’s priorities and the substance of regulatory
decisionmaking. Even more insidious, under the right circumstances
this information capture occurs even if the dominant participants are
not trying to manipulate the system.
Information may have been a scarce commodity in the 1940s
when the foundation for the administrative state was being laid, but
this is no longer the case. Existing administrative processes suffer
from too much rather than too little information. Other areas of law
have developed rules that explicitly discourage parties from playing
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strategic games with information and encourage communications
between participants to be productive and efficient. It is past time for
the administrative system to take note and change its ways.

